The Brazilian Experience

TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE BRAZILIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

Bruno Mello Souza, Carlos Artur Gallo

INTRODUCTION

From an institutional point of view, since the second half of the 1980s, Brazil has rebuilt its political system, gradually coming closer to practices typically associated with the liberal-democrat-ic regime (existence of a competitive party system, freedom of opposition, promotion of regular elections, some civil and political rights guarantee, etc.). The reconstruction of political institutions in the country and their reconnection with the democratic system were carried out during a long political process of transition, which began in 1974, during the civil-military dictatorship in Brazil. The end of the authoritarian regime in the country, which lasted from 1964 to 1985, did not mean, however, an immediate restoration of democracy, nor the end of practices and norms established and/or impacted by the dictatorship.

Considering that, this chapter has as its main objective to draw an overview of the transformations that took place in the Brazilian political system after the end of the civil-military dictatorship and carry out a diagnosis, identifying the advances, setbacks and challenges present in the country’s political sphere. Therefore, the analysis is divided in five sections. The first two sections focus on the historical background of the 1964 coup and the main characteristics and impacts of the dictatorship on the Brazilian political system. The third section presents an overview of the process of transition to democracy in the country, identifying how it occurred and paying attention to its particularities. The fourth section identifies how and when the new Brazilian political institutionality was established, and identifying its main characteristics. In the last part of the chapter, an assessment is made of the advances that the end of the dictatorship made possible in regard to the Brazilian political system and its limits.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE 1964 COUP

The construction of a democratic regime in recent Brazilian political history refers directly to the context of the political transition initiated in 1974. This does not mean, however, that democratic mechanisms have only been incorporated into the Brazilian political system from the last decades of the 20th century onwards. On the contrary, although quite limited, a previous (liberal) democratic experiment was carried out in the country between 1946 and 1964, in an international context marked by the defeat of European Nazi-fascism and, internally, by the end of the authoritarian experience of the “Estado Novo”¹ (1937–1945), commanded by Getulio Vargas.²

Before approaching how the new democratic institutionality and its main characteristics emerged, it is interesting then, for a better understanding of the antecedents of the Coup that deposed President João Goulart (1961–1964) and started a dictatorship that lasted more than two decades,³ to contextualize the period of the “liberal” experience undertaken between the 1940s and 1960s in the country.

In general terms, the Republic of 46, as the phase of republican history that began with the end of the “Estado Novo” dictatorship is commonly called, and is characterized by:

a) establishing Executive-Legislative relations in which the National Congress had superior agenda powers than those of the president, demanding broad negotiations for the government to approve his measures;

b) structuring a plural party system with a tendency towards nationalization, considering national parties; c) experiencing a new national-developmental phase marked, on the one hand, by the deepening of the country’s industrialization and, on the other, by a greater opening to foreign capital; d) for the maintenance of labor rights granted during the 1930s and 1940s; e) holding regular elections.⁴

In practice, relations between powers during the post-1946 period were quite tense, with elected officials having great difficulty in implementing their political agenda. Elections were held regularly, and the electoral calendar was obeyed until the 1960 presidential election. The promotion of elections, however, does not mean that everything went undisturbedly. On the contrary, most presidents elected during the period were subjected to high resistance before their inauguration. The succession of President Jânio Quadros, who resigned from office in August 1961, even generated an unprecedented crisis in order to guarantee the inauguration of his Vice President, João Goulart.

1. [1] The dictatorship of the “Estado Novo” was an authoritarian regime commanded by Getulio Vargas between 1937 and 1945. Close to the European corporatist models of the 1920s and 1930s, this dictatorship was marked by the concentration of powers in the hands of President Vargas, by the closing of Parliament, by the prohibition of the existence of political parties, for the repression of opponents of the regime, especially sectors associated with communism, and, at the same time, for the expansion of social rights of the working class and for the economic modernization of the country. On the period after 1930 and on the “Estado Novo”, see: Capelato, Maria Helena, “O Estado Novo: o que trouxe de novo?”, in Jorge Ferreira, Lucilia de Almeida Neves Delgado, eds., O Brasil Republicano: o tempo do nacional-estatis-mo: do início da década de 1930 ao apogeu do Estado Novo, V. 2, Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2003, 107–143; and: Gomes, Angela de Castro, “Oitenta anos de Estado Novo ou quando o Brasil era grande e ia dar certo”, in Luciana Murari, Tatyana de Amaral Maia, Antonio de Ruggiero, eds., Do Estado à Nação: política e cultura nos regimes ditatoriais dos anos 1930, Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS, 2018, 19–47.

2. [2] Tavares de Almeida, Maria Hermínia, “O Estado no Brasil contemporâneo: um passeio pela história”, in Carlos Ranulfo Melo, Manuel Alcántara Sáez, eds., A democracia brasileira: balanço e perspectivas para o século 21, Belo Horizonte: Editora UFMG, 2007, 17–37.

3. [3] It would be impossible, in addition to evading the objectives of this chapter, to address rigorously the context of crisis in which the 1964 coup took place. An appropriate overview on the subject can be found in: Napolitano, Marcos, 1964: história do regime militar brasileiro, São Paulo: Contexto, 2014.

4. [4] Santos, Fabiano, “A República de 46: separação dos poderes e política aloc-ativa”, in Carlos Ranulfo Melo, Manuel Alcántara Sáez, eds., A democracia brasileira: balanço e perspectivas para o século 21, Belo Horizonte: Editora UFMG, 2007, 39–72.

When President Jânio Quadros resigned, there was an intense mobilization of sectors of the Armed Forces who, supported by conservative sectors inside and outside the National Congress, were against the inauguration of João Goulart and tried to prevent it. The movement called “Campanha da Legalidade” (Legality Campaign), initiated in the state of Rio Grande do Sul and articulated by the Governor Leonel Brizola, added a strong popular mobilization demanding obedience to the Constitution that lead to the Vice President inauguration. However, the Brazilian political system was modified, starting to adopt the form of parliamentary government until 1963.

Even though the 1950s saw an increase in the national-devel-opmentalist project, major buildings, such as the construction of the new capital, it increased the country’s indebtedness. Regarding to the party system established in 1945, with the resignation of Vargas and the formation of the Constituent Assembly that drafted the 1946 Constitution, it is a fact that it was not nationalized in a balanced way in all regions of the country,⁵ and, furthermore, its openness to pluralism proved to be restricted in the short term, once the Communist Party was declared illegal in 1948. It is true, however, that the new party system represented a great advance in terms of the characterization of the experience as being democratic and liberal because, after all, since the beginning of the Republic, in 1889, it had not been put into practice in the country as a structure like the one created at the end of the “Estado Novo”.

In the early 1960s, and especially during the period of the João Goulart government, a political crisis developed. It is in the understanding of this crisis in the liberal-democratic experience, increased by the resignation of President Jânio Quadros in 1961 and combined with factors of an external order that will be addressed in sequence, so part of the antecedents of the 1964 Coup can be found.

THE CIVIL-MILITARY DICTATORSHIP (1964–1985)

The civil-military coup, carried out between March 31 and April 1st of 1964, interrupted the liberal-democratic experiment implemented in Brazil in the post-World War II context. In general terms, the Brazilian civil-military dictatorship initiated after the deposition of President João Goulart is marked by the following characteristics: a) ideological alignment with the United States foreign policy for Latin America, that is, the assimilation of the National Security Doctrine (DSN), which aimed to combat the (supposed) advance of communism in the region and to establish a new pattern of economic modernization;⁶ b) full control and/ or temporary closure of existing institutions to impose the new order; c) creation of new political institutions with the purpose of establishing an apparent normality.

One of the arguments used by the sectors involved in the coup to legitimize the intervention in the political sphere was the instability experienced in the period, which was marked, among other factors, by large social demonstrations in favor of the reforms promised by the Government (the Base Reforms) and by polarization between progressive sectors and sectors opposed to those measures.⁷

From an institutional point of view, the dictatorship in the country subverted democratic rules, trying to simulate, during its long duration, some degree of “democratic normality”. It is no coincidence, in this sense, that the National Congress operated with some regularity (although it was closed in times of crisis of the authoritarian regime), there were regular elections for the composition of the Legislative Power, there was a party system established, and even there was alternation in the Executive Power, as the presidents of the Republic were elected by the Electoral College. However, the party system at that time was created (by the Institutional Act No. 2, of 1965) after the extinction of the system established by the Republic of 46. In other words, the dictatorship imposed a new institutionality. Inspired by the North American system, as it aimed to set a bipartisanship in the country, the new arrangement forced such a situation, since there were only two political parties: National Renewal Alliance – ARENA (government base in Congress) and the Democratic Brazilian Movement – MDB (consented opposition).

Regarding the application of the DSN, it made possible the persecution of any and all opposition to the authoritarian regime. On the one hand, it is a fact that anti-communism was not a novelty instituted by the dictatorship, since the hunt for communists had already been part of Brazilian politics since the 1930s.⁸ On the other, the internalization of the DSN was responsible for establishing a new standard in the fight against “subversion”, since it considered as a potential internal enemy any element that was minimally deviant from the regime’s ideology.⁹ Thus, in order to contain the advance of communism in the region, which had been strengthened from 1959 onwards, considering the Cuban Revolution, the dictatorship persecuted anyone (regardless of being a communist or not).

As a result of the political repression practiced in the name of National Security, there were a set of massive violations of human rights, including persecutions, imprisonments, tortures, killings, kidnappings and exile of thousands of citizens.¹⁰ Along with the repression, the dictatorship carried out the intended economic modernization. Usually remembered as the “economic miracle”, this modernization was responsible, in fact, for the unprecedented growth of the Brazilian economy and for the accomplishment of great works. The miracle, however, intensified inequalities in the country, as it deepened the concentration of income and generated an external debt that would take decades to be overcome.¹¹ From a regional perspective, for the countries of the Southern Cone, it is important to note that the dictatorship in Brazil is

1. [5] Nicolau, Jairo, “Partidos na República de 1946: velhas teses, novos dados”, in Dados, 2004, (47), 1.

2. [6] See: Martins, Luciano, “A ‘liberalização’ do regime autoritário no Brasil”, in Guillermo O’Donnell, Philip Schmitter, Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transições do regime autoritário: América Latina, São Paulo: Vértice / Revista dos Tribunais, 1988, 108–139; and: Padrós, Enrique Serra, “Repressão e violência: segurança nacional e terror de Estado nas ditaduras latino-amer-icanas”, in Carlos Fico et al., eds., Ditadura e democracia na América Latina: balanço histórico e perspectivas, Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2008, 143–178.

3. [7] Napolitano, Marcos, Op. cit.

4. [8] Motta, Rodrigo Patto Sá, Em guarda contra o perigo vermelho: o anticomunismo no Brasil (1917–1964), São Paulo: Perspectiva / Fapesp, 2002.

5. [9] Padrós, Enrique Serra, Op. cit.

6. [10] See Gallo, Carlos Artur, “O Cone Sul entre a memória e o esquecimento: elementos para uma comparação”, in Revista Debates, 2017, (11), 3, 57–78. More details about the different sectors affected by repression can be found on Comissão Nacional da Verdade, Relatório Final, Brasília: CNV, 2014.

7. [11] Prado, Luiz Carlos Delorme, Earp, Fábio Sá, “O ‘milagre’ brasileiro: crescimento acelerado, integração internacional e concentração de renda”, in Jorge Ferreira, Lucilia de Almeida Neves Delgado, eds., O Brasil Republicano: o tempo da ditadura: regime militar e movimentos sociais em fins do século XX, V. 4, Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2003, 207–241.

the first in a series of authoritarian regimes that, in line with the DSN, were established through civil-military coups. In this sense, one can mention the dictatorships in Uruguay (1973–1985), Chile (1973–1990) and Argentina (1976–1983).

THE PROCESS OF TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY (1974–1985)

In 1974, anticipating the exhaustion of the regime’s economic project (which would be interrupted, among other factors, by the international oil crisis) and also the strengthening of the consenting opposition, the new Dictator-President, Ernesto Geisel, started the process of “slow, gradual and safe” transition.¹² The highly controlled process of transition to democracy in the country was carried out until March 1985, when the last of the dictator-presidents, João Figueiredo (1979–1985), ended his term. It is important to highlight that the transition in Brazil did not occur in a linear way. On the contrary, the long process, lasting more than a decade, is marked by moments of dispute between the regime and the opposition, and even between different sectors of the support base of the authoritarian regime, which were not favorable to the end of the dictatorship.¹³ Disputes aside, the control of the process remained, hegemonically, in the hands of the government, which gradually liberalized the regime, as it had been planned, before 1974, by the Geisel-Golbery alliance. In a very objective way, the gradual opening of the dictatorship can be observed based on the following events: 1) the repeal of AI-5, in December 1978, reestablishing civil and political rights that had been suspended in December 1968; 2) the edition of the Amnesty Law (Law No. 6.683/1979) which, apart from the discussions on the impunity of repression agents, allowed the gradual release of political prisoners and the return of exiled ones to the country; 3) Law No. 6.767/1979, which ended bipartisanship, allowing the creation of new parties and generating a “moderate multiparty” system, since parties on the far left of the political spectrum, such as a communist party, were not registered at this time.

Regarding the Amnesty Law, specifically, it is interesting to highlight the role it plays during and after the transition to democracy and was completed in the country. During that period, because it was used by the authoritarian regime as an instrument of control over the course of political opening. After that, because its effects reverberate to the present day. After all, its edition guaranteed, on the one hand, a partial concession to the demands of civil society that was organized in the struggle for amnesty, and, on the other, a victory for the sectors responsible for the repression, which obtained, through an ambiguous law, their impunity guaranteed in the short, medium and long term.¹⁴ Another aspect that deserves to be noted when analyzing the transitional process in Brazil is that it occurs in an international context marked by various transition processes, such as the ones that happened in Europe or in the region itself. For example, regime change in the country took place along with the collapse of dictatorships in Portugal, Spain, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. Deeply analyzed by the research agenda known as “transitology”, the process that took place in Brazil was classified as a “negoti-ated transition”, being associated with the cases of Spain, Chile and Uruguay (despite the differences), countries in which the groups formerly in power had a great capacity to control the change of political regime.¹⁵

THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER AND THE TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE BRAZILIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

An important chapter in the process of transition to democracy was the election of the first civilian to the Presidency of the Republic since the occupation of power by the civil-military coalition responsible for the 1964 coup. This election took place indirectly, in January 1985, at the Electoral College. In the election, Tancredo Neves (representing the opposition to the dictatorship) ended up victorious, obtaining 480 votes to 180, in the dispute against Paulo Maluf (also a civilian, but candidate of the authoritarian regime). According to Cruz Júnior¹⁶ , the elected candidate brought with him a “triple hope”: (1) to make Brazil a full democracy; (2) to attenuate the impacts of the economic crisis; and (3) to promote social justice in a context marked by extreme inequalities. However, health problems that culminated in the death of the elected candidate (in April 1985) prevented him from taking office. It this scenario, the Vice-President elected, José Sarney (1985–1990), took office on March 15 of 1985, putting an end to more than two decades of military in power. After Sarney’s inauguration, the reconstruction of the democratic institutionality in the country advanced, despite of the persistent economic difficulties faced. However, it is noteworthy that his government was marked by strong ambiguities in relation to the continuities-ruptures regarding the authoritarian period.¹⁷

In May 1985, through a Constitutional Amendment, direct elections for mayors of cities that until then were considered Areas of National Security were reestablished. In addition, the Amendment made requirements more flexible for the formalization and registration of political parties in the country. Its most important prediction, however, was the convening of the National Constituent Assembly (ANC). It is interesting to note that these domestic events took place in an international scenario marked, among other facts, by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the consolidation of democracy as a value of leftist movements around the world, and the strengthening of the struggle for human rights on a global scale.¹⁸ The ANC was formed by 559 congressmen that took office in on February 1, 1987, and its work lasted about a year and a half, until the promulgation of the new Constitution in October 1988.¹⁹

1. [12] Arturi, Carlos S., “O debate teórico sobre mudança de regime político: o caso brasileiro”, in Revista de Sociologia e Política, 2001, (17), 11–31.

2. [13] Arturi, Carlos S., Op. cit., and: Gugliano, Alfredo Alejandro, Gallo, Carlos Artur, “On the ruins of the democratic transition: Human Righst as an agenda item in abeyance for the Brazilian democracy”, in Bulletin of Latin American Research, 2013, (32), 3, 325–338.

3. [14] Gallo, Carlos Artur, Gugliano, Alfredo Alejandro, “Political memory, authoritarian legacies, and the quality of democracy: considerations for a comparison between Brazil and Argentina”, in Revista del CESLA, 2020 (25), 251–276.

4. [15] Arturi, Carlos S., Op. cit.; and: O’Donnell, Guillermo, Schmitter, Philippe C., Transições do regime autoritário: primeiras conclusões, São Paulo: Vértice / Revista dos Tribunais, 1988.

5. [16] Cruz Júnior, Ademar Seabra, “Constituinte e democratização no Brasil: o impacto das mudanças do sistema internacional”, in Lua Nova, 2013, (88), 217–256.

6. [17] Moisés, José Álvaro, Os brasileiros e a democracia, São Paulo: Editora Ática, 1995.

7. [18] Cruz Júnior, Ademar Seabra, Op. cit.

8. [19] A detailed approach to the subject can be found in: Rocha, Antônio Sérgio, “Genealogia da Constituinte: do autoritarismo à democratização”, in Lua Nova, 2013, (88), 29–87.

GRAPH 1 – SATISFACTION WITH THE REDUCTION OF SOCIAL INEQUALITIES (%)

Source: Produced by the authors based on ESEB data (2018).

It should be noted, however, that the drafting process of the Constitution was marked by disputes, especially between President Sarney and Ulysses Guimarães, President of the ANC. While Guimarães defended the construction of a democratic institutional framework, Sarney aimed to establish a liberalization process, more restricted in a democratic point of view. There was, however, a consensus on some fundamental rights, of a social, political and individual nature. Based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, an attempt was made to guarantee individual freedoms and minimum social conditions so that Brazilians could enjoy a dignified life.

Objectively, the new constitutional text ratified a series of institutional changes that were being made in the transition context, certainly increasing its democratization. Widely regarded as the most advanced republican constitutional charter in the history of Brazil, its text includes the guarantee of individual and collective rights.²⁰ Considering that, many people refer to the 1988 Constitution as a “citizen Constitution”, adding the term “citizen” to the foundation of the legal-institutional system is symptomatic. After all, citizenship, in modern terms, is only possible within the framework of a legitimately established constitutional system. It occurs that, in the transition from a 21-year dictatorship to a new stage in the national political history, it made sense to point out, discursive and objectively, the obvious. From a discursive point of view, the new constitutional order called for the defense of basic civil and political rights as a starting point for a new moment. From an objective point of view, the new Constitution is repeatedly recognized as one of the most detailed in the world, having exhaustively provisions on basic rights and guarantees.

Among others, the Constitution guaranteed the right to health and education, established the bases for the creation of the Unified Health System (SUS), reinforced the Republican and presidential model as the form of government to be maintained (in 1993, a plebiscite was held that ratified presidential-ism), guaranteed multipartyism de facto and de jure (excepting separatist and nazi-fascist-inspired parties, all ideologies can constitute political parties in the country) and served as the basis for the expansion of social rights and participatory spaces in public administration. Also, some important achievements for Brazilian workers were guaranteed within the framework of the new Constitution, as the limitation of working hours, unemployment insurance, maternity and paternity leave; in addition, civil servants were given the opportunity to defend their rights through union organization and their right to strike was recognized, except in those cases of services considered essential.

GRAPH 2 – CONFIDENCE IN THE NATIONAL CONGRESS (MUCH/SOME) (%)

Source: Produced by the authors based on the Latinobarômetro.

Nevertheless, the Constitution faced political resistance, even after its promulgation, by sectors of the left wing, who considered its text timid about social advances, and by the right, as conservative sectors offered resistance to its social achievements and proposed reforms in order make them more “flexibles”.²¹

From an institutional point of view, a moment that can be considered as the conclusion of the transitional process towards democracy was the first direct election for President, in 1989. That election was marked by a strong ideological polarization, led by Fernando Collor de Mello, from the National Renewal Party (PRN), a conservative and neoliberal oriented politician, and by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, from the Workers’ Party (PT), on the left, defending a greater role for the State in economic and social issues. Collor won the election, taking charge of the presidency in 1990, but had his term shortened by his resignation in December 1992, when he was about to be impeached. Considering important advances achieved throughout the 1990s and during the first decade of the 2000s, such as the stabilization of the currency, significant increases in income redistribution and the expansion (although limited) of rights for women, Afro-descendants and for LGBT+ population, the Brazilian democracy, from an institutional point of view, was consolidated and improved. Between what the laws provide and what is practiced, however, there have always been large gaps that have now intensified. It stands out, for example, the deep social inequalities and the persistent high rates of violence in the country, which repercuss in deep social dissatisfaction.

Baquero and González²² claim that the economic crisis and the crisis in the popularity of political leaders are factors capable of a regime destabilization. For them, moments of prosperity have less repercussions for the entrenchment of democratic values than moments of crisis contribute to eroding them, which makes the scenario even more challenging. As an illustration of the difficulties that Brazilian democracy has faced in combating

1. [20] Goulart, Jefferson, “Processo constituinte e arranjo federativo”, in Lua Nova, 2013, (88), 185–215.

2. [21] Goulart, Jefferson, Op. cit.

3. [22] Baquero, Marcelo, González, Rodrigo, “Cultura política, mudanças econômicas e democracia inercial: uma análise pós-eleições de 2014”, in Opinião Pública, 2016, (22), 3, 492–523.

GRAPH 3 – CONFIDENCE IN POLITICAL PARTIES (MUCH/SOME) (%)

Source: Produced by the authors based on the Latinobarômetro.

GRAPH 4 – SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY (%)

Source: Produced by the authors based on the Latinobarômetro.

economic dilemmas, data from the Brazilian Electoral Study – ESEB²³ (2018) indicate that 70 % of Brazilians express dissatisfaction with the fight against social inequalities in the country.²⁴ See Graph 1.

This type of dissatisfaction can contribute to a generalized disbelief, which reverberates in a process of deepening the credibility crisis of institutions such as the National Congress and political parties, which have shown significative confidence declines in recent years. This situation is also marked by strong instabilities materialized in street demonstrations, in the overthrow of President Dilma Rousseff, in 2016, and in the politic denial caused by the media repercussions on the Lava-Jato operation. Data from the Latinobarômetro²⁵ indicate that institutions have thus fragilized in the Brazilian context. Confidence in Congress dropped from 44 % in 2010 to just 12 % in 2018. Regarding political parties, a confidence that, historically, is not high, fell from a range between 15 and 20 % to only 6 % in the latter three rounds of research. See Graph 2 and Graph 3.

It is important to highlight that such patterns of distrust can directly affect Brazilians’ evaluation of the regime itself. That is, the perception of institutional inefficiency can create, over time, disaffection and apathy about democracy. The Graph 4, containing data on Brazilians’ satisfaction with democracy, shows the fall from 48 % between 2009 and 2010 to less than 10 % in 2018. Despite the institutional arrangements and the procedural dimension of the regime, there is an ongoing process of erosion that becomes potentially worrying in Brazil, considering the country’s young democracy and its legitimacy not yet fully affirmed before the population. For example, data from the World Values Survey (2017–2020)²⁶ indicate that more than 70 % of Brazilians do not trust or have little trust in the electoral process. This is a worrying fact, as such distrust in face of the main symbol of liberal democracy can lead questioning and authoritarian postures of delegitimization of the regime. This is dangerously combined with the conception that there are authoritarian legacies inherited from an undemocratic tradition. Persistent police violence is to some extent accepted in terms of public opinion, being considered as a kind of “unavoidable side effect” of the fight against crime.²⁷ There is also a scenario in which minorities, despite formal legal advances, continue to suffer from exclusion and prejudice, in a context in which, according to ESEB data from 2018, 56 % of Brazilians agree (strongly or a little bit) with the assertion that minorities should adapt to the customs and traditions of Brazil. Moreover, the same research points out that almost 40 % believe that the will of the majority must always prevail, even if it undermines minority rights. This type of position contradicts the idea that a democracy should respect plurality and minorities, highlighting the perception that there are still important steps to be taken in the country towards a more democratic society.

LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Considering this chapter contribution, it is possible to identify aspects in which the Brazilian political system has advanced since the end of the transition process, as well as to make recommendations within contemporary limits. In terms of lessons learned, it can be said that, since 1985, the Brazilian political system has significantly advanced, from both institutional and procedural points of view, because:

1/ The Armed Forces transferred control over the Executive Power to civilians;

2/ A new Constitution was promulgated in 1988, guaranteeing basic civil and political rights and significantly expanding the list of social rights;

3/ The party system was reconfigured, enabling a high degree of competition, with the existence of plural political parties, representing different ideologies and programs;

1. [23] n=2506. For more information about the research, visit: https://www.cesop.unicamp.br/por/eseb/ondas.

2. [24] In the research, a scale from 0 to 10 is employed, where 0 means totally dissatisfied with the fight against social inequalities in the country, and 10 means totally satisfied. For analysis purposes, values from 0 to 3 were considered as corresponding to dissatisfied, from 4 to 6 as neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, and from 7 to 10 as satisfied.

3. [25] The samples of the Latinobarômetro surveys presented here for the case of Brazil were the following: n 1995, 2003 and 2017=1200, 1996=1080,

   1997=1001, 1998 a 2002=1000, 2004 to 2013, 2016 and 2018=1204,

   2015=1250. For more information, visit https://www.latinobarometro.org/latOnline.jsp.

4. [26] More information about the research can be found at the WVS website: https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp.

5. [27] Almeida, Alberto Carlos, A cabeça do brasileiro, Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2012.

4/ Regular elections started to happen in order to fill all elective positions in the country, taking place, between 1989 and 2018, 7 direct elections for the office of President of the Republic;

5/ After a long period of economic crisis (between the 1980s and 1990s), there was an increase in income redistribution policies in the early 2000s, aiming to reduce inequality in the country.

Despite the highlighted advances, the data presented allows the conclusion that the country faces great and continuous difficulties in terms of maintaining the democratic regime and consolidate it, being highly recommended to:

a/ Strengthen representative political institutions and, consequently, reinforce the legitimacy for the democratic regime as the best and needed form of government;

b/ Invest effectively in social and income redistribution policies, with the objective of reducing the high rates of exclusion and inequality in the country;

c/ Combat everyday structural violence, especially the type committed by Public Security agents;

d/ Create effective mechanisms to fight corruption and impunity.

SOURCES USED AN FURTHER READING

Almeida, Alberto Carlos, A cabeça do brasileiro, Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2012

Arturi, Carlos S., “O debate teórico sobre mudança de regime político: o caso brasileiro”, in Revista de Sociologia e Política, 2001, (17), 11–31

Baquero, Marcelo, González, Rodrigo, “Cultura política, mudanças econômicas e democracia inercial: uma análise pós-eleições de 2014”, in Opinião Pública, 2016, (22), 3, 492–523

Capelato, Maria Helena, “O Estado Novo: o que trouxe de novo?”, in Jorge Ferreira, Lucilia de Almeida Neves Delgado, eds., O Brasil Republicano: o tempo do nacional-estatismo: do início da década de 1930 ao apogeu do Estado Novo, V. 2, Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2003, 107–143

Comissão Nacional da Verdade, Relatório Final, Brasília: CNV, 2014, https://cnv.memoriasreveladas.gov.br/

Cruz Júnior, Ademar Seabra, “Constituinte e democratização no Brasil: o impacto das mudanças do sistema internacional”, in Lua Nova, 2013, (88), 217–256

Gallo, Carlos Artur, “O Cone Sul entre a memória e o esquecimento: elementos para uma comparação”, in Revista Debates, 2017, (11), 3, 57–78

Gallo, Carlos Artur, Gugliano, Alfredo Alejandro, “Political memory, authoritarian legacies, and the quality of democracy: considerations for a comparison between Brazil and Argentina”, in Revista del CESLA, 2020 (25), 251–276

Gomes, Angela de Castro, “Oitenta anos de Estado Novo ou quando o Brasil era grande e ia dar certo”, in Luciana Murari, Tatyana de Amaral Maia, Antonio de Ruggiero, eds., Do Estado à Nação: política e cultura nos regimes ditatoriais dos anos 1930, Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS, 2018, 19–47

Goulart, Jefferson, “Processo constituinte e arranjo federativo”, in Lua Nova, 2013, (88), 185–215

Gugliano, Alfredo Alejandro, Gallo, Carlos Artur, “On the ruins of the democratic transition: Human Righst as an agenda item in abeyance for the Brazilian democracy”, in Bulletin of Latin American Research, 2013, (32), 3, 325–338

Martins, Luciano, “A ‘liberalização’ do regime autoritário no Brasil”, in Guillermo O’Donnell, Philip Schmitter, Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transições do regime autoritário: América Latina, São Paulo: Vértice / Revista dos Tribunais, 1988, 108–139

Moisés, José Álvaro, Os brasileiros e a democracia, São Paulo: Editora Ática, 1995

Motta, Rodrigo Patto Sá, Em guarda contra o perigo vermelho: o anticomunismo no Brasil (1917–1964), São Paulo: Perspectiva / Fapesp, 2002

Napolitano, Marcos, 1964: história do regime militar brasileiro, São Paulo: Contexto, 2014 Nicolau, Jairo, “Partidos na República de 1946: velhas teses, novos dados”, in Dados, 2004, (47), 1

O’Donnell, Guillermo, Schmitter, Philippe C., Transições do regime autoritário: primeiras conclusões, São Paulo: Vértice / Revista dos Tribunais, 1988

Padrós, Enrique Serra, “Repressão e violência: segurança nacional e terror de Estado nas ditaduras latino-americanas”, in Carlos Fico et al., eds., Ditadura e democracia na América Latina: balanço histórico e perspectivas, Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2008, 143–178

Prado, Luiz Carlos Delorme, Earp, Fábio Sá, “O ‘milagre’ brasileiro: crescimento acelerado, integração internacional e concentração de renda”, in Jorge Ferreira, Lucilia de Almeida Neves Delgado, eds., O Brasil Republicano: o tempo da ditadura: regime militar e movimentos sociais em fins do século XX, V. 4, Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2003, 207–241

Rocha, Antônio Sérgio, “Genealogia da Constituinte: do autoritarismo à democratização”, in Lua Nova, 2013, (88), 29–87

Santos, Fabiano, “A República de 46: separação dos poderes e política alocativa”, in Carlos Ranulfo Melo, Manuel Alcántara Sáez, eds., A democracia brasileira: balanço e perspectivas para o século 21, Belo Horizonte: Editora UFMG, 2007, 39–72

Tavares de Almeida, Maria Hermínia, “O Estado no Brasil contemporâneo: um passeio pela história”, in Carlos Ranulfo Melo, Manuel Alcántara Sáez, eds., A democracia brasileira: balanço e perspectivas para o século 21, Belo Horizonte: Editora UFMG, 2007, 17–37.

DISMANTLING THE STATE SECURITY APPARATUS

Andrés del Río, Vanessa Dorneles Schinke

INTRODUCTION

During the dictatorship, justice was negligent with human rights violations. In turn, public security institutions and armed forces actively participated in serious human rights violations. Especially after the coup d’état of 1964, institutional changes shaped justice by reducing its institutional role in the period, gradually and steadily. With the re-democratization, continuities and innovations have existed. But justice, armed forces and public security institutions today are a barrier to holding state agents accountable for systematic human rights violations. Impunity has become an unresolved debt.

THE 1964 COUP AND REDUCED JUSTICE: IMPUNITY UNTIL TODAY

On April 9, the military Junta dictated Institutional Act (AI) no. 1. AI no. 1 granted the military government the power to revoke legislative mandates, suspend political rights for 10 years, place on standby or compulsorily retire anyone who attempted to undermine national security. Furthermore, AI no. 1 determined indirect elections for President of the Republic for April 11.¹ The Art. 7 declared that: “The constitutional or legal guarantees of vitality and stability are suspended for six months” and, in its § 4, which particularly affected the Supreme Tribunal Federal (STF), declared that: “The jurisdictional control of these acts will be limited to the examination of extrinsic formalities…” However, this Institutional Act was not isolated, nor was it the Only.

The intensity of the attacks and institutional and legal transformations went from minor to major, until a balance was reached between the suit of law and the impunity of state agents in their violations of human rights. In the initial period, the courts and the Supreme Federal Court tried to grant several habeas corpus, but each time one was accepted, the regime became more and more closed.²

On October 27, 1965, AI no. 2 was published, which particularly affected the STF: it increased the number of justices of the Court to 16 (Brazilian court-packing); suspended the constitutional guarantees of vitality, immovability and stability; and declared in its article 19 that some acts were excluded from judicial review. In November 1965, Constitutional Amendment no. 16 profoundly altered the Judiciary.³ On March 15, 1967 the new constitutional text went into effect together with the ascension to the Presidency of the Republic of Costa e Silva. Since national security was its main objective, the constitutional guarantees were deeply affected, especially individual rights. The textual previsions of habeas corpus and the writ of mandamus would be confronted by the restrictive practice “authorized” by national security. The 1967 Constitution, of flagrant authoritarian profile, coexisted with the institutional acts and other legal instruments that arose in the course of time. Impunity for agents of the state was guaranteed.

On December 13, 1968, the most authoritarian legal instrument in Brazil was adopted, AI no. 5. The new AI gave ample powers to repress opponents: the National Congress was closed (a measure regulated by Complementary Act No. 38), elective mandates were revoked, the political rights of any citizen were suspended for ten years, there was intervention in states and municipalities, confiscation of property for illicit enrichment was permitted, and habeas corpus was suspended for political crimes against national security and the economic and social order. After AI-5, the authoritarian regime increased repression and used detention, torture, and murder against the enemies of those considered as such. And, in September, a new national security regulation was imposed, Decree-Law No. 898, which included the death penalty.

Institutional Act No. 6, of February 1st, 1969, again targeted the Supreme Federal Court, in its goal to model the court according to its needs and to enable the impunity of the security forces’ collaborations. AI n. 6 also modified the competencies of the STF, increased those of the Superior Military Court, and ratified the Constitutional Amendments made by Complementary Acts after AI n. 5. Finally, from AI no. 5 until October 1978, 12 Institutional Acts, 59 Complementary Acts and 8 Constitutional Amendments had been decreed, significantly altering Brazil’s institutional architecture. On October 17, 1969, the junta imposed Constitutional Amendment no. 1, which made clear the concentration of power it had obtained from the Executive Branch through AI no. 5 of 1968, when it declared in its reasons that “the Federal Executive Power is hereby authorized to legislate on all matters…”. With these alterations, the impunity of the security forces and of the public agents had its legal stamp.

On August 22, 1979, the Amnesty Law was passed. And it will be present for the foreseeable future. And the STF will be one of the greatest guardians.⁴

DEMOCRACY AND AUTHORITARIAN LEGACIES

The return to democracy was less abrupt due to the prolonged, slow, and gradual transition (controlled). The process of reconstruction and institutional reform took an important step with the enactment of the new 1988 Constitution. Despite the constitutional strengthening, the institutional legacy of the authoritarian regime lingered during the democratic return. With the change of regime, none of the Supreme Court justices were set apart or

1. [1] The term was limited until January 31, 1966.

2. [2] The habeas corpus granted to the governors of the states of Goiás, Mauro Borges, Amazonas, Plínio Coelho, Pernambuco, Miguel Arrais, and Sergipe, Seixas Dória, were decisive.

3. [3] In this phase some purges in the Judiciary occurred. A detailed approach to the subject can be found in: Pereira, Anthony W. Ditadura e repressão: o autoritarismo e o estado de direito no Brasil, no Chile e na Argentina. São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2010, pag. 91.

4. [4] In 2010, the STF established the validity of the Amnesty law through ADPF n. 153.

removed. But it was through this feature of continuity that the authoritarian regime found an institutional safeguard, a kind of institutional insurance policy in democracy. As Abrão points out: “The absence of a purging process in the post-dictatorship Judiciary allowed an elitist and authoritarian mentality to be kept alive there (…)”.⁵ In this sense, according to Koerner, the Amnesty Law “(…) served as support for the permanence of the authoritarian regime’s cadres in state institutions”.⁶ When provoked, the Court would validate the self-amnesty interpretation of the Amnesty Law and reject its revision (ADPF n. 153). The STF’s decision was in opposition to the strong global trend of individual criminal responsibility of public agents for human rights violations.⁷ The STF demonstrated selective activism, with a conservative profile, in this particular area.⁸ In this way, it contributed, albeit indirectly, to the policies of forgetfulness and impunity.

At the international level, in March 2009, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights presented a claim against Brazil before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights for the forced disappearances that occurred during the Araguaia Guerrilla War. On December 14, 2010, the Court published the sentence and judged Brazil responsible for the disappearance of 62 people between 1972 and 1974, in the region of the Araguaia River. Other actions will also have the same fate, both nationally and internationally.⁹ In the October 2014 report, the Inter-American Court considered that the point of the sentence regarding compensation was partially complied with by Brazil. In its writings, the State reported the payment of compensation for material and immaterial damages in favor of 39 of the family-victims who were still alive. In addition, through judicial deposits made in inheritance proceedings or through actions to fulfill an international obligation, it has allocated compensation to 18 heirs of deceased victims. The amounts paid by the Brazilian government vary among the victims.

The Court reminds the State that it must continue implementing the actions necessary to comply, as soon as possible, with all the payments ordered in the Sentence in accordance with the provisions of the Sentence.

THE NATIONAL TRUTH COMMISSION

In many transitional justice cases, justice comes after the truth. The National Truth Commission (CNV) was created long after those established in the rest of the region, decades after, in fact. In 2014, in the final report, it clearly indicated that there was a structure used to commit systematic crimes against the civilian population – whether they were Brazilian or foreign, as Brazil was part of Operation Condor. The recognition that such crimes would be crimes against humanity challenged the breadth intended by the 1979 amnesty. The CNV disturbed the military sectors which collaborated very little to make everyone aware of the truth.

MILITARY JUSTICE AND THE DEEPENING OF AUTHORITARIAN LEGACIES

One of the consequences of the military’s participation in civilian life in the Latin American region has been through activities related to patrolling and combating organized crime, an atypical function since it is dissociated from traditional territorial defense. In Brazil, the use of the Armed Forces in policing activities dates back to the first years after the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution, although the constitutional text did not include the Armed Forces in the list of agencies responsible for public security. In fact, such activities have been based either on the constitutional provision according to which the Armed Forces can be employed, by initiative of any of the branches of government, to guarantee law and order (art. 142), or on “expedient political arrangements” between the states and the Union in a wide variety of circumstances “to substitute, complement, or supplement police action”.¹⁰ According to the Ministry of Defense, from 1992 to 2019, 138 GLO operations were conducted, 23 of them related to urban violence, 25 to military police strikes, 22 in guaranteeing voting and counting, and 39 at events.¹¹ Recent examples involve the federal intervention in Rio de Janeiro beginning in 2017, the use of the Army throughout the national territory during the truckers’ strike in 2018, and in prison units, such as in the Federal Peniten-tiary of Brasilia in February 2020 (Decree n. 10.233/2020), without there being, according to the then Minister of Justice Sérgio Moro “nothing concrete” that justified such a measure.¹² We currently highlight the expansion of the jurisdiction of military justice in cases involving civilians, and its consequences for human rights in the country, as an authoritarian legacy. The progressive expansion of the jurisdiction of military justice and the consolidation of an authoritarian legal architecture in Brazil coincides with the country taking an authoritarian course and goes against the Brazilian Constitution and the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on the matter.

Military justice stiffened during the civil-military dictatorship inaugurated in 1964, through Institutional Act No. 2, of 1965.¹³ During this period, the jurisdiction of the Military Justice was expanded to cover “military crimes, crimes against national security, crimes against administrative probity and crimes against the popular economy, committed by civilians or by military

1. [5] Abrão, Paulo, “A Lei de Anistia no Brasil. As alternativas para a verdade e a justiça”, in Acervo, Rio de Janeiro, 2011, v. 24, n. 1, jan./jun, p. 119–138.

2. [6] Koerner, Andrei, Assumpção, San Romanoli, “A lei de Anistia e o Estado democrático de direito no Brasil”, in Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, 2009, Vol. 24, n. 69. São Paulo, fev.

3. [7] Sikkink, Kathryn, “A Era da Responsabilização: a ascensão da responsabilização penal individual”, in A anistia na era da responsabilização: o Brasil em perspectiva internacional e comparada. Brasília: Ministério da Justiça, Comissão de Anistia; Oxford: Oxford University, Latin American Centre, 2011.

4. [8] Garrido da Silva, Alexandre; Ribas Vieira, José, “Justiça transicional, direitos humanos e a seletividade do ativismo judicial no Brasil”, in Revista Anistia Política e Justiça de Transição, n. 2 (jul. / dez. 2009). Brasília: Ministério da Justiça.

5. [9] Of the 27 criminal actions filed so far by the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office, almost all have encountered obstacles in habeas corpus actions filed by the defendants and accepted by the federal judiciary or in complaints with preliminary injunctions to suspend them before the STF. The recurring argument is that it is necessary to wait for the final judgment of ADPF 153 and 320 (which again brought the issue to the STF, now demanding that it take a position on the effects of the decision of the Inter-Amer-ican Court).

6. [10] Muniz, Jacqueline de Oliveira, Proença Júnior, Domício, “Forças armadas e policiamento”, in Revista Brasileira de Segurança Pública, 2007, a. 1, ed. 1, pp. 48–63.

7. [11] Ministério da Defesa. Histórico de GLO. 26/11/2019. 2019. https:// www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/exercicios_e_operacoes/glo/2_tabelas_glo_atualizada_em_261119.pdf.

8. [12] Valfré, Vinícius, Moro diz que GLO para presídio de Brasília é “medida preventiva”. UOL. 7. 2. 2020. https://bit.ly/3h1EoSF.

9. [13] Zaverucha, J., Melo Filho, H. C., “Superior Tribunal Militar: entre o autoritarismo e a democracia”, in Dados. 2004, 47 (4), pp. 763–797.

personnel”.¹⁴ The Military Justice worked at that time as a political instance of reiteration of the regime and maintenance of the dictatorial order “operating as a recognized space of punishment of opponents of the regime and assisting in the process of political persecution” of both civilians and military.¹⁵ With the re-democratization, the 1988 Federal Constitution kept practically unchanged the institutional arrangement established for the Military Justice of the Union during the authoritarian regime established in 1964. The 1988 Constitution only establishes that the Military Justice “is responsible for processing and judging military crimes defined by law”. It is the law that defines what military crimes are and, therefore, what falls under the jurisdiction of the Military Justice that is suspect. Two of these laws are direct legacies of the authoritarian regime established in 1964: the Military Penal Code (Decree-Law no. 1.001/1969) and the Military Code of Criminal Procedure (Decree-Law no. 1.002/1969).

In recent years, the jurisdiction of the Military Justice System has been further expanded and directly impacts situations in which civilians are victims of human rights violations perpetrated by military personnel. The Complementary Law n. 117 that, in 2004, expressly established that the employment of the Armed Forces in the Guarantee of Law and Order (GLO) would be considered military activity for purposes of applying the jurisdiction of Military Justice and the LC n. 136/2010 that attributed the character of “military activity” to the employment of the Armed Forces in “subsidiary activities”. In 2018, the STF began to judge Direct Action of Unconstitutionality n. 5032, which seeks to remove the jurisdiction of the Military Justice in these cases. On February 12, 2021, the case was included in the virtual environment and the trial resumed. The votes suggest that any activity performed by the Armed Forces is military activity, as long as it is under the label of “guaranteeing law and order”, and that, in all these cases, the jurisdiction of the Military Justice will be legitimate – thus making it virtually unlimited. At no time do the votes address the structure of Brazilian Military Justice, its organization and applicable legislation. Nor do they question the systematic use of GLO operations for the most diverse purposes. The trial was interrupted by a request for an emphasis made by Justice Ricardo Lewandowski. While the trial is not resumed, the legislation which constitutionality is being questioned remains in force.

A new situation was added to the jurisdiction of Military Justice over civilians and military personnel in the exercise of subsidiary functions, by force of Law No. 13.491, October 13, 2017, sanctioned by then-President Michel Temer. The new law, even though it blatantly violates the constitutional provision that establishes the jurisdiction of the jury in these cases remains in force. The actions before the STF that question its constitutionality remain without a trial date (ADI 5804 and ADI 5901).

In November 2010, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights determined that criminal actions of accountability by the Brazilian State should be processed and tried in an ordinary forum and not in the Military Justice, in the Case of Araguaia. In the same vein, the IDH Court affirmed in 2018 in a judgment regarding the Herzog Case. Moreover, on numerous other occasions, the IDH Court has affirmed that military courts have an exceptional and restricted character and that the trial of cases involving civilians should fall to the ordinary justice.¹⁶

Symbolically, the progressive expansion of Military Justice –especially in relations with civilians – denies Brazilian society the opportunity to consolidate its break with the shackles of authoritarianism and its commitment to democracy and fundamental rights. In fact, in the current context, it reinforces a return to that authoritarianism that has been manifesting itself at the political and social level. The increased participation of the Armed Forces in state and government agencies has been accompanied by the construction of a legal framework that seeks to legitimize and shield their activities in subsidiary activities, especially those related to public security. This movement is reflected in the expansion of Military Justice to judge cases involving civilians. As seen, the Military Justice lacks independence and impartiality to deal with civilians and embodies authoritarian legacies alive until today when exercising this activity, which, according to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, puts the democratic rule of law at risk.

THE 1964 COUP AND THE ARMED FORCES

The Brazilian historical narrative has several authoritarian periods marked by institutional ruptures of different densities that intertwined the institutions of the public security system and army forces in different ways. The 1964 authoritarian regime was inaugurated with a document signed by the three heads of the military. The document also mentions the fear of communism, a paranoid expression that became common throughout the regime, further strengthened by the Cold War context. Unlike other interventions carried out by the Armed Forces during the democratic system, in 1964 political power was not given back to civilians, but it was controlled and commanded by the military and supported by a sector of the civil society, including big companies.

THE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM IN THE REPRESSION AND THE SEARCH FOR THE ENEMY

The political repression established in 1964 included the participation of several institutions, reinforced by the Armed Forces central role. Countless government organs and intelligence systems were created, such as the National Intelligence Service –a body linked to the Presidency which centralised information related to national security. Run by a military with privileges of a minister of state, this body articulated information from the federal government, states and municipalities, in addition to being able to request information from autarchic entites private and parastatal entities. The National Information Service gathered knowledge obtained by regional agencies spread throughout the national territory, and entities aligned with the regime, in addition to being responsible for planning information and counter-information actions and for activating investigative bodies. The National Intelligence Service had a department responsible for

1. [14] Souza, A. B., Silva, Angela M. D. da, “A organização da Justiça Militar no Brasil: Império e República”, in Estudos Históricos, 2016, maio-agosto, 29 (58), pp. 361–380.

2. [15] Silva, A. M. D. da. Ditadura e Justiça Militar no Brasil: A Atuação do Superior Tribunal Militar (1964–1980). Tese de Doutorado em História, Política e Bens Culturais. Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil – CPDOC, Rio de Janeiro, 2011.

3. [16] Guitiérrez, Juan Carlos, Cantú, Silvano, “A restrição à jurisdição militar nos sistemas internacionais de proteção dos direitos humanos”, in SUR – Revista Internacional e Direitos Humanos, 2010, v. 7, n. 13, p. 75–97.

identifying opponents of the regime and ranking documents as “confidential” and “highly confidential”.¹⁷

The regime’s intelligence services focused greatly in monitoring citizens opposed to the regime who were considered enemies. The term enemy was used throughout the regime to identify people who posed a threat to the authoritarian regime’s objectives. The Superior War School, headquartered in Rio de Janeiro and subordinated to the General Staff of the Armed Forces, was a civil-military intellectual hub intended to bring together economic and civil elites to spread the Doctrine of National Security, based on the idea that an enemy to national interests should be neutral-ized.¹⁸ The narrative of the National Security Doctrine served as the foundation for serious human rights violations, many of them practiced in spaces that were the Armed Forces responsibility.

During the authoritarian regime, the information system was controlled and changed to meet the demands of repression. In the 70s, for example, the National Information System and the Internal Security System were created, both linked to the National Information Service. The regulation which created the Internal Security System also determined that each military command should create a Deployable Operations and Information (DOI) and an Internal Defense Operations Center (CODI), under the responsibility of the region Army’s commander. The country had been divided into several information zones, each being headed by an Army commander who was also responsible for the DOI-CODI of their respective region. With the expansion of the intelligence apparatus, responsible for monitoring opponents, the regime invested in training its employees. The directors of the sectorial bodies of the Internal Security System should hold a diploma from the Superior School of War or a diploma from one of the other Armed Forces schools.

The authoritarian regime created an “information com-munity” aimed at monitoring and harassing opponents of the regime. In addition to the National Information Service, this “community” was comprised of the secret services of the Army (CIE), Navy (CENIMAR) and Air Force (CISA), the Federal Police, the security departments of each Ministry, the regionals Departments of Political and Social Order (DOPS) and by the military police.¹⁹ As seen, the regime invested in the formation of an apparatus which main function was to identify, monitor and eliminate movements opposed to the regime, based on the National Security Doctrine which, among other concepts, defended the idea of there being an internal war with the enemies of the nation, moved by a communist influence, which would prevent the state from achieving its national goals. Given this, the bodies of the regime should act to eliminate this threat. The Doctrine of National Security though was based on undefined, redundant and often disconnected ideas. Such concepts guided the actions of repressive bodies and agents during the serious violations of human rights practiced throughout the authoritarian regime.

Furthermore, the search for the internal enemy was carried out even outside the national territory.²⁰ The repressive apparatus had the collaboration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in monitoring and persecuting Brazilians who were abroad. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs made it difficult for people who were opposed to the regime to exercise their fundamental rights abroad and provided information to the National Information Service, the Armed Forces and the Federal Police. As an illustration, Brazilian embassies in other countries should report “cases of subversion” to the Ministry, while access to documents, services and rights of opponents who were abroad would be difficult. At the same time,

during the authoritarian regime, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs vehemently denied in international forums the serious human rights violations practiced by the regime, as in the United Nations Organizations and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Furthermore, the search for the internal enemy led to the construction of repressive networks between countries that were under authoritarian regimes in the 70s and 80s. An example of this was Operation Condor, the name given to a secret system of actions, through which Militarized states in South America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay) shared information and carried out extraterritorial operations of kidnapping, torture, execution and forced disappearance of exiled political opponents.²¹ In the context of the Cold War, the persecution of opponents of Latin American dictatorial regimes had the intense collaboration of the United States of America, which in that context sought to exercise and increase control (military, economic and social) in South America, based on the discourse of preventing the advance of communist influence in the region.

THE PUBLIC SECURITY INSTITUTIONS AND ARMED FORCES: THE SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The public security institutions played a special role in the serious human rights violations committed during the authoritarian regime in Brazil. In 1969, Operation Bandeirante (OBAN) was created with the objective of identifying, capturing and neutralising members of organisations considered subversive. This operation was pushed by the regime’s intelligence apparatus expanding policy, which assigned to the regional military commanders the responsibility of centralizing information on insurgents to be shared with the National Intelligence Service. The inauguration of this public security operation was attended by several businessmen, military commanders and politicians from the State of São Paulo. The diversity of people presented at the ceremony illustrated the regime’s support base and the cooperation among the public security institutions (Armed Forces and the police) in implementing the guidelines proposed by the regime for national security.²²

Operation Bandeirante included military and police officers, who received a bonus as a way to encourage them to take part in this kind of agencies. Subsequently, the same bonus policy was applied to agents who were part of DOI-CODI operations. As a modus operandi, Operation Bandeirante carried out repressive actions to capture people considered “subversive”. They relied on the use of helicopters, roadblocks and infiltration of civil police into left-wing organisations.

1. [17] Brasil. Relatório/Comissão Nacional da Verdade. Brasília: CNV, 2014. Vol. I. https://cnv.memoriasreveladas.gov.br/.

2. [18] Schinke, Vanessa Dorneles, “A história que nos contam: a memória do judiciário sobre o regime autoritário”, in Revista Direito e Práxis, v. 8, p. 1224–1249, 2017.

3. [19] Brasil. Relatório/Comissão Nacional da Verdade. Brasília: CNV, 2014. Vol. I. https://cnv.memoriasreveladas.gov.br/.

4. [20] Brasil. Relatório/Comissão Nacional da Verdade. Brasília: CNV, 2014. Vol. I. https://cnv.memoriasreveladas.gov.br/.

5. [21] Brasil. Relatório/Comissão Nacional da Verdade. Brasília: CNV, 2014. Vol. I. https://cnv.memoriasreveladas.gov.br/.

6. [22] Brasil. Relatório/Comissão Nacional da Verdade. Brasília: CNV, 2014. Vol. I. https://cnv.memoriasreveladas.gov.br/.

The headquarters of Operation Bandeirante was open 24 hours a day to allow interrogations to be carried out at any time. Opponents of the regime were taken to the headquarters of the Operation to carry out the so-called “preliminary examina-tion”, which was nothing more than an extrajudicial interrogation followed by torture sessions.²³ After it the arrest was formalised by the Department of Political and Social Order, a police inquiry was opened. Operation Bandeirante served as a model for other agencies of repression, especially with regard to the use of undercover agents and the systematic and widespread use of torture.

Opponents of the regime were also heavily harassed by agents of the Operations and Information Detachment (DOI) and the Internal Defense Operations Center (CODI). There was a DOI-CODI in every military region in the country. The DOI-CODI consisted of agents from the Federal Police, Air Force and Navy personnel, and civil and military police officers who were at the disposal of the Army’s command. The training material for the agents who made up the DOI-CODI, prepared by one of the re-gime’s greatest torturers, Carlos Brilhante Ustra, recommended carrying out more intense interrogations when it came to “sub-versives”, without the concern of causing death or any serious injury.²⁴

The country had several DOI-CODIs offices spread throughout the territory during the authoritarian regime, which became known as great centres of arbitrary detention and torture practices. Many of these arrests had no legal basis. In addition to that, it was common to frame opponents of the regime in the provisions of the National Security Law, a legislation created in 1935 during the authoritarian period called the Estado Novo and reissued in 1967. This law anticipated for crimes against national security and political and social order and was used on a large scale to criminalise opponents of the regime.

PUBLIC SECURITY INSTITUTIONS AND ARMED FORCES: THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

The transition period to democracy was heavily controlled by the authoritarian regime. Despite it, the National Constituent Assembly (ANC) held between 1987–1988 had a large participation of civil society and great advances in certain matters. In this sense, the ANC was the result of the confluence of forces that wanted the permanence of policies and institutional designs committed to authoritarianism, as well as movements committed to the implementation of a new democratic order of respect for human rights. It was in this turbulent scenario that the current Federal Constitution was born.

With regard to the Armed Forces, there was an intense debate about the possibility of it being part of the internal security acting as an intervening power in the event of political crises. The groups in favour of this proposal saw the Armed Forces as regulators of civil society due to its inability to govern itself without the use of force and violence. This proposal was aligned with a military group’s desire, who was concerned about the lack of prestige and discredit the Armed Forces would have in a democratic system, besides not having any engagement with the new democratic order that was being inaugurated.²⁵

At the same time, there were groups that defended the action of the Armed Forces only for national defence to protect the borders and in case of war. During the National Constituent Assembly, several members of the Superior War College were heard. They used the terminology of the National Security Doctrine widely disseminated during the authoritarian regime to defend the possibility of intervention by the Armed Forces in national political life. In the end, the constitutional text did not bring major innovations compared to previous texts, with the exception of the wording given by authoritarian regimes. The Armed Forces were subordinated to the civil power and destined to guarantee the constitutional powers. The biggest change occurred in the foundational principles of this text: for it is a constitutional framework, democratic principles adopted by Brazil in the Federal Constitution of 1988 does not admit that the military interfere voluntarily in the internal order.

With regard to the police, Brazil has adopted a rather confused model of organization. The 1988 Constitution provides for the following police institutions: Federal Police; Federal Highway Police; Civil Police; Military Police and Fire Department; Federal, State and District Criminal Police.

It is up to the Federal and Civil Police to investigate criminal offences, open police inquiries and investigate possible crimes, as long as they are not military crimes, which are investigated by the military justice.

The military police are highlighted in this constitutional design. According to the Constitution, the military police are supplementary and reserved forces of the Army, responsible for ostensive policing and preservation of public order. The military police respond to two commands: on the one hand, it owes obedience to the Army, responsible for its control and coordination, and, on the other, to the Secretary of Public Security of each State, responsible for its orientation and planning.²⁶ The military police comply with the Army regulations, as long as they do not conflict with state law. This institutional ambiguity makes the military police function like small disorganized armies, incapable of carrying out preventive actions, relating to citizens and controlling themselves internally. The structure of the military police itself mirrors the Army’s, having commands, regiments, battalions, etc. Military police uniforms also strongly resemble army uniforms.²⁷ Under the democratic regime, the military police has increasingly moved away from the ideal of a non-investigative, routine and urban police, frequently characterized by excessive use of force, structural corruption and arbitrary and excessive exercise of arrests in the act.

PUBLIC SECURITY AND ARMED FORCES IN DEMOCRACY

Brazil is going through a serious crisis in public security institutions, which has been increasing year by year. None of these institutions were able to carry out relevant structural reforms after the democratization. There was no extraction of agents who

1. [23] Brasil. Relatório/Comissão Nacional da Verdade. Brasília: CNV, 2014. Vol. I. https://cnv.memoriasreveladas.gov.br/.

2. [24] Brasil. Relatório/Comissão Nacional da Verdade. Brasília: CNV, 2014. Vol. I. https://cnv.memoriasreveladas.gov.br/.

3. [25] Schinke, Vanessa Dorneles, “A história que nos contam: a memória do judiciário sobre o regime autoritário”, in Revista Direito e Práxis, v. 8, p. 1224–1249, 2017.

4. [26] Soares, Luiz Eduardo, Desmilitarizar: segurança pública e direitos humanos. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2019.

5. [27] Muniz, Jacqueline de Oliveira, “A Crise de Identidade das Polícia Militares Brasileiras”, in Security and Defense Studies Review, 2001, p. 177–198.

practiced torture during the authoritarian regime. On the contrary, agents who aligned themselves with dictatorial practices continued within the institutions and progressed in their careers, many of them reaching the peak of it. The problems of public security institutions in a democracy start in the formation of its agents – many of them underwent training courses that do not dialogue with the needs of a democratic, plural, and complex system – to institutional designs that mimic structures and divisions created before democracy and that do not meet the needs of the professionals of these institutions.²⁸

In relation to the Military Police, the Federal Constitution gave exclusivity to ostensive policing, a relevant activity in democratic societies. The heavily militarised and hybrid design of the Military Police, however, does not contribute to the improvement of its responsibilities. Currently, Brazil has one of the highest rates of incarceration in the world and most arrests are based on flagrant arrests made by military police officers in the exercise of ostensible policing. The excessive use of arrests in the act and the lack of prevention and intelligence in the police action have become one of the biggest problems of the democratic regime. At the same time, torture is still a common practice within the police.

The Armed Forces, in turn, did not collaborate with investigations into the serious human rights violations committed during the authoritarian regime and did not carry out any removal or accountability of its officers who notoriously contributed to these violations and repression, or who held relevant positions in the regime. Several sectors of the Armed Forces have difficulty understanding the place that these institutions should occupy in a constitutional and democratic regime. Therefore, it is common in periods of greater authoritarian recrudescence for Brazil to have military personnel occupying relevant civilian positions, even if such soldiers do not have any technical capacity to exercise such functions. Furthermore, these same sectors of the Armed Forces maintain the possibility to intervene in the political direction of the country, not only through the occupation of government high-level positions, but also through the use of force, breaking the constitutionally constituted powers. The transition to democracy of public security institutions and armed forces

was clearly flawed and insufficient for the challenges of Brazilian democracy. More than that, public security institutions, in the current format replicate several of the designs built before the democratic regime, perpetuating violent and authoritarian practices, typical of the previous regime, being an unavoidable factor that must be faced if Brazil intends to face the past authoritarianism and the legacy of serious human rights violations.

LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORMS IN THE JUDICIARY, POLICE AND ARMED FORCES:

1/ Institutional reforms in the justice system, reducing the jurisdiction of the military justice to exceptional cases and prohibiting the subject of civilians to military jurisdiction;

2/ Institutional reforms in the police, with the extinction of the military police;

3/ Adoption of entry forms and training courses for police and armed forces careers that honor knowledge of human rights and that dialogue with the needs of a democratic, complex and plural society;

4/ Prohibition of public institutions denying the authoritarian past and the serious violations of human rights practiced during the authoritarian regime;

5/ Recognition by the Armed Forces of their participation in the authoritarian regime and in serious human rights violations;

6/ Openness and wide access to the archives of the Armed Forces regarding the serious violations of human rights committed during the authoritarian period;

7/ Removal and accountability of members of the careers of the Armed Forces, the police or the judiciary who have contributed to the practice of serious violations of human rights during the authoritarian period, without applying Law 6.683/79 to its agents;

8/ Creation of memory spaces related to the participation of public security institutions, the Armed Forces and the Judiciary during the authoritarian period.

1. [28] Bonelli, Maria da Gloria, Os Delegados de Polícia entre o Profissionalismo e a Política no Brasil. São Paulo: Universidade Federal de São Carlos, 2003.

REFERENCES

Abrão, Paulo, “A Lei de Anistia no Brasil. As alternativas para a verdade e a justiça”, in Acervo, Rio de Janeiro, 2011, v. 24, n. 1, jan./jun, p. 119–138

Bonelli, Maria da Gloria, Os Delegados de Polícia entre o Profissionalismo e a Política no Brasil. São Paulo: Universidade Federal de São Carlos, 2003

Brasil. Relatório/Comissão Nacional da Verdade. Brasília: CNV, 2014. Vol. I. https://cnv.memoriasreveladas.gov.br/ Carvalho, José Murilo de., Forças Armadas e política no Brasil. São Paulo: Todavia, 2019

Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos. (2018), Caso Herzog e outros vs. Brasil. Sentença de 15 de março de 2018. Disponível em: https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_353_por.pdf

Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos. Caso Gomes Lund e outros – Guerrilha de Araguaia – c. Brasil – sentença de 24 de novembro de 2010, 2010

Debert, Guita, Polícia e delegacias. Antropologia e Direito: temas antropológicos para estudos jurídicos. Rio de Janeiro/Brasília: ABA/ LACED/Contracapa Livraria, 2012

Del Río, Andrés, Meyer, Emilio Peluso Neder, “Justiça transicional no brasil: os labirintos da impunidade”, in Marona, Marjorie, Del Rio, Andrés, Justiça no Brasil: às margens da democracia. Belo Horizonte: Arraes Editores, 2018

Del Río, Andrés, Cesário Alvim Gomes, Juliana, Direitos Humanos e Relações Cívico-Militares: o caso da expansão da competência da Justiça Militar no Brasil. Mural Internacional, Rio de Janeiro, Vol. 11, 2020, e48807

Garrido da Silva, Alexandre, Ribas Vieira, José, “Justiça transicional, direitos humanos e a seletividade do ativismo judicial no Brasil”, in Revista Anistia Política e Justiça de Transição, n. 2 (jul. / dez. 2009). Brasília: Ministério da Justiça

Guerra, Maria Pia, Machado Filho, Roberto Dalledone, “O regime constitucional da segurança pública: dos silêncios da Constituinte às deliberações do Supremo Tribunal Federal”, in Revista de Informações Legislativas, Brasília, v. 219, 2018, p. 155–181

Guitiérrez, Juan Carlos, Cantú, Silvano, “A restrição à jurisdição militar nos sistemas internacionais de proteção dos direitos humanos”, in SUR – Revista Internacional e Direitos Humanos, 2010, v. 7, n. 13, p. 75–97

Koerner, Andrei, Assumpção, San Romanoli, “A lei de Anistia e o Estado democrático de direito no Brasil”, in Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, 2009, Vol. 24, n. 69. São Paulo, fev

Manso, Bruno Paes, A República das milícias: dos esquadrões da morte à era Bolsonaro. São Paulo: Todavia, 2020

Meyer, Emílio Peluso Neder, “Criminal Responsibility in Brazilian Transitional Justice: A Constitutional Interpretative Process under the Paradigm of International Human Rights Law”, in Indonesian Journal of International and Comparative Law, 2017, v. IV, p. 41–72

Mingardi, Guaracy, Tiras, gansos e trutas: cotidiano e reforma na polícia civil. São Paulo: Scritta, 1992

Ministério da Defesa. Histórico de GLO. 26/11/2019. 2019. https://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/exercicios_e_operacoes/glo/2_tabelas_glo_atualizada_em_261119.pdf

Muniz, Jacqueline de Oliveira, “A Crise de Identidade das Polícia Militares Brasileiras”, in Security and Defense Studies Review, 2001, p. 177–198

Muniz, Jacqueline de Oliveira, Proença Júnior, Domício, “Forças armadas e policiamento”, in Revista Brasileira de Segurança Pública, 2007, a. 1, ed. 1, pp. 48–63

Pereira, Anthony W., Ditadura e repressão: o autoritarismo e o estado de direito no Brasil, no Chile e na Argentina. São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2010

Rede Latino-americana de Justiça de Transição, Nota de repúdio à declaração do Deputado Federal Jair Bolsonaro, 2016

Rocha, Alexandre Pereira da, A gramática das polícias militarizadas: estudo comparado entre a Polícia Militar do Estado de São Paulo – Brasil e Carabineros – Chile, em regimes políticos autoritários e democráticos. 2013. 303 f. Tese (Doutorado em Ciências Sociais). Universidade de Brasília, Brasília

Schinke, Vanessa Dorneles, “A história que nos contam: a memória do judiciário sobre o regime autoritário”, in Revista Direito e Práxis, v. 8, p. 1224–1249, 2017

Schinke, Vanessa Dorneles, Judiciário e autoritarismo: regime autoritário (1964–1985), democracia e permanências. Rio de Janeiro: Lumen Juris, 2016

Schinke, Vanessa Dorneles, “O papel da Escola Superior de Guerra na sustentação do regime autoritário brasileiro”, in Revista Direito e Práxis, v. 10, n. 3, p. 1955–1980, 2019. https://www.e-publicacoes.uerj.br/index.php/revistaceaju/article/view/34661/26355

Schinke, Vanessa Dorneles, “A assembleia nacional constituinte e as forças armadas: os trabalhos da subcomissão”, in Revista Direito e Práxis, 2021. https://www.e-publicacoes.uerj.br/index.php/revistaceaju/article/view/52473/37200

Sikkink, Kathryn, “A Era da Responsabilização: a ascensão da responsabilização penal individual”, in A anistia na era da responsabilização: o Brasil em perspectiva internacional e comparada. Brasília: Ministério da Justiça, Comissão de Anistia; Oxford: Oxford University, Latin American Centre, 2011

Silva, A. M. D. Da, Ditadura e Justiça Militar no Brasil: A Atuação do Superior Tribunal Militar (1964–1980). Tese de Doutorado em História, Política e Bens Culturais. Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil – CPDOC, Rio de Janeiro, 2011

Soares, Luiz Eduardo, Desmilitarizar: segurança pública e direitos humanos. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2019

Souza, A. B., Silva, Angela M. D. Da, “A organização da Justiça Militar no Brasil: Império e República”, in Estudos Históricos, 2016, maio-agosto, 29 (58), pp. 361–380

Zaverucha, J., Melo Filho, H. C., “Superior Tribunal Militar: entre o autoritarismo e a democracia”, in Dados. 2004, 47 (4), pp. 763–797.

THE ARCHIVES OF THE BRAZILIAN MILITARY DICTATORSHIP

JANAÍNA DE ALMEIDA TELES¹

CONTENT OF THE SECRET SERVICE ARCHIVES

The archives that document repression during the military dictatorship in Brazil (1964–1985) are known for being manifold. Among other reasons, this is due to the complexity and ubiquity of the repressive state apparatus, as well as the administrative bureaucracy installed by the dictatorship, one of the worst in the region. The range of political and institutional transformations brought about by the state of exception aimed at giving the state strict social and political control. The National Truth Commission (Comissão Nacional da Verdade, hereinafter called CNV) estimates that the fatal victims of the dictatorship encompass, besides the 434 known cases,² other 8,350 indigenous people (estimate which encompasses only ten nations of the native peoples) as well as 1,192 peasants and supporters killed in land disputes.³

The implementation of the repressive apparatus demanded a well-structured bureaucratic system, like those of sophisticated states, as well as a high level of collaboration between civilians and the military. This allowed for a division of responsibilities as well as some leeway for the state to manage power and disputes inside and outside its apparatus. In such context, the repressive apparatus has gradually evolved to more violent and centralized action against the reorganization of the state, which brought the Armed Forces to coordinate and take over the role of political police.⁴

After May 1967, significant changes took place due to the reorganization of the information bodies of the Brazilian Armed Forces, which were turned into “hybrid bodies”, meaning they merged information and repression operations. In July 1967, the National Information Service (Serviço Nacional de Informações, hereafter called SNI) – created in 1964 in order to collect and systematize information – was integrated to the Divisions of Security and Information (Divisões de Segurança e Informações, hereinafter called DSI), which, in turn, were connected to the civil ministries, and to the Advisory of Security and Information (Assessorias de Segurança e Informações, hereafter called ASI). These worked mainly in universities and state-owned enterprises.⁵ The aggravation of the conflicts with the left wings and the opposition groups as well as the intensification of the dispute for the presidential succession within the government hastened the process which led the Army to take control of activities regarding public and internal security, with the decree of Institutional Act No. 5 (Ato Institucional No. 5, hereinafter called AI-5).

These changes in the repressive apparatus led to the organization of Operação Bandeirante (OBAN). Started in July 1969, this operation counted on the financial support of businessmen, bankers and multinational companies. After this successful experience, one year later DOI-Codi (Destacamentos de Operações de Informações – Centros de Operações de Defesa Interna – Detachment of Information Operations Center – Internal Defense Operations Center) was created. Little by little, this system became a net of secret and clandestine units specialized in fighting “the revolutionary war”.

The most visible face of repression was made up by the State Departments for Political and Social Order (Departamentos Es-taduais de Ordem Política e Social, hereinafter called DOPS), which had been in action since 1924; by the Military Justice (Justiça Militar, hereinafter called JM); the units of the Forensic Medicine Institute (Instituto Médico Legal, herafter called IML), public cemeteries and prisons. The prison system was adapted to punish, separate and isolate all dissidents. Such structure allowed for the repeated use of clandestine pits in public cemeteries of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Pernambuco, thus dismissing the idea that such practices would only be the result of “excessive”, atypical actions to the standard of Brazilian institutions and authorities. In this context, JM has become a fundamental element for the legitimation of the regime and an important factor for the disengagement from political opposition.⁶

In this context, political violence has become more extreme, especially after the conversion of the Military Police (Polícia Militar, hereinafter called PM) into an assistant organ to the Army, in July 1969. With the transformation of the police forces,⁷ repression has spread over several social groups, most notably the ones which lived in big cities slums or those involved in land disputes in the rural areas.

ATTEMPTS TO DESTROY THE OPERATION DOCUMENTS OF THE POLITICAL FORCE

Such extensive repressive apparatus has led to a silence pact regarding the repressive actions perpetrated by the military

1. [1] With special thanks to researcher Pádua Fernandes, from Research Institute for Rights and Social Movements (IPDMS), without whom this article would not have been possible.

2. [2] The actual estimate is 454 fatal victims, Janaina de A. Teles, “‘Eliminar, sem deixar vestígios’: a distensão política e o desaparecimento forçado no Bra-sil”, in Revista M., Rio de janeiro, v. 5, n. 10, Jul./Dec.2020, p. 265–297.

3. [3] Comissão Nacional da Verdade, Relatório: Textos Temáticos, Vol. II, Brasília/DF, 2014, CNV, p. 203–262, p. 91–153.

4. [4] Janaina de Almeida Teles, Memórias dos cárceres da ditadura militar: as lutas e os testemunhos dos presos políticos no Brasil. São Paulo, Tese de Doutorado, História/FFLCH-USP, 2011.

5. [5] Carlos Fico, Como eles agiam: os subterrâneos da ditadura militar. Rio de Janeiro, Record, 2001, p. 63, 91–92.

6. [6] The Military Justice (JM) had been established by several legislative actions, which overlapped and merged. The legality of exception has resulted in a bloated system, overlapping, besides the Brazilian Constitution, over 366 legislative actions, among them exceptional actions, as well as complementary and ordinary laws and acts. Janaina de Almeida Teles, Memórias dos cárceres da ditadura militar: as lutas e os testemunhos dos presos políticos no Brasil. São Paulo, Tese de Doutorado, História/FFLCH-USP, 2011.

7. [7] Martha K. Huggins, Polícia e política: relações Estados Unidos/América-Latina. São Paulo, Cortez, 1998.

dictatorship. The ambiguous dynamic which supported the legality of the exception, as well as the controlled transition into democracy explains, to a large extent, the fact that the repression archives were under the custody of the military and of institutions which remained active even after the end of the dictatorship, with the issue of the 1988 Federal Constitution. The nature of the democratic transition had great impact on the conservation of the repression archives, whose documentation started gaining clarification in 1978, when SNI inaugurated a program for the reorganization, reassessment and the elimination of documents under the custody of the organ’s central agency and its regional branches. The program made it possible to purge thousands of documents which were considered to be “useless” for the repressive apparatus.⁸

In March 1990, when the first democratically elected Brazilian president – Fernando Collor – took office, SNI was extinct. This started a long and slow process of transferring a significant portion of the documents regarding repression to public archives. A few months before that, in December 1989, “Pro-ject SNI” was created, in order to plan its redraft in conformity with the newly democratic context. The idea was to cover its illegal action, according to the available documents, adapting them to the speech of democratic values and public service transparency. To do so, SNI carried out a considerable cleansing in its archives collection, keeping only the ones that had legal support in order to avoid embarrassment and problems with justice.⁹

In this regard, in response to a request from the families of the dead and disappeared, former president Fernando Collor promoted, in 1991, the opening of the archives under the custody of the states’ political police bodies, the DOPS, thus starting the process of making these documents available to the respective public archives. Pressure from several agents resulted in the transfer of the collection from DOPS/SP to the public archive in January 1992. The initial researches done by family members of the victims and human rights activists showed several gaps in the documents provided by the military information bodies, especially the one regarding the Araguaia Guerilla.¹⁰ This was in keeping with the responses given by the Brazilian Army along the legal disputes involving family members of the disappeared in the Araguaia, in progress at the time. Such responses reasserted the inexistence of a document collection regarding the period, as the archive had been incinerated, however with no proof of the destruction of the documents.¹¹ The Brazilian Armed Forces repeatedly claimed that the repression files had been supposedly destroyed during legal routine operations, hypothesis which was later dismissed by facts, thus provoking a heated debate regarding the legality of such measures.¹²

Notwithstanding, a considerably extensive collection of documents could be preserved, and their custody was given to the National Archive (hereinafter called AN, Portuguese for Arquivo Nacional) as from 2005. In the same year, SNI’s collection was transferred to the AN, although it was only open to public consultation in 2012. It is estimated that the Brazilian compilation counts on around 27 million pages of text documents concerning the period of the military dictatorship. A considerable part of this set is made up by the files of the state public police bodies, the DOPS, which contain about 10 million text documents.¹³ In the 1990s, these documents slowly started being made available to public consultation.

USE OF ARCHIVES DURING TRANSFORMATION; RISKS RELATED TO THE USE OF ARCHIVES

In the face of this political-institutional situation, the transition back into democracy in Brazil culminated in a process that was regulated by the civil and military elites who, with no evident disruptions, guaranteed impunity to torturers¹⁴ and crime

1. [8] One third of the SNI collection is estimated to have been destroyed between 1978 and 1990. Within this period, 58 % of the documents belonging to the Central Agency of the Brazilian Intelligence Service were discarded. Inez Stampa, San R. Assunção, Cristina Buarque de Hollanda (org.), Arquivos, democracia e ditadura: reflexões a partir dos 10 anos do Centro de Referência Memórias Reveladas do Arquivo Nacional. Curitiba, Appris, 2020, p. 36–38.

2. [9] On 9th February 1990, SNI’s director ordered cabinet members to return documents which had been previously disclosed to the DSIs, Lucas Figueiredo, Ministério do Silêncio. A história do serviço secreto brasileiro de Washington Luís a Lula (1927–2005). Rio de Janeiro, Record, 2005, p. 418–421.

3. [10] Roldão Arruda, “Parentes de desaparecidos dizem que PF usou o arquivo”, in O Estado de S. Paulo, 19. 3. 1992.

4. [11] In this period, the military information bodies changed added the term “Intelligence” to their names and acronyms. CISA (Air Force Information and Security Center) became Secint (Air Force Intelligence Secretariat –Secretaria de Inteligência da Aeronáutica); Cenimar (Navy Information Center) became CIM (Navy Intellligence Center – Centro de Inteligência da Marinha). CIE kept the same acronym, but changed its name from Army Information Center to Army Intelligence Center in late 1992. The idea behind these name changes was to make sure these bodies remained active in the scope of internal security. Lucas Figueiredo, Ministério do Silêncio. A história do serviço secreto brasileiro de Washington Luís a Lula (1927–2005). Rio de Janeiro, Record, 2005, p. 461–462.

5. [12] Such account was refuted following the disclosure of photographs by the Brazilian press in 2004 which had been initially assigned to journalist Vladimir Herzog, tortured and assassinated at DOI-Codi/São Paulo, in 1975. Vinícius Torres Freire et. al., “Amigos divergem sobre veracidade de fotos”, in Folha de S. Paulo, 20/10/2004, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ fsp/brasil/fc2010200411.htm. As a matter of fact, this account has been refuted in several occasions, so in March 2010 Defense Minister Nelson Jobim sent a letters to Dilma Rousseff claiming that the period legislation supported evidence erasing with no documenting. It is worth noting that this was true for the period between 1949 and 1967 (Decree 27583/1949 and Law 5433/1968), as an exceptional measure. Lucas Figueiredo, Lugar Nenhum: militares na ocultação dos documentos da ditadura. São Paulo, Companhia das Letras, 2015, p. 96–97.

6. [13] This set comprises the collections of several bodies, namely SNI, EsNi (National Information School – Escola Nacional de Informações); CGI (General Investigations Commission – Comissão Geral de Investigações) – this one responsible for the investigation of corruption accusations –, the Federal Police Information Division (Divisão de Informações da Polícia Federal) and the General Staff of the Armed Forces. Besides these, the set i salso made up by the collections belonging to the sector bodies of the National Information and Counter-Information System (SISNI), as well as DSIs (Security and Information Divisions), ASIs (Security and Information Advisory Services) and AESIs (Special Security and Information Advisory Services), not to mention DOPS collections. Stampa, Inez, et.al., eds., Arquivos, democracia e ditadura: reflexões a partir dos 10 anos do Centro de Referência Memórias Reveladas do Arquivo Nacional. Curitiba, Appris, 2020, p. 28–29, p. 56.

7. [14] Law 6.683/79 was interpreted in a way which assigned a very sui generis meaning to the concept of connected crimes. As it regarded ‘crimes connected to political crimes”, it was considered ‘mutual amnesty’, which means that the nature of the crimes torturers committed would equate the one of the political crimes committed by the dictatorship opponents. However, according to the concept of connected crimes, the perpetrators of the crimes should be the same, as well as the crime motivations, and this was obviously not the case. Based on the theory of the two demons, this perspective equates State violence with that committed by the dictatorship dissidents. Janaína de Almeida Teles, Os herdeiros da memória: as lutas dos familiares de mortos e desaparecidos políticos no Brasil. São Paulo, Dissertação de Mestrado, História/FFLCH-USP, 2005.

perpetrators, as well as the persistence of several mechanisms of the National Security State.¹⁵

Due to this, the opening of the repression files kept on being permeated by the tensions and ambiguities involved in the transition process, which was restricted to a privileged group “of political and social disputes”.¹⁶ In contrast with the neighboring countries, the Brazilian processes were acutely restrained, especially those regarding the investigation of the abuses committed by the dictatorial state, the penal accountability of those who committed serious violations to human rights, as well as initiatives of reformulation of the Brazilian Armed Forces, of the administrative structure, above all of the public security, with the aim of overcoming the authoritarian legacy.

In the 1982 direct elections for state governors, opposition party candidates were elected in the main states, resulting in a slow and obscure dismantling of the repressive organs which aimed at political vigilance and persecution, starting by the political police bodies. In the state of São Paulo, DOPS was extinct in 1983, and its archive was transferred to the Federal Police, whose director was deputy Romeu Tuma, former DOPS director.¹⁷ Notwithstanding the massive electoral victory of the oppositions, the first civil president was elected indirectly in 1985, despite the social movement which took millions of Brazilians to march on the streets in favor of direct elections, a movement called “Diretas Já” (Direct Elections Now). This year was marked by the publishing of the report of Project Brasil Nunca Mais (BNM, in English, Brazil Never Again), based on a wide range of documents found in the archive of the Supreme Military Court (STM – Supremo Tribunal Militar). The project, coordinated by the São Paulo Archdiocese, allowed the lawyers of politically persecuted people to secretly copy court cases based on the National Security Law (LSN – Lei de Segurança Nacional) between 1964 and 1979.¹⁸ Soon after the first civil president took office, a book which revealed accusations of human rights violations documented by the Military Justice itself was published. It resulted in the first “foundational act”¹⁹ in the construction of the social memory regarding dictatorship violence, thus favoring the constitution of a collective consciousness about the repressive policy of the period and the status of the survivors, as well as encouraging research studies and legal accusations.²⁰

In 1987, the Archdiocese of São Paulo donated the material collected by the project BNM to Centro de Documentação Edgard Leuenroth, a documentation center from the State University of Campinas (Unicamp), thus guaranteeing unrestricted access to its compilation.²¹ In this period, the intense popular mobilization regarding the National Constituent Assembly guaranteed the conquest of fundamental democratic prerogatives listed in the 1988 Constitution, called “Citizen” Constitution, such as the right to receiving information of both private and collective interest from public bodies as well as the habeas data. In spite of the institution of a transparency paradigm and access to public information through the Magna Carta, the generic, contradictory and not very operational character prevailed in the establishing of these rights.²²

PUBLIC CONTROL OVER ARCHIVES; DECLASSIFICATION AND OPENING UP THE ARCHIVES

Archive files play a fundamental role as a tool for the exercise of democracy and of civil rights, being used as proof of the abuses committed by authoritarian regimes in legal actions such as the National Truth Commission. Such documents contribute with a boomerang effect²³ to qualify the victims of forced disappearance, summary executions or tortures, as well as to rebuild the history of resistance to tyranny. In Brazil, due to the scarce official support to the factual retrieval of the repression actions perpetrated by the military dictatorship, for a long time, the archives were made up essentially by documents and testimonials collected and promoted by the victims and their family members, as well as organisms in favor of human rights.

With the extinction of SNI in March 1990,²⁴ a slow process of transferring the documents regarding repression started taking place. Not long after that, in September 1990, the opening of clandestine pits in Perus, São Paulo, had a great repercussion along the public opinion, thus turning into another “foundational act” of the memory regarding the military dictatorship. The search for bone remains of militants who were killed by the state repression was

1. [15] Brazilian 1988 Federal Constitution has articles inspired by the country’s authoritarian tradition and laws that remain from the dictatorial period. This allows us to categorize Brazil’s current democracy as a regime under military tutelage. Examples of this are Constitution article 142, which determines that the Armed Forces “have the role of defending the country, and of guaranteeing constitutional powers as well as law and order by means of any of the aforementioned powers” and the National Security Law (Lei de Segurança Nacional – LSN), existing since 1983. José Murilo de Carvalho, “Forças Armadas e política no Brasil”. São Paulo, Companhia das Letras, 2015, p. 21–25.

2. [16] Elizabeth Jelin, Los trabajos de la memoria. Madrid, Siglo XXI, 2002, p. 3.

3. [17] DOPS Rio Grande do Sul was the first one to become extinct in 1982. Arquivo Histórico do Rio Grande do Sul, “Acervo da luta contra a ditadura“, in Secretaria da Cultura, https://cultura.rs.gov.br/acervo-da-luta-contra-a-ditadura.

4. [18] In the two years following its publication, this was the most sold book in Brazil, with over 300 thousand copies sold. After the extinction of AI-5 and the reformulation of the National Security Law (LSN) in December 1978, the lawyers of political prisoners were allowed to order and secretly copy the lawsuits of their clients with the Superior Military Court (STM). Between 1964 and 1979, 707 full processes were copied, as well as tens of incomplete ones, resulting in around 1,2 million pages of testimonies and documents produced by the repressive apparatus or confiscated by them from the dissident groups. This collection is currently available on Project Brasil: Nunca Mais website, on https://bnmdigital.mpf.mp.br/pt-br/.

5. [19] Elizabeth Jelin, Los trabajos de la memoria. Madrid, Siglo XXI, 2002, p. 42–43.

6. [20] Janaina de A. Teles, “A constituição das memórias sobre a repressão da ditadura: o projeto Brasil: Nunca Mais e a abertura da vala de Perus”, in Revista Anos 90, Porto Alegre, v. 19, n. 35, jul. 2012, p. 265.

7. [21] In the same year, the project team published a new study revealing the main data about the profile of the victims of the Military Justice in the dictatorial period, Arquidiocese de São Paulo, O perfil dos atingidos. Petrópolis/RJ, Vozes, 1987.

8. [22] There has been a lot of engagement from several sides in order to create specific measurement tools to enforce the right to information access and to governmental transparency. One such example was the law that established the right to habeas data (Lei no. 9507/1997). João Francisco Resende, Da opacidade à publicidade: atores e ideias na construção de políticas de acesso à informação governamental no Brasil. São Paulo, Dissertação de Mestrado, EACH/USP, 2018.

9. [23] Antonio González Quintana. Los archivos de seguridad del Estado de los desaparecidos: regímenes represivos, Santiago de Chile, 1999.

10. [24] The Intelligence Department (DI – Departamento de Inteligência) took SNI’s place between 1990 and 1992. After that, the Under-Secretariat of Intelligence (SSI – Subsecretaria de Inteligência), was installed and remained active between 1992 and 1999. Lastly, the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (Abin – Agên-cia Brasileira de Inteligência) was established in 1999. Both bodies were created with the objective of enhancing internal security. Lucas Figueiredo, Ministério do Silêncio. A história do serviço secreto brasileiro de Washington Luís a Lula (1927–2005). Rio de Janeiro, Record, 2005, p. 452–462.

accompanied by the installation of an investigation commission (CPI – Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito) in the City Council of São Paulo in order to investigate the crimes committed in that setting. The national repercussion of these facts favored the research in the archive of the Forensic Medicine Institute (IML – Instituto Médico Legal) in the states of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, thus giving birth to forensic searches and excavations with the objective of finding disappeared and other clandestine pits in Rio de Janeiro, Pernambuco and in the southeast of Pará – where the Araguaia Guerilla took place – between 1991 and 1993.²⁵

Concurrently, activists, historians and archivists made an effort to propose bills in order to regulate the rights to access information and the habeas data guaranteed by the Magna Carta, as a way to make them effective. These people were deeply engaged in the proposal of a bill regarding the national policy of public and private archives. This bill passed in January 1991 (Law 8159).²⁶ With advances and setbacks, the process of actually making these rights effective went on by means of ordinary laws and decrees on the subject, issued along the 1990s and 2000s.

In this context of disputes and pressure from several agents, the DOPS/SP collection was transferred to the Public Archive in January 1992,²⁷ thus guaranteeing unrestricted access to entities related to family members of the dead and disappeared, due to the difficulty in reaching a consensus regarding the treatment given to the right to privacy and to collective rights.²⁸

The debate regarding the publicity of such documents has brought to light the existing tension between the public and private spheres, especially in Rio de Janeiro, where historians and survivors have opposed the proposition of unrestricted access to the documents. They highlighted the fact that these files were made up of “expropriations” carried out by the repressive apparatus, having stolen books, letters, photos and personal objects belonging to the politically persecuted, thus going beyond the extortion of information under torture. The personal nature of the material of the files hindered their free access as it violated, in a particularly offensive and cruel way, the privacy of victims and survivors.²⁹

Despite the legitimacy of the aforementioned considerations, the commission of specialists and representatives from segments of the civil society created in São Paulo looked into the situation from another point of view: they took into account the DOPS extinction and the fact that its attributions were not transferred to any other organs, thus characterizing the collection as a closed-end fund, befitting historical archives. Therefore, the documents should be made available to the public with no restrictions, highlighting the end of the values which justified the existence of the political police.³⁰ Unrestricted access constituted the main means to expand the public debate on the legacy of the military dictatorship and to share with the society the burden of the investigations undertaken by the victims and their family members.

Following extensive consultation promoted by the aforementioned commission, which culminated with a seminar on the subject in August 1994, unrestricted access to the repression documents was guaranteed in São Paulo as from December 1994.³¹ It was taken into account that the official sources of the repressive apparatus should be analysed in conformity with their production conditions, marked by the use of physical and psychological torture, involving disclosures, false testimonies and made-up stories all aiming at stopping violence. Besides, it was common for these institutions to fake documents in order to hide prisoners or to protect the identity of police agents infiltrated in opposition organizations, among other aspects related to counter information. The production of fake documents for operational or legitimating use is a recurring practice in security bodies, which doesn't affect its probative use when submitted to a strict critique of the sources.³²

Another aspect to be considered, in keeping with the reflections of Ana Maria de A. Camargo, was that these collections result from the accumulation of a number of documents – produced along the activities carried out by the institutions – thus turned into instruments and witnesses of their operation. In archive documentation, authenticity is distinct from veracity, which should be sought in a broader scope of investigation. The prevalence of the context over the content of the documents is crucial to understanding the peculiar evidence these documents bear. As they are produced for their strict and immediate functionality, with no aspiration to inform posterity, these documents reflect the internal rationale of the institutions that produced them, bearing witness to their competences, functions and activities.³³

The very biased nature of the documents’ probative value gave room for questioning the access restrictions which, based on the right to intimacy, made the repression files unavailable to public

1. [25] Janaina de Almeida Teles, “Vala clandestina de Perus: entre o passado e o presente”, in Revista InSURgência, Brasília, ano 4, v. 4, no. 1, 2018, p. 300–341.

2. [26] The law established the a period of 30 years (renewable only once) before access was granted to the top-secret documents which jeopardized ‘secu-rity of both society and State’. and 100 years before disclosing documents which could hurt the honor and the image of the individuals involved (Cap. V, § 2 e 3), https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l8159.htm.

3. [27] The DOPS files were collected and preserved in twelve states of Brazil, out of a total of existing twenty, Inez Stampa, San R. Assunção, Cristina Buarque de Hollanda, eds., Arquivos, democracia e ditadura: reflexões a partir dos 10 anos do Centro de Referência Memórias Reveladas do Arquivo Nacional. Curitiba, Appris, 2020, p. 51.

4. [28] The family members did their research mainly in the collection of the Secret Service at DOPS/São Paulo, made up by 1,100,000 individual personal records and 9.626 folders, with documents produced between 1940 and 1983, Criméia A. S. Almeida, Suzana K. Lisbôa, Janaína de A. Teles, Maria Amélia de A. Teles, eds., Dossiê Ditadura: Mortos e Desaparecidos políticos no Brasil (1964–1985). São Paulo, Imprensa Oficial, 2009.

5. [29] Beatriz Kushnir. “Decifrando as astúcias do mal”, in Revista do Arquivo Público Mineiro. Belo Horizonte/MG, ano XLII, n. 1, jan.–jun., 2006, p. 46 and Ludmila da Silva Catela, “Do segredo à verdade… processos sociais e políticos na abertura dos arquivos da repressão no Brasil e na Argentina”, in Cecília M. Santos, Janaina de Almeida Teles, Edson Luís de Almeida Teles, eds., Desarquivando a Ditadura. Memória e justiça no Brasil. Vol. II, São Paulo, Hucitec, 2009, p. 465–470.

6. [30] Historian Ana Maria de A. Camargo was a member of the experts commission created by the Sao Paulo State Secretariat of Culture (Secretaria da Cultura do Estado de São Paulo) to debate the issue of access to documents. Please refer to Ana Maria de Almeida Camargo, “Informação, documento e arquivo: o acesso em questão”, in Boletim da Associação dos Arquivistas Brasileiros, Seção Regional de São Paulo, n. 11, mai.–ago./1993, p. 4 and “Os arquivos da polícia política como fonte”, in Registro, Indaiatuba, n. 1, jul. 2002.

7. [31] I took part as a presenter in the seminar in which the unrestricted disclosure of the documents from DOPS/São Paulo was decided. “Estado abre arquivo do Deops”, in Diário Popular, 25. 8. 1994, p. 5.

8. [32] Ana Maria de A. Camargo, “Os arquivos e o acesso à verdade”, in Cecília

   M. Santos, Janaína de Almeida Teles, Edson Luís de Almeida Teles, eds., Desarquivando a Ditadura. Memória e justiça no Brasil. Vol. II, São Paulo, Hucitec, 2009, p. 434.

9. [33] Ana Maria de A. Camargo, “Os arquivos e o acesso à verdade”, in Cecília M. Santos, Janaína de Almeida Teles, Edson Luís de Almeida Teles, eds., Desarquivando a Ditadura. Memória e justiça no Brasil. Vol. II, São Paulo, Hucitec, 2009, p. 434–435.

consultation. The initial research of the family members suggested that the search for clues about the political disappeared demanded an investigation of the whole collection of documents, not only those connected to the records where their names were listed. It was necessary to scrutinize the documents of close people, examine the ones resulting from information exchanges in different hierarchical levels in several institutions, knowing that they worked in close cooperation with one another. It was also contended that, if these documents presented rumors or lies, the best thing to do was to bring them to light in order to reveal their misrepresentation.³⁴

It was highlighted that the material collected from the security bodies or the political police changes status when made available to the public archives: it doesn't have its original function anymore, but it still preserves a bond with the institution where it comes from. This aspect doesn't undermine the probative use of the repressive action, on the contrary, as it is the custody of the guarding entity which prevails over its original meaning and use. The whole of such documentation, seen in its wider production context – makes it possible to get more information about the institution as well as its prior procedures and uses.³⁵

Such view of the articulation of the documental set is fundamental for people to understand the meanders of the files. For this reason, the circumstances in which they are preserved (or not) have great influence on the reliability of their use, thus justifying the worry over protecting them from fraudulent interventions. It is worth highlighting that the research carried out by family members in the archive of DOPS/SP resulted in the discovery that the vigilance of “suspects” continued to exist illegally until 1991, according to entries found in individual files and police records.³⁶

The measure adopted in São Paulo showed appropriate to the development of academic research, as well as to those regarding the abuses committed by the military dictatorship, bearing in mind that there were no accusations or judicial conflicts arising from the violation to the right to privacy.³⁷

Actually, the documents which remained from these institutions proved useful from the historical point of view, as well as in what concerns the investigations of serious violations to human rights. Confronted with the documents provided by the Forensic Medical Institute, the public cemeteries and the interviews held, it was possible to clarify the circumstances of prison, torture and death for most of the opponents mentioned in the accusation files available then, thus confirming the state accountability for these crimes before the Special Commission for Political Dead and Disappeared (in Portuguese, Comissão Especial de Mortos e Desaparecidos Políticos, hereinafter referred to as CEMDP). This institution was created by means of Law 9.140, from December 1995, with the objective of evaluating compensation claims due to extrajudicial executions and forced disappearances between 1961 and 1988.³⁸ It is worth noting that the victims of forced disappearance³⁹ were validated by the law with basis on the information shared by their family member,⁴⁰ with only occasional supplementary information provided by the state, thus frustrating the expectations of society.

In this context, scandals involving corruption cases in the public administration contributed to the advancement in the debate about the right to information access, as seen in the Brazilian scandal referred to as “Seven Dwarves”, which resulted in an investigation promoted by a hybrid nature investigation commission (CPMI – Comissão Parlamentar Mista de Inquérito) in the National Congress in 1993. The sensitivity and interest of society towards access to public documents has expanded so as to reach all types of documents, not only those stored in historical archives,⁴¹ thus strengthening the demand in defense of the right to information access.

RIGHTS AND ACCESS PROBLEMS, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND PERSONAL DATA

The debate around the right to information access in Brazil was guided by its provision in the Brazilian constitution as a subjective right (article 5, XIV) and state duty, with a caveat on confidentiality when indispensable to the security of society and state (article 5, XXXIII). The Magna Carta also guarantees the right to order certificates in government departments (article 5, XXXIV, b) “to defend rights and clarify situations of personal interest” and the habeas data (article 5, LXXII), a specific request for personal information present in public records.⁴²

1. [34] Green restated this argument, among others, James N. Green, “A Proteção da Privacidade com a Abertura Plena dos Arquivos”, in Acervo, Rio de Janeiro, v. 24, n. 1, jan/jun 2011, p. 213. Also check Ana Maria de A. Camargo, “Os arquivos e o acesso à verdade”, in Cecília M. Santos, Janaína de Almeida Teles, Edson Luís de Almeida Teles, eds., Desarquivando a Ditadura. Memória e Justiça no Brasil. Vol. II, São Paulo, Hucitec, 2009, p. 428–29.

2. [35] Ana Maria de A. Camargo, “Os arquivos e o acesso à verdade”, in Cecília M. Santos, Janaína de Almeida Teles, Edson Luís de Almeida Teles, eds., Desarquivando a Ditadura. Memória e justiça no Brasil. Vol. II, São Paulo, Hucitec, 2009, p. 430–431.

3. [36] Roldão Arruda, “Parentes de desaparecidos dizem que PF usou o arquivo”, in O Estado de S. Paulo, 19. 3. 1992.

4. [37] Maria Aparecida Aquino, “As Vísceras expostas do autoritarismo. Uma exposição do resultado de exaustivas pesquisas realizadas sobre a série Dossiês do Arquivo Deops/SP”, in Revista do Arquivo Público Mineiro. Belo Horizonte/MG, ano XLII, n. 1, jan.–jun., 2006, among others.

5. [38] Janaína de Almeida Teles, “Mortos e desaparecidos políticos: um resgate da memória brasileira”, in Janaína Teles (org.), Mortos e desaparecidos políticos: reparação ou impunidade?, São Paulo, Humanitas/FFLCH/USP, p. 168–180.

6. [39] In 1970s Brazil, individuals were deemed victims of forced disappearance by their family members when they had their prison or abduction denied, or when their location or the one of their bone remains were not revealed. If the State acknowledged the death of the individual, even not releasing their body, the individual was no longer deemed missing. This is not in consonance with International Law, according to which a missing body is a decisive factor indicating forced disappearance. Janaína de Almeida Teles, Os herdeiros da memória: as lutas dos familiares de mortos e desaparecidos políticos por “verdade e justiça” no Brasil. São Paulo, Dissertação de Mestrado, História/FFLCH-USP, 2005.

7. [40] The government’s bill, passed by the National Congress (Law 9.140/95) has included a list of the political disappeared elaborated by family members of the victims and activists, published in the book Dossier of Political Dead and Disappeared after 1964 (Recife, CEPE, 1995), which has not been contested. The book was based on research done in the DOPS files between 1992 and 1995 and organized by the Commission of Families of the Political Dead and Disappeared, the State Institute for Violence Studies (IEVE) and the sections of Rio de Janeiro and Pernambuco of the Group Tortura Nunca Mais (Group Torture Never Again).

8. [41] João Francisco Resende, Da opacidade à publicidade: atores e ideias na construção de políticas de acesso à informação governamental no Brasil. São Paulo, Dissertação de Mestrado/Gestão de Políticas Públicas, EACH/ USP, 2018, p. 248.

9. [42] The Brazilian Constitution deems as inviolable “individual’s intimacy, private life, honor and image, thus guaranteeing the right to indemnity for material or moral damages resulting from such violation” (art. 5, item X), https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicao.htm.

In this regard, Law 8159, also called Archives Law, passed in January 1991, followed the constitutional regulation and the principle of access to public documents, except the ones that jeopardized state and society security. This access was restricted for thirty years, only renewable once. The law determined that documents which hurt people’s honor and image would have restricted access for the maximum deadline of 100 years.⁴³ Based on this legislation and on the pressure of the civil society featuring the movement “Political Dead and Disappeared Family Members”, it was possible to disclose the documents of the political police in the state of São Paulo in 1994, against the signature of a consulter’s commitment term.⁴⁴ This measure revealed to be fundamental as both the Disappeared Law (Law 9140/95) and the law that regulated the political amnesty (Law 10559/2002) placed the burden of the persecution to obtain the approval of the compensations granted by them on the families of the fatal victims and survivors. The lack of access to the Armed Forces documents seriously hindered the efforts of the plaintiffs. In parallel with that, president Fernando H. Cardoso violated legal command by signing decree 4553/2002, which established perpetual confidentiality, with no deadline limits. This measure expanded the legal deadlines of the status “top secret”, allowing 50 years of secrecy to be expanded indefinitely. According to the Brazilian legislation, the decree can regulate, but not alter the law. Anything different from that is unconstitutional. In spite of that, this issue has not been brought to the Supreme Court. The violation to the Brazilian Constitution was institutionally manifested by means of this decree, as well as by actions and statements by the military,⁴⁵ who did not act only in the scope of external defense. In 2001, the press revealed the Army action in a secret office located in Marabá (in the Brazilian state of Pará), where social assistance was offered to the peasants who collaborated with the repression to the Araguaia Guerilla, in an operation called “Guardian Angel Operation” (“Operação Anjo da Guarda”). The Federal Public Ministry was searching for the disappeared in the guerilla and found out that the Army kept an updated record of social movements activists. The booklets found in the office catered for the violation of human rights in the cases in which the vigilance activities demanded so.⁴⁶ In order to keep the loyalty of the Armed Forces, such events were not investigated or punished, thus making it evident that Brazil was far from obtaining the demilitarization of the intelligence services and their retreat from internal matters.

There were also other episodes that contributed to the strain of the authorities. In October 2004, statements from the Armed Forces regarding the destruction of military dictatorship documents in the Air Base Salvador were proven to be fake, according to the news on TV.⁴⁷ In this respect, president Lula (2003–2010) revoked decree 4553 in December 2004.⁴⁸ However, the perpetual non-disclosure clause came back into question when Law 11.111, from May 2005 was passed and determined the confidentiality of the documents for unrestricted time in case a commission – which could be made up only by members of the Executive Power –judged it “mandatory for society and state security”. This regulation harmed both constitutional and international laws guaranteed by the Brazilian Constitution and the United Nations, as follows:

By preventing access to the public dictatorial period documents in the archives of both civil and military Brazilian information bodies, civil governments have contributed to limit access to justice by dictatorship victims, thus making it difficult to find evidence in compensations for damages or legal actions, thus generating a standoff which prevents a settlement with the past. The retrieval of the circumstances of the deaths and forced disappearances, as well as the location of the mortal remains continue unsolved.⁴⁹

International pressure has ramped up. In December 2005, UN’s Human Rights Committee expressed the need for Brazil to make public “all documents relevant to human rights abuses”:

18. While noting that the State party has created a right to compensation for victims of human rights violations by Brazil’s military dictatorship, there has been no official inquiry into or direct accountability for the grave human rights violations of the dictatorship (arts. 2 and 14).

To combat impunity, the State party should consider other methods of accountability for human rights crimes committed under the military dictatorship, including disqualifying of gross human rights violators from relevant public office and establishing justice and truth inquiry processes. The State party should make public all documents relevant to human rights abuses, including the documents currently withheld pursuant to presidential decree 4553.⁵⁰

Theoretically, this issue could have been challenged in court. But, following considerable pressure from several agents, including the family members of the dead and disappeared, who had launched the movement “Unarchiving Brazil” along with

1. [43] The law established the a period of 30 years (renewable only once) before access was granted to the top-secret documents which jeopardized ‘secu-rity of both society and State’. and 100 years before disclosing documents which could hurt the honor and the image of the individuals involved (Cap. V, § 2 e 3), https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l8159.htm.

2. [44] Janaína de Almeida Teles, “A abertura dos arquivos da ditadura militar e a luta dos familiares de mortos e desaparecidos políticos no Brasil”, in Diversitas FFLCH/USP, 2006, https://diversitas.fflch.usp.br/files/a%20abertura%20dos%20arquivos%20da%20ditadura.pdf.

3. [45] In 2003, general Oswaldo Pereira Gomes, a representative of the military in the CEMDP, claimed that “the National Security Law (LSN) protects institutions and makes it difficult to access confidential documents of national interest”, which were withheld from the public under penalty of 2–10 years in prison. With this statement, the general proved his complete ignorance of the 1988 Constitution. Janaína de Almeida Teles, “A abertura dos arquivos da ditadura militar e a luta dos familiares de mortos e desaparecidos políticos no Brasil”, in Diversitas FFLCH/USP, 2006. https://diversitas.fflch.usp.br/files/a%20abertura%20dos%20arquivos%20da%20ditadura.pdf.

4. [46] Janaína de Almeida Teles, ed., “Mortos e desaparecidos políticos: um resgate da memória brasileira”, in Janaína de Almeida Teles, Mortos e desaparecidos políticos: reparação ou impunidade¿ 2a. ed., São Paulo, Humanitas/FFLCH/USP, 2001, p. 15–17.

5. [47] Vicente A. C. Rodrigues, “A queima do arquivo: apontamentos sobre o acesso à informação e a destruição de parte da memória da ditadura de 1964–1985 no Brasil”, in Stampa, Inez; Assunção, San R.; Hollanda, Cristina Buarque de, eds., Arquivos, democracia e ditadura: reflexões a partir dos 10 anos do Centro de Referência Memórias Reveladas do Arquivo Nacional. Curitiba, Appris, 2020.

6. [48] Substituting it by Decree 5301, from 9th December 2004, https://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/decret/2004/decreto-5301-9-dezembro-2004-535030-norma-pe.html.

7. [49] Janaína de Almeida Teles, “A abertura dos arquivos da ditadura militar e a luta dos familiares de mortos e desaparecidos políticos no Brasil”, in Diversitas FFLCH/USP, 2006, https://diversitas.fflch.usp.br/files/a%20abertura%20dos%20arquivos%20da%20ditadura.pdf.

8. [50] Consideration of Reports submitted by State Parties under Article 40 of the Convenant, Human Rights Committee, CCPR/C/BRA/CO/2, 2005. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/574953?ln=en.

university professors and pupils, president Lula ordered the transfer, in April 2005, of the withheld documents from CSN, CGI, SNI to the National Archive, by means of decree 5.584/2004, issued in November. The aforementioned extinct repression bodies were of paramount importance. However, the documents transfer happened only partially. Based on the 1991 Archive Law, the decree highlighted the late compliance with the laws regarding access to the documents.

In 2006, as a request from family members of the victims, Federal Prosecutor Marlon Weichert started a process with the State Prosecutor’s Office in order to propose a Direct Action of Unconstitutionality against Law 11.111/2005, with basis on studies carried out by himself and lawyer Fabio K. Comparato. The focus of the movement became the unconstitutionality of the law and the need to make public information involving crimes against humanity, especially the ones committed during the dictatorial period. As a result of the debates, seminars and meetings promoted by movement “Unarchiving Brazil”, in August 2007, a manifesto and a petition “For the opening of the dictatorship archives” were launched during a public hearing which took place in the City Council of São Paulo. They demanded “the end of the files withholding, most notably the ones regarding the military period”. This action counted on the presence of authorities, as well as lawyers, activists and family members of the political dead and disappeared.⁵¹

During this period, a growing convergence of entities connected to historians, archivists, sociologists and researchers was observed towards these objectives. Among the most active pressuring groups, Abraji (Associação Brasileira de Jornalismo Investigativo) – an association of investigative journalists – and Transparência Brasil, could be mentioned. They were responsible for the creation of the Forum to the Right to Public Information Access, in 2004. Their goal was to gather entities from the civil society which were not connected to political parties in order to pressure the government for the regulation of the right to information access. The civil society was showing more attention to the democratization of public management, to state efficiency and to the transparency paradigm, in expansion since the 1980s and 1990s.⁵²

In this regard, in April 2007, Project Orvil was disclosed in full. It was a book secretly made between 1985 and 1988 based on the CIE documents as a response to the publishing of “Brazil: never again”. Family members of the victims demanded strict investigation, once the publication was living proof that a considerable part of the repression files collection had been pre-served.⁵³ Soon after this, the sentence to the legal action started by family members of the disappeared from the Araguaia Guerilla was confirmed: it determined the end of the withholding of all military information regarding the operations combatting the guerilla and the disclosure of all the information regarding the operations.⁵⁴ The sentence left no breech for Lula’s government, thus causing great embarrassment to the authorities.⁵⁵

Soon after that, in May 2008, the Direct Action of Unconstitutionality against Law 11.111/2005 was actually proposed by the Federal Prosecutor – one of the people authorized by the Brazilian Constitution to propose this kind of legal action. The Supreme Federal Court, however, remained unresponsive.⁵⁶ One year later, the Presidency of the Republic Civil House, headed by Dilma Rousseff, launched a project called “Revealed Memories”, in order to disclose the withheld documents, as well as inaugurating the Reference Center for Political Struggle in Brazil (1964 – 1985). Nevertheless, the National Archive, kept on disrespecting the files legislation – which guaranteed unrestricted access as a guiding principle – and denying access to the dictatorship documents. Several researchers have reported this situation and protested against it.⁵⁷ In 2010, the National Archive also withheld access to documents due to the electoral campaign. For this reason, historian Carlos Fico dropped out of the project.⁵⁸

In this regard, the Claim of Non-Compliance with Fundamental Precept 153 was judged in the Supreme Federal Court in April 2010. It had been proposed in 2008 by the Federal Association of the Brazilian Bar (OAB), and authored by Fabio K. Comparato questioning 1979’s Amnesty Law. The decision was guided by historical revisionism, aiming to prove the existence of a wide public debate on the project by the military, and the denial to the right to truth, “which has been outraged in the revisionist militancy of the Armed Forces and also” – as seen in the trial of this lawsuit – “by the Supreme Federal Court and the State Prosecutor’s Office”.⁵⁹

1. [51] Jurists Fábio Konder Comparato, Dalmo Dallari, Hélio Bicudo, historian Ana Maria de Almeida Camargo and attorney Marlon Weichert contributed to the elaboration of the petition and the manifesto. Fábio K. Comparato, Marlon Weichert, Ana Maria de A. Camargo, among others, were present at their launch, Observatório da Imprensa in https://www.observatoriodaimprensa.com.br/interesse-publico/pela-abertura-dos-arquivos-da-ditadura/. In 2007, Paulo Vannuchi, Human Rights Minister at the time, took part in a debate organized by movement Desarquivando o Brasil (Unarchiving Brazil) in order to debate information access and the proposals of the movement. The debate took place at the Amphi-theater of the History College, at USP, and also counted on the participation of Fábio K. Comparato, Marlon Weichert and Ana Maria A. Camargo.

2. [52] Site Fórum de Direito de Acesso a Informação Pública, https://informacaopublica.org.br/?page_id=158; and João Francisco Resende, Da opacidade à publicidade: atores e ideias na construção de políticas de acesso à informação governamental no Brasil. São Paulo, Dissertação de Mestrado, EACH/USP, 2018, p. 247.

3. [53] Lucas Figueiredo, Lugar Nenhum: militares na ocultação dos documentos da ditadura, São Paulo, Companhia das Letras, 2015, p. 82–99.

4. [54] The sentence established a strict investigation in the scope of the Armed Forces, in order to get a detailed picture of the operations carried out in the Araguaia Guerilla, Solange Salgado, Sentença da Ação Ordinária dos familiares de desaparecidos da Guerrilha do Araguaia. Processo nº I-44/82-B, Brasília/DF, 20/06/2003, p. 45–6.

5. [55] In August 2003, the appeal of Lula’s government against the victims fami-lies’ lawsuit (ruled in 1982) caused great wear to the Brazilian authorities, Lucas Figueiredo, Ministério do Silêncio. A história do serviço secreto brasileiro de Washington Luís a Lula (1927–2005). Rio de Janeiro, Record, 2005, p. 533.

6. [56] The action was ruled by Minister Rosa Weber as late as December 2016, after the law had been revoked. This procedure was adopted only to invalidate the action for loss of the thing due. Final monocratic decision, Direct Action of Unconstitutionality 4077, Superior Court of Justice. 23 Sep., 2016, https://www.stf.jus.br/portal/peticaoInicial/verPeticaoInicial.asp?base=ADI&documento=&s1=11.111&numProcesso=4077.

7. [57] “[…] the AN not only suppressed names mentioned in the disclosed documents, but also prevented access to dossiers whose ‘subject’ regarded an ‘individual’”, Desirée de Lemos Azevedo, “Documento Reservado. Verdades, segredos e disputas pela memória nos acervos da Ditadura Civil Militar brasileira”, in Juiz de Fora, Teoria e cultura, Jan/Dec 2011, N. 1–2, V. 6, p. 11–24.

8. [58] Carlos Fico reported that the government was denying access to documents which had already been disclosed; STM did the same with JM’s lawsuits. Rodrigo Rötzsch, “Historiador protesta contra censura no Arquivo Nacional”, in Folha de S. Paulo, 4. 11. 2010. https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/poder/po0411201025.htm.

9. [59] Pádua Fernandes, ”Ditadura Militar na América Latina e o Sistema Interamericano de Direitos Humanos: (in)justiça de transição no Brasil e Argentina”, in XIV Encuentro de Latinoamericanistas Españoles: congreso internacional, Santiago de Compostela, 2010, 1674–1692, p. 1688, https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/file/index/docid/531273/filename/AT12_Fernandes.pdf.

In November 2010, however, the Brazilian State was sentenced by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights for the case Gomes Lund (Araguaia Guerilla), after accusation presented in 1995 by the Commission of Family Members of Political Dead and Disappeared, by the Group Tortura Nunca Mais, from Rio de Janeiro, and by the Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL) before the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights. The accusation had been presented due to the absence of investigation and accountability for the crimes committed by the repressive apparatus to the Araguaia Guerilla, among them forced disappearance. The 2003 Brazilian State sentence has never been served.

The public debate generated by the international sentence has led, at last, to the passing of two important laws: the first, Law 12.527, from November 2011 – the Information-Access Law (LAI) –, which revoked the perpetual confidentiality law, and the second, Law 12.528, which created the National Truth Commission (CNV). With the issue and regulation of LAI, the National Archive started complying with the constitutional principle of unrestricted access to information.⁶⁰

Yet, CNV has still encountered obstacles, in spite of their legal mandate and the validity of the LAI, and could not get access to documents from institutions such as CIE and Cenimar, among others, which were declared officially destroyed.⁶¹

It is worth noting that LAI penalizes the destruction of documents attesting the grave violations to human rights (article 21, paragraph first in the Brazilian Criminal Code).⁶² Once again not complying with the sentence issued by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, namely in the cases Gomes Lund (2010, Araguaia Guerilla) and Vladimir Herzog (2018), the Brazilian State has not launched an independent investigation to verify whether the archives had actually been destroyed and the subsequent accountability process for this crime, as well as an attempt to retrieve at least part of the documents. Such restrictions have culminated in the limited results presented by the National Truth Commission.

CURRENT STATUS

At present, Bolsonaro’s government has been making systematic use of the state of exception (industrial confidentiality, State security, private information) to withhold information from the public. In June 2021, the government denied access to the technical reports of the Health Ministry to justify the opening of extraordinary credit claiming “private interest from the Chief Executive”.⁶³ The budget implementation is treated as the Presi-dent’s personal business in order to try to justify the confidentiality that has been imposed on the public machine in a government broadly made up by military officers. It is worth noting that Bolsonaro is a retired captain and has rigged the public machine with members of the Armed Forces.

In the first two years of Bolsonaro’s office, the Armed Forces broke LAI by means of a “blindfolded declassification” of the documents, whose confidentiality deadline has already expired, according to a study by Luiz Fernando Toledo. They have fragmented information so as to make them unintelligible and have kept even the names of the people who have classified the documents in secret, as well as the reasons for confidentiality, and there is no clear connection between the reasons for secrecy and the content of the documents.

Furthermore, the Armed Forces have released a minimum number of documents:

In spite of having asked for permission to access the more than 20 thousand documents declassified in the period between 2019 and 2020, the Army has provided thirteen files, the Navy fifteen and the Armed Forces nothing but one file, with blacked-out words. It was claimed that it would be impossible to analyse documents one by one to verify if they could be made available to the public or whether they were still classified.⁶⁴

On the one hand, secrecy has become illegally and unconstitutionally the rule in Bolsonaro’s government; on the other hand, institutions related to transition justice, such as CEMDP and the Amnesty Commission have been undermined with lots of personnel changes in their structures in order to restrain the presence of civil society, so they have not fulfilled their purpose. Fernando H. Cardoso (1995–2002) and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s (2003–2011) civil governments handled the subject in an ambiguous way and created barriers to information access. Dilma Rousseff’s government (2011–2016), on the other hand, had a more positive balance, with the passing of LAI and the creation of the National Truth Commission, despite its many limitations.⁶⁵ This experience was

1. [60] Between 2006 and 2015, over 3 million document pages were disclosed. “LAI’s regulation was crucial in order for the number of disclosed documents to go from 127 thousand, in 2012, to 1 million […] in 2013. The user still has to sign a ‘commitment term for the use and disclosure of personal information’, […] as a way to protect the people investigated by the State who were depicted in the documents with information about their private lives […]”. Vivien F. da S. Ishaq, “Entrevista concedida a Shana San-tos”, in Carla Osmo, Shana Marques Prado dos Santos (eds.), Justiça e arquivos no Brasil: perspectivas de atores da justiça de transição, Florianópolis: Tribo da Ilha; Belo Horizonte: Rede Latino-Americana de Justiça de Transição (RLAJT); Centro de Estudos sobre Justiça de Transição, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (CJT/UFMG), 2016, p. 120.

2. [61] Comissão Nacional da Verdade, Relatório, Brasília/DF, 2014, Vol. I, p. 63–4, p. 963.

3. [62] LAI determines that “no access can be denied to the necessary information for the judicial or administrative tutelage of fundamental rights” (art. 21, 1º. §). It also guarantees unrestricted access to archives with collections containing documents which prove “conducts that imply human rights violations perpetrated by public agents or ordered by public authorities” (Idem, ibidem).

4. [63] According to journalist Luiz Fernando Toledo, the Brazilian Ministry of Health has pleaded “private interest” from the part of Bolsonaro to deny information on the extraordinary credit matter, in Fiquem Sabendo, 09/11/2020. https://fiquemsabendo.com.br/transparencia/ministerio-da-saude-alega-interesse-privativo-de-bolsonaro-para-negar-informacoes-sobre-credito-extraordinario/.

5. [64] Luiz Fernando Toledo Antunes, Desclassificação tarjada: o sigilo de documentos das Forças Armadas brasileiras no contexto da Lei de Acesso à Informação, Fundação Getúlio Vargas, São Paulo, 2021, p. 74.

6. [65] CNV has contributed very little to bring the silenced memories of the dictatorial period to light. While the state of Sâo Paulo Commission has promoted 941 testimonies in public hearings along its mandate, the National Commission conducted no more than 246 public testimonies, Cristina B. Hollanda, Direitos Humanos e Democracia: A experiência das comissões da verdade no Brasil in Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, V. 33, n. 96, 2018, p. 10. In addition, CNV has located the mortal remains of just one political disappeared, Epaminondas Gomes de Oliveira, who had been located before the creation of the commission, Bruno Boti Bernardi, Janaína de Almeida Teles e Christian Jecov Schallemüller, “Memória, verdade e justiça: desdobramentos do sistema interamericano de direitos humanos no Brasil”, in Carlos Artur Gallo, ed., Nas trincheiras da memória: lutas pelo passado, políticas de memória e justiça de transição no Sul da Europa e na América do Sul. Rio de Janeiro, Editora Oficina Raquel, 2021.

interrupted with Dilma’s impeachment, with no political justification, in 2016, and had disastrous repercussions to transparency in public administration and the access to governmental documents.

LESSONS LEARNT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The critical evaluation of the situation of the repression files in Brazil reveals that the period of (re)democratization was systematically marked by mechanisms of denial and the blocking of the processes of clarification and accountability of the crimes committed by State agents during the military dictatorship. This scenario hindered a wide public debate about the violence legacy of the dictatorial period, as well as a great number of judicial and extrajudicial processes for the retrieval of facts, which ended up being largely limited to the systematization and disclosure of reports and notifications.

Despite the efforts made by family members of the victims, as well as by the Public Ministry, researchers and the National Truth Commission, among other actors in this process, it is possible to notice several gaps in the bridge between past and present when it comes to the military dictatorship. Many events related to the dictatorial period remain unknown, especially in what concerns the fatal victims of the regime. Despite the amount of documents from the security bodies found along the first decades of the 21st century, these collections have contributed little to the knowledge about the circumstances or authorship and execution of the operations that resulted in the death, disappearance and body concealment of those persecuted by the dictatorship. The whereabouts of the main repressive files, the ones produced by the military secret services,⁶⁶ remains unknown. And they are exactly the ones which supposedly hold such information and could clarify relevant historical facts or help locate the body remains of the political disappeared.

The lack of significant data in the archives that were disclosed has made it difficult to carry out a wider and effective debate about the violence legacy left by the military dictatorship, as well as to build deeper historical knowledge about the country’s recent past. Notwithstanding, the validity of documents used in extrajudicial investigation mechanisms, such as CNV, CEMDP and the Amnesty Commission, both in penal actions and in the constitution of “memory places”, only reaffirm their essential role in reconstructing the past and preserving history in Brazil.

In this regard, the need for deep institutional, legislative and cultural transformations persists in Brazil, as well as the need for effective public control over Brazilian intelligence services, especially the military ones and the Defense Ministry, without this, the redemocratisation of the Brazilian state will remain unfeasible. Such changes remain as crucial for the “pursuance and strengthening of the policy of finding and opening the files of the military dictatorship”,⁶⁷ as recommended by the National Truth Commission’s report, among other directions.

1. [66] This refers to the files from CIE (Army Intelligence Center), CISA (Centro de Informações da Aeronáutica – Air Force Information Center) and Cenimar (Centro de Informações da Marinha – Naval Information Center) as well as the ones from DOI-Codi units. It is estimated that there were ten DOI-Codi units in Brazil, spread around São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Recife, Porto Alegre, Brasília, Curitiba, Salvador, Belém e For-taleza, Carlos Fico, Como eles agiam: os subterrâneos da ditadura militar. Rio de Janeiro, Record, 2001.

2. [67] Recommendation number 29 on CNV. Please refer to Comissão Nacional da Verdade. Relatório. Brasília/DF, 2014, V. I, p. 975.

SOURCES USED AND FURTHER READING

Almeida, Criméia A. S., Lisbôa, Suzana K., Teles, Janaína de Almeida, Teles, Maria Amélia de A., eds., Dossiê Ditadura: Mortos e Desaparecidos políticos no Brasil (1964–1985). São Paulo, Imprensa Oficial/IEVE, 2009

Arquidiocese de São Paulo, Brasil: Nunca Mais. Petrópolis/RJ, Vozes, 1985 Arquidiocese de São Paulo, O perfil dos atingidos. Petrópolis/RJ, Vozes, 1987

Arruda, Roldão, “Parentes de desaparecidos dizem que PF usou o arquivo”, in O Estado de S. Paulo, 19. 3. 1992

Aquino, Maria Aparecida, “As Vísceras expostas do autoritarismo. Uma exposição do resultado de exaustivas pesquisas realizadas sobre a série Dossiês do Arquivo Deops/SP”, in Revista do Arquivo Público Mineiro. Belo Horizonte/MG, ano XLII, n. 1, jan.–jun., 2006

Azevedo, Desirée de Lemos, “Documento Reservado. Verdades, segredos e disputas pela memória nos acervos da Ditadura Civil Militar brasileira”, in Teoria e cultura, Juiz de Fora, Jan./Dec. 2011, No. 1–2, V. 6, 11–24

Bernardi, Bruno Boti, Teles, Janaína de Almeida, Schallemüller, Christian Jecov, “Memória, verdade e justiça: desdobramentos do sistema interamericano de direitos humanos no Brasil”, in Carlos Artur Gallo, ed., Nas trincheiras da memória: lutas pelo passado, políticas de memória e justiça de transição no Sul da Europa e na América do Sul. Rio de Janeiro, Editora Oficina Raquel, 2021

Camargo, Ana Maria de Almeida, “Informação, documento e arquivo: o acesso em questão”, in Boletim da Associação dos Arquivistas Brasileiros, Seção Regional de São Paulo, no. 11, mai.–ago./1993

Camargo, Ana Maria de Almeida, “Os arquivos da polícia política como fonte”, in Registro, Indaiatuba, n. 1, jul. 2002

Camargo, Ana Maria de A., “Os arquivos e o acesso à verdade”, in Cecília M. Santos, Janaína de Almeida Teles, Edson Luís de Almeida Teles, eds., Desarquivando a Ditadura. Memória e justiça no Brasil. Vol. II, São Paulo, Hucitec, 2009

Carvalho, José Murilo de, Forças Armadas e política no Brasil. São Paulo, Companhia das Letras, 2015

Catela, Ludmila da Silva, “Do segredo à verdade… processos sociais e políticos na abertura dos arquivos da repressão no Brasil e na Argentina”, in Cecília M. Santos; Janaina de Almeida Teles, Edson Luís de Almeida Teles, eds., Desarquivando a Ditadura. Memória e justiça no Brasil. Vol. II, São Paulo, Hucitec, 2009

Comissão de Familiares de Mortos e Desaparecidos Políticos, Instituto de Estudos sobre a Violência do Estado (IEVE), Grupo Tortura Nunca Mais (GTMN/RJ e PE). Dossiê dos Mortos e Desaparecidos Políticos a partir de 1964, Recife/PE, CEPE/IEVE, 1995

Comissão Nacional da Verdade, Relatório, Vol. I, II, III, Brasília/DF, 2014. “Estado abre arquivo do Deops”, in Diário Popular, 25. 8. 1994

Fernandes, Pádua, “Ditadura Militar na América Latina e o Sistema Interamericano de Direitos Humanos: (in)justiça de transição no Brasil e Argentina”, in XIV Encuentro de Latinoamericanistas Españoles: congreso internacional, Santiago de Compostela, 2010, 1674–1692. https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/file/index/docid/531273/filename/AT12_Fernandes.pdf

Fico, Carlos, Como eles agiam: os subterrâneos da ditadura militar. Rio de Janeiro, Record, 2001

Figueiredo, Lucas, Ministério do Silêncio. A história do serviço secreto brasileiro de Washington Luís a Lula (1927–2005).

Rio de Janeiro, Record, 2005

Figueiredo, Lucas, Lugar Nenhum: militares na ocultação dos documentos da ditadura. São Paulo, Companhia das Letras, 2015 Freire, Vinícius Torres et. al., “Amigos divergem sobre veracidade de fotos”, in Folha de S. Paulo, 20. 10. 2004

Green, James Nolan, “A Proteção da Privacidade com a Abertura Plena dos Arquivos”, in Acervo, Rio de Janeiro, v. 24, n. 1, jan/jun 2011

“Historiador se demite do projeto Memórias Reveladas em protesto contra sigilo de acervos da ditadura”, in Associação Brasileira de Jornalismo Investigativo (Abraji), 4. 11. 2010, https://abraji.org.br/noticias/historiador-se-demite-do-projeto-memorias-reveladas-em-protesto-contra-sigilo-de-acervos-da-ditadura

Hollanda, Cristina B., “Direitos Humanos e Democracia: A experiência das comissões da verdade no Brasil”, in Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, V. 33, n. 96, 2018

Huggins, Martha K., Polícia e política: relações Estados Unidos/América Latina. São Paulo, Cortez, 1998

Ishaq, Vivien Fialho da Silva, “Entrevista concedida a Shana Santos”, in Carla Osmo, Shana Marques Prado dos Santos, eds., Justiça e arquivos no Brasil: perspectivas de atores da justiça de transição, Florianópolis, Tribo da Ilha; Belo Horizonte: Rede Latino-Americana de Justiça de Transição (RLAJT); Centro de Estudos sobre Justiça de Transição, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (CJT/UFMG), 2016, 114–125

Jelin, Elizabeth, Los trabajos de la memoria. Madrid: Siglo XXI, 2002

Kushnir, Beatriz, “Decifrando as astúcias do mal”, in Revista do Arquivo Público Mineiro. Belo Horizonte/MG, ano XLII, n. 1, jan.–jun., 2006

Quintana, Antonio González, Los archivos de seguridad del Estado de los desaparecidos: regímenes represivos, Santiago de Chile, 1999 Resende, João Francisco, Da opacidade à publicidade: atores e ideias na construção de políticas de acesso à informação

governamental no Brasil. São Paulo, Dissertação de Mestrado, Gestão de Políticas Públicas-EACH/USP, 2018 Rötzsch, Rodrigo. “Historiador protesta contra censura no Arquivo Nacional”, in Folha de S.Paulo, 4. 11. 2010, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/poder/po0411201025.htm

Santos, Cecília M., Teles, Janaína de Almeida, Teles, Edson Luís de Almeida, eds., Desarquivando a Ditadura. Memória e justiça no Brasil. Vol. II, São Paulo, Hucitec, 2009

Stampa, Inez, Assunção, San R., Hollanda, Cristina Buarque de, eds., Arquivos, democracia e ditadura: reflexões a partir dos 10 anos do Centro de Referência Memórias Reveladas do Arquivo Nacional. Curitiba, Appris, 2020

Teles, Janaína de Almeida, “A abertura dos arquivos da ditadura militar e a luta dos familiares de mortos e desaparecidos políticos no Brasil”, in Diversitas FFLCH/USP, 2006. https://diversitas.fflch.usp.br/files/a%20abertura%20dos%20arquivos%20da%20ditadura.pdf

Teles, Janaína de Almeida, “‘Eliminar, sem deixar vestígios’: a distensão política e o desaparecimento forçado no Brasil”, in Revista

M. Estudos sobre a morte, os mortos e o morrer, Rio de Janeiro, v. 5, n. 10, jul./dez.2020

Teles, Janaína de Almeida, Memórias dos cárceres da ditadura militar: as lutas e os testemunhos dos presos políticos no Brasil, São Paulo, Tese de Doutorado, História/FFLCH-USP, 2011

Teles, Janaína de Almeida, “Mortos e desaparecidos políticos: um resgate da memória brasileira”, in Janaína Teles, ed., 2a. ed., Mortos e desaparecidos políticos: reparação ou impunidade¿, São Paulo, Humanitas/FFLCH/USP, 2001

Teles, Janaína de Almeida, Os herdeiros da memória: as lutas dos familiares de mortos e desaparecidos políticos por “verdade e justiça” no Brasil, São Paulo, Dissertação de Mestrado, História/FFLCH-USP, 2005

Teles, Janaína de Almeida, “Vala clandestina de Perus: entre o passado e o presente”, in Revista InSURgência, Brasília, ano 4, v. 4, no. 1, 2018

Toledo, Luiz Fernando, Desclassificação tarjada: o sigilo de documentos das Forças Armadas brasileiras no contexto da Lei de Acesso à Informação, Fundação Getúlio Vargas, São Paulo, 2021, p. 74. https://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace/handle/10438/30717

Toledo, Luiz Fernando, “Ministério da Saúde alega ‘interesse privativo’ de Bolsonaro para negar informações sobre crédito extraordinário”, in Fiquem Sabendo, 9. 11. 2021. https://fiquemsabendo.com.br/transparencia/ministerio-da-saude-alega-interesse-privativo-de-bolsonaro-para-negar-informacoes-sobre-credito-extraordinario/

LUSTRATION

Tatyana de Amaral Maia

INTRODUCTION

The absence of Lustration measures in Brazil after re-democratization (1985) must be comprehended as a result of the political transition process adopted by the Brazilian State (1974–1985). The political transition was negotiated by the own dictatorial regime with the political elites (civil and military), making a wide and deep Transitional Justice unviable. The Brazilian Transitional Justice, also, is considered a shy, oblique, and limited policy if compared to other countries with similar dictatorial experiences in Latin America. To understand the absence of Lustration actions, the limits of Transitional Justice in Brazil, and the permanence of authoritarian enclaves in Brazil, we will consider three important moments in this process: the model of political transition adopted from the beginning of the 1970s; the Transitional Justice actions undertaken; and, finally, the authoritarian legacies, the political violence and the maintenance of human rights violation practices by the public safety forces.

DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN BRAZIL: A NEGOTIATED MODEL (1974–1985)

The coup d’état of March 31, 1964, took down president João Goulart (1961–1964), put an end to our democratic experience and established a dictatorship that stayed in power until 1985. From the coup d’état on, and especially from December 13, 1968, with the promulgation of the Institutional Act No. 5, the dictatorship would be marked by the systematic use of political violence with serious violation of Human Rights, through censorship and political propaganda, through the logic of the “dirty war” against the “enemy within”, the curtailment of civil and political freedom, the suspension of rights, the adoption of clandestine actions against opposers and those disaffected, and the promotion of a legacy of violence against Brazilian citizens. From 1974, we would begin a process of democratic transition, characterized by the negotiation and accommodation of civil and military political elites, in a long non-linear trajectory controlled by the State. Announced as State politics and promoted by the dictatorship itself, president General Ernesto Geisel (1974–1979) already indicated the option for the control of the process by the military themselves through the motto “slow, gradual and safe transition”. Besides, more radicalized military sectors inside the regime pressured for the maintenance of status quo, creating difficulties for the advance of the transition. The action of social movements, the so-called “New Left”, in favor of re-democratization allowed the creation of a wide and heterogenous democratic arch that will include teachers, workers, students, Human Rights groups, the families of political prisoners, exiles, artists and also the mainstream liberal media (massively supportive of the 1964 coup), the Church, sectors of the business community unhappy with the protectionist economic policies in effect, and MDB politicians. The so-called “democratic resistance” would contribute to the advancement of the transition process, through a series of mobilizations in the name of democracy and the elaboration of a new Constitution that consecrated a series of fundamental Rights which, if accomplished, would expand social justice, and qualify democratic institutions.¹ However, we cannot neglect the maintenance of military and civil elite control during the whole transition process, which became a negotiated and unfinished process. As an unfinished transition we understand the permanence and reminiscence of practices and legislation of the dictatorial period during democracy, as well as the permanence of political actors from the dictatorship in the New Republic.²

The death of journalist Vladimir Herzog (1975) on the DOI-CODI premises, which a photograph simulating a suicide broadly circulated in the press, turned into an ignition of collective mobilization against the dictatorship. Thousands of people assembled at Praça da Sé, in the city of São Paulo, for the ecumenic cult that gathered Jewish, Catholic, and Evangelical religious leaderships. The act made explicit the condemnation of the violence committed and hidden by the State and the non-acceptance of expressive segments of the civil society of the suicide thesis. Dissatisfaction against the course of the dictatorship, its incapacity to contain the economic crisis, and the constant reports of Human Rights violations allowed the formation of an alliance among heterogenous civil sectors in the name of a return to democratic normalcy. The Amnesty Campaign launched in 1975 by the action of middle-class women from São Paulo led by social worker Therezinha Zerbini, was fundamental in this process. The Campaign rapidly spread to many cities in the country and marked the first years of the democratic resistance. In the name of a “wide, general and unrestricted Amnesty” these women spoke out in defense of a national reconciliation process, the union of Brazilian families, asking for the release of political prisoners and the return of exiles through the Amnesty mechanism and, consequently, the end of State Terrorism. At the same time, new social movements were being built, in the name of the widening of Rights, and comprehending the democratic fight as the first and decisive step for achieving them. The creation of the Brazilian Amnesty Committees, the black movement, the new labor movement, the movements in defense of Human Rights, among others, started to organize themselves under the same flag: the return of democracy.³ Actions of organized groups against the dictatorship abroad exposed the systematic repression instituted by the regime. At the end of 1978, amid pressure from different sectors, the State suspended the Institutional Act No. 5, in effect since the end of 1968, a symbol of State Terrorism.

1. [1] Silva, Francisco Carlos Teixeira da, “Crises da ditadura militar e o processo de abertura política no Brasil, 1974–1985”, in Jorge Ferreira, Lucilia de Almeida Neves Delgado, O Brasil Republicano, O tempo da ditadura, Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2003, 243–283.

2. [2] Carlos Fico, “Brasil: a transição inconclusa”, in Carlos Fico; Monica Grin e Maria Paula Araújo, Violência na História. Memória, trauma e reparação. Rio de Janeiro: Ponteio, 2012, 39–56.

3. [3] Carla Simone Rodeghero, “A Anistia de 1979 e seus significados, ontem e hoje”, in Daniel Aarão Reis, Marcelo Ridenti, Rodrigo Patto Sá Motta (eds.), A ditadura que mudou o Brasil: 50 anos do golpe de 1964, Rio de Janeiro, Zahar, 2014 172–186.

In August 1979, the “Amnesty Law” is approved, as proposed by president João Figueiredo (1979–1985), by a minimal difference in votes. Voting day was quite troubled and the stands of the Chamber of Deputies plenary were filled with defenders of a “Wide, General and Unrestricted Amnesty”. The government project won, with a partial and restricted Amnesty, which brought in one of its articles, amnesty of the so-called “connected crimes”, a self-amnesty, that is, it also forgave the State agents who had acted on direct or indirect repression of opposers to the regime.⁴ Impunity and Silence over the violations of Human Rights would be the tonic of the transition. With the advancement of the transition process, the Dante de Oliveira amendment, which allowed direct elections for the president of the Republic was defeated in the National Congress. Maintaining indirect elections, was chosen to be the first civil successor after 21 years of dictatorship. Through the National Congress, conciliator and moderate politician Tancredo Neves and vice-president José Sarney, the latter an old member of the ARENA party, a government party created right at the beginning of the dictatorship was elected. The indirect election exposes the conciliatory character of military and political intra-elite; after all, a great movement on the streets in defense of direct elections for president of the Republic had mobilized thousands of people around the country, through the slogan “Diretas-Já” (Direct elections now) and “I want to vote for president”. Crowds demanded the right of choosing a new president through a direct vote. With José Sarney’s inauguration in 1985, began the process of creating a new Constitution with the hope that the so-called “authoritarian waste” would be buried. The 1988 Constitution, built by a wide debate with civil society sectors, the most varied social and political movements, fomented the creation of the first Brazilian Constitution to consecrate a series of Rights that made it deserving of the title of “Citizen Constitution”. However, this process did not mean the adoption of a policy dedicated to clarification, possible reparation, and promotion of justice for the crimes committed by the State during the dictatorial period. Instead, the negotiated transition foresaw the maintenance of many privileges to Armed Forces officials, forgetfulness, and impunity.

Even though many themes in the Constitution had received a progressive treatment, this was not the case on the civil-military relationships. The Constitution kept many non-dem-ocratic military prerogatives that existed in the past authoritarian Constitution, and it even added new prerogatives. In 1988 Brazil, politicians opted for not properly questioning the authoritarian legacy of the military regime.⁵

The Amnesty Law, of 1979, guaranteed the self-amnesty of public agents, without any measures of punishment to those who perpetuate State violence, nor the removal of those who acted in the several spheres of the authoritarian State and collaborated with the dictatorship from their positions and jobs. The military withdrew to their quarters but kept over their dominium the teaching of new military generations, maintaining the speech of the revolutionary character of 1964 and the fight that saved the country from communism. They did not admit to tortures, forced disappearances, clandestine centers of detention, and the murder of opposers. They still kept political privileges, such as the power to avoid any alteration to the Amnesty Law that would lead to the Courts of Justice those responsible for violence committed against opposers, or the obligation of the Armed Forces to clarify how the deaths and disappearances had happened and who had been the executioners.⁶

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN BRAZIL: POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS

This negotiated or unfinished transition led to an oblique action by the Brazilian State on the way the dictatorial past is treated, and also by the late and limited adoption of reparation and memory actions, if compared to the experience of other Latin-American countries, such as, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. In this regard, there has not been, in Brazil, a Lustration process, understood here as the purge of those figures responsible for the repressive apparatus or those who occupied key-positions in the organization of the authoritarian structure. Rather, forgetfulness and impunity was opted for, measures understood by the elites that conducted the transition to democracy as fundamental to the process of “national reconciliation”.

Despite the tireless action of relatives, former political prisoners and Human Rights groups, the idea of national reconciliation as a synonym for forgetfulness of the past widely circulates among sectors of the society. Also observed, was a silence over the civil participation in important posts of public administration and in the construction of the dictatorial State, collaborating with the authoritarian and conservative modernization project adopted in the period. In addition, a restructuring of the training and performance of public safety forces was not made, nor of the Armed Forces, keeping the power control between military and civil partners in key-positions in the State.

What we call Transitional Justice is a set of adopted actions in democratic countries that see themselves facing the obligation to respond to Human Rights violations committed during recent dictatorial regimes. In this regard, countries that post-1945 lived with dictatorial experiences faced the non-negotiable need to adopt measure of possible reparation, clarification of Human Rights violations and investment in the construction of a democratic culture. The State of Law sees itself forced to build a memory to treat the period of systematic violation of Human Rights.⁷ In the countries from the South of the American continent, policies undertaken in the field of Transitional Justice presented as plural processes, deeply identified with the so-called “democratic transitions”, inaugurated in the 1980s and 1990s.⁸

Transitional Justice in Brazil was concentrated in actions initially in the administrative field, beginning in 1995, with the recognition of Human Rights violations and individual indemnity payments to the victims and their families; and more recently, actions dedicated to the right of truth and the duty to memory, with the creation of Amnesty Caravans and, in 2012, the National Truth

1. [4] Carla Simone Rodeghero, “A Anistia de 1979: um levantamento bibliográfico à luz de algumas efemérides”, in Tatyana de Amaral Maia e Ananda Simões Fernandes (eds.), Anistia, um passado presente? Porto Alegre: Edipucrs, 2020, 17–42.

2. [5] Jorge Zaverucha, “Relações civis-militares: o legado autoritário da Constituição brasileira de 1988”, in Telles, Edson e Safatle. O que resta da ditadura: a exceção brasileira, São Paulo: Boitempo, 2010, 41–76, 41.

3. [6] D’Araújo, Maria Celina, “Limites políticos para a transição democrática no Brasil”, in Carlos Fico, Monica Grin e Maria Paula Araújo, Violência na História. Memória, trauma e reparação. Rio de Janeiro: Ponteio, 2012, 39–56.

4. [7] Mezarobba, Glenda, “Do que se fala quando se diz ‘Justiça de Transição’?”, in Revista Brasileira de Informação Bibliográfica em Ciências Sociais, n. 41. São Paulo, Anpocs, 1996, 111–122.

5. [8] Carlos Artur Gallo, “Quarenta anos da Lei da Anistia: uma luta do passado, uma interdição no presente, uma dívida com o futuro”, in Tatyana de Amaral Maia e Ananda Simões Fernandes (org.), Anistia, um passado presente? Porto Alegre: Edipucrs, 2020, 77–108.

Commission, the latter influencing the creation of state, municipal and inside public institutions commissions. Also, some “places of memory” were created – museums, counter-monuments, audiovisual productions, archival projects. In the Justice field, little has advanced, reinforcing the understanding created by the Amnesty Law of 1979 that both victims of political persecution and their executioners, that is, the agents that acted in the repressive apparatus and their representatives benefited. Transitional Justice in Brazil did not incorporate the punishment of those responsible for Human Rights violations in its action frame. The transition controlled by the Armed Forces and negotiated by the intra-elite was built under the mantle of impunity and forgetfulness. Thus, we have a transition and a democratic New Republic marked by the maintenance of authoritarian enclaves with legacies of dictatorship in a democratic regime. The incapacity of the Brazilian Democratic State, from 1988, to act in an assertive manner to dismantle such authoritarian enclaves has favored the emergence of far-right branches over the past few years in Brazil. Such groups go to the streets and invade the social network with all kinds of negationist production, demanding the return of dictatorship as a way to solve the country’s political and economic problems, taking advantage and fomenting the political crisis that led to the coup against the elected president Dilma Rousseff in 2016.

Speeches about the dictatorship as a period marked by the order that promoted numerous economic gains and favored national development still circulate among different social layers. Such narratives favor the denial of State Terrorism and ignore that the period was marked by the amplification of social inequalities, a concentration of income, and left the country drowned in serious economic crisis in the 1980s.

The oblique action of the State and the maintenance of autonomy and privileges by the Armed Forces demonstrate the continuity of conservative and authoritarian political forces. Such conservative forces reflect the maintenance of systematic actions through public safety actions against the population that is impoverished and unassisted by the State protection policies, whose access to citizenship is circumscribed by the cold letter of the law. Social, ethnic and gender minorities are a constant target of the State repressive action, which the frightening numbers have been denounced by the main national and international organisms of Human Rights defense.

NO LUSTRATION, NO JUSTICE: AUTHORITARIAN LEGACIES IN A DEMOCRATIC REGIME (1985–2021)

The arrival of the first civil president in 1985, after twenty-one years of dictatorship, was marked by an indirect election, carried out by an electoral college, that elected the ticket formed by Tancredo Neves and José Sarney. Dictatorship came to an end, but the conciliatory character was explicit in the nascent democracy. The own winning ticket indicated the intra-elite conciliation in the construction of the new democratic period.⁹ The result of this conciliation was the maintenance of the dictatorial States leading figures inside the bureaucracy; the maintenance of the Armed Forces privileges; the untouchability of public safety forces and the construction of a democratic State marked by strong police violence and the maintenance of an impunity legacy; and the attempt to forget the State Terrorism practiced during the years of dictatorship. The militarized state public safety forces remained under the control of the Armed Forces.

The New Republic (1985–2021) has an alarming amount of data of Human Rights violation practiced by the Brazilian State. We have, therefore, as Boaventura de Sousa Santos defends, a low intensity democracy, that is, which a democratic framework is not capable of guaranteeing civil and political rights, prevailing conservative positions, where the Constitution is not carried out, and the institutions do not answer to what they were created for.¹⁰ According to data published by Amnesty International, with the global pandemic caused by the Covid-19 virus, Brazil saw an increase in cases of violation and serious violation of Human Rights, facing a State that is often omissive to violence growth and, not rarely, an accomplice to this violence. The Amnesty International report, 2020/2021, brings serious data to a setting that was never encouraging in the country. Police violence in the past year has risen 7,1 %, resulting in the death of 3.181 citizens whose lives were reaped by police action. 79 % of these citizens were black men and 74,3 % were less than 30 years of age. The number reveals the re-qualification of the enemy within, to be fought against by the State. As Edson Teles and Renan Quinalha propose, it is not about fighting the infiltrated subversive communist anymore, but the peripheral population, especially, the black and/or the poor, revealing our structural racism and our intolerance against all those citizens who are considered a threat to the order and good moral habits.

Torture is largely practiced in the current correctional system, in juvenile offenders’ detention houses and police stations. Police violence has been growing systematically, expanding its target, which is not fundamentally the activist, but the youth from the periphery, the black, the poor. Exception practices are now availed by the current president of the Republic, Jair Bolsonaro, who reproduces discriminatory speeches, reinforces the militarization of politics, and defends the torture in the dictatorship.¹¹

Namely, enter in this list of possible threats to the order, the LGBTQIA+ population, community political leaders, organized peasants in search of land, residents of peripheral areas. The population of the adult correctional system and of young people taken to the state-owned correctional education system, one of the biggest in the world, suffer systematic actions of torture and violation of rights. With the pandemic, it was registered until October 2020, more than 39.000 cases of covid in the adult correctional system and more than 4.190 in the correctional education system aimed at juveniles deprived of liberty.¹²

The country’s current president, the far-right politician Jair Messias Bolsonaro, who has no party affiliation and is a defender of the civil-military dictatorship. Bolsonaro’s speeches, even as

1. [9] Marcos Napolitano, 1964: o regime militar no Brasil, São Paulo: editora Contexto, 2014.

2. [10] Santos, Boaventura de Sousa, “Que democracia é esta?”, in Público.pt, 19/07/2021. https://www.boaventuradesousasantos.pt/media/Que%20democracia%20%C3%A9%20esta_P%C3%BAblico19Julho2011.pdf.

3. [11] Edson Telles, Renan Quinalha, “O alcance e os limites do discurso da Justiça de Transição no Brasil”, in Edson Telles, Renan Quinalha, Espectros da ditadura: da Comissão Nacional da Verdade ao Bolsonarismo, São Paulo: Autonomia Literária, 2020, 15–58, 53.

4. [12] See: Anistia Internacional. Informe 2020/2021. “O Estado de Direitos Humanos no mundo”. https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/POL1032022021BRAZILIAN%20PORTUGUESE.PDF access on: 16/06/2021.

a federal Congressman, were marked by compliments to the actions of ex-torturers, such as colonel Brilhante Ustra, and illustrate the heartbreaking setting of the Brazilian democracy. It is necessary to recognize, however, that the deaths caused during police action in peripheral areas in Brazilian municipalities are recurring throughout the New Republic (1985–2021). Public safety, including state military police and Armed Forces, remained untouchable in the process of political re-democratization. Some actions of the public safety forces have been, again, in the headlines of newspapers for the use of violence against peripheral communities, such as the recent slaughter of Jacarezinho, which happened on May 6, 2021, in the city of Rio de Janeiro, and resulted in the death of 28 young adults; or the police action in Lins, also in Rio de Janeiro, that resulted in the death of a 24 year-old young woman, pregnant, who was walking with her grandmother on the streets of the community where her family still lived.¹³ These are examples that repeat themselves daily and which the punishment of those responsible is unlikely.

The absence of Lustration policies favors the maintenance of impunity and the reproduction of the enemy within logic, being that ideologic, through reediting a “supposed red threat”, identified by the far-right as all those whose defense are closer to liberal values in the field of behavior and of Human Rights or even in left-wing values around social justice. On the other hand, the ineptitude of the Rule of Law in front of the reformulation of its security forces, including a process of frame formation grounded on Human Rights, exposes the maintenance of the leading role of the military throughout the transition and the New Republic. A Lustration process would have been essential on the reset of military and civil political forces; on the transformation of the public safety system and the effective adoption of a Human Rights agenda.

LESSON LEARNT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There is a urgency in the country for a set of actions that promote the valuing of Human Rights and the accountability of public agents for practiced actions. Safety specialists and

Human Rights movements claim the need for a reset on public safety forces; demilitarization of state police; renewal of the curriculum in the training of young officers of the Armed Forces; formulation of an effective democratic culture and control of the military by the civil powers of the Republic. The need to build a democratic culture; the formation of new frames committed to democracy and social justice can only be effective with the accountability of those who committed crimes against humanity.

The permanence of the Armed Forces leading role in Brazilian politics, including the presence of their officers in executive positions as we see nowadays, makes it difficult for the consolidation of a democratic political culture. Associated with this is the permanence in the political arena of figures that are not very committed to democracy, the large-scale circulation through social media of speeches that deny the existence of the dictatorship – a speech ratified by the current president of the Republic Jair Bolsonaro (2019–2022) – and far-right movements that occupied the streets asking for the return of dictatorship. The oblique treatment promoted by the Brazilian State also keeps under the veil of silence the participation of civil sectors, collective and individuals, inside the State in the years of the civil-military dictatorship. Without a wide debate about our authoritarian past that promotes memory, truth and justice, and a deep review on the performance of public safety forces, Brazilian democracy will always be at risk of losing itself in the face of the authoritarian culture that remains in the political and social structures of the country.

1. [13] About the slaughter See: Júlia Barbon, Gustavo Queirolo, Italo Nogueira, “Saiba quem são e como morreram as 28 vítimas do jacarezinho”, in Folha de S. Paulo, 12. 5. 2021. https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2021/05/saiba-quem-sao-e-como-morreram-as-28-vitimas-do-jacarezinho.shtml; About the death of the young pregnant woman during police action see: Fábio Grellet, o Estado de São Paulo, “Grávida de 24 anos é baleada e morre em meio a operação policial no Rio”, in Estado de São Paulo, 8. 6. 2021. https://brasil.estadao.com.br/noticias/rio-de-janeiro,gravida-de-24-anos-e-baleada-e-morre-em-meio-a-operacao-policial-no-rio%2C70003740859 access on: 16. 6. 2021

SOURCES USED AND FURTHER READING

Anistia Internacional, Informe 2020/2021. O Estado de Direitos Humanos no mundo. https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/POL1032022021BRAZILIAN%20PORTUGUESE.PDF

Barbon, Júlia, Queirolo, Gustavo, Nogueira, Italo, “Saiba quem são e como morreram as 28 vítimas do jacarezinho”, in Folha de S. Paulo, 12. 5. 2021. https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2021/05/saiba-quem-sao-e-como-morreram-as-28-vitimas-do-jacarezinho.shtml

D’araújo, Maria Celina, “Limites políticos para a transição democrática no Brasil”, in Carlos Fico, Monica Grin, Maria Paula Araújo,

Violência na História. Memória, trauma e reparação. Rio de Janeiro: Ponteio, 2012, 39–56

Fico, Carlos, “Brasil: a transição inconclusa”, in Carlos Fico, Monica Grin, Maria Paula Araújo, Violência na História. Memória, trauma e reparação. Rio de Janeiro: Ponteio, 2012, 39–56

Gallo, Carlos Artur, “Quarenta anos da Lei da Anistia: uma luta do passado, uma interdição no presente, uma dívida com o futuro”, in Tatyana de Amaral Maia, Ananda Simões Fernandes (eds.), Anistia, um passado presente? Porto Alegre: Edipucrs, 2020, 77–108

Grellet, Fábio, o Estado de São Paulo, “Grávida de 24 anos é baleada e morre em meio a operação policial no Rio”, in Estado de São Paulo, 8. 6. 2021. https://brasil.estadao.com.br/noticias/rio-de-janeiro,gravida-de-24-anos-e-baleada-e-morre-em-meio-a-operacao-policial-no-rio,70003740859

Mezarobba, Glenda, “Do que se fala quando se diz ‘Justiça de Transição’?”, in Revista Brasileira de Informação Bibliográfica em Ciências Sociais, n. 41. São Paulo, Anpocs, 1996, 111–122

Napolitano, Marcos. 1964: o regime militar no Brasil, São Paulo: editora Contexto, 2014

Rodeghero, Carla Simone, “A Anistia de 1979 e seus significados, ontem e hoje”, in Daniel Aarão Reis, Marcelo Ridenti, Rodrigo Patto Sá Motta, A ditadura que mudou o Brasil: 50 anos do golpe de 1964, Rio de Janeiro, Zahar, 2014 172–186

Rodeghero, Carla Simone, “A Anistia de 1979: um levantamento bibliográfico à luz de algumas efemérides”, in Tatyana de Amaral, Ananda Simões Fernandes (org.), Anistia, um passado presente?, Porto Alegre: Edipucrs, 2020, 17–42

Santos, Boaventura de Sousa, “Que democracia é esta?”, in Público.pt, 19/07/2021. https://www.boaventuradesousasantos.pt/media/Que%20democracia%20%C3%A9%20esta_P%C3%BAblico19Julho2011.pdf

Silva, Francisco Carlos Teixeira da, “Crises da ditadura militar e o processo de abertura política no Brasil, 1974–1985”, in Jorge Ferreira, Lucília Delgado de Almeida Neves, O Brasil Republicano, O tempo da ditadura, Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2003, 243–28

Telles, Edson, Quinalha, Renan, “O alcance e os limites do discurso da Justiça de Transição no Brasil”, in Edson Teles, Renan Quinalha (eds.), Espectros da ditadura: da Comissão Nacional da Verdade ao Bolsonarismo, São Paulo: Autonomia Literária, 2020, 15–58

Zaverucha, Jorge, “Relações civis-militares: o legado autoritário da Constituição brasileira de 1988”, in Edson Teles, Wladimir Safatle,

O que resta da ditadura: a exceção brasileira, São Paulo: Boitempo, 2010, 41–76, 41

INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF DICTATORSHIP CRIMES

Carlos Artur Gallo

INTRODUCTION

The fight for justice toward the crimes committed by the Brazilian dictatorship is marked by significant contrasts when compared to the experience of its neighboring countries in the Southern Cone, especially Argentina. Although in some cases there are advances and partial achievements made by the victims and their relatives against the authoritarian regime, in practice, most cases show how the investigation and punishment of agents of repression has been made impossible due to the amnesty law.¹

Considering this situation, this chapter aims to identify how the demand for justice regarding the violations that occurred between 1964 and 1985 has been carried out (or not) in the Brazilian case. I offer an overview that identifies the advances obtained through the Judiciary Power to date, as well as the obstacles that, even today, prevent and/or make difficult the investigation and punishment of those responsible.

The chapter is organized into four parts. The first part looks at the fight for amnesty in the country, identifying how laws impacts the past and present. The second part of the chapter presents data on the attempts to investigate and punish the crimes of the dictatorship over the last decades. The third part focuses on the advances made to identify those responsible for the violations, considering the contribution of the National Truth Commission (CNV). Finally, the chapter concludes by making recommendations overcoming the existing obstacles.

THE FIGHT FOR AMNESTY AND ITS IMPACTS ON THE PAST AND PRESENT

To understand the difficulties faced in the fight for justice carried out by the victims and their relatives against the Brazilian dictatorship, it is essential to understand the role of the Amnesty Law edited by the authoritarian regime in the transition context. Referred by scholars as one of the non-negotiable items of Brazil’s transition,² the amnesty granted under Law No. 6.683 of 1979 was claimed right after the first great wave of repressions and cassations of mandates practiced by the regime (at the time of the stabilization of the 1964 Coup) but it was only during the “slow, gradual and safe” transition initiated by the Geisel Government (1974–1979), that a broad mobilization of society around the issue began. The transition to democracy in Brazil was a political project articulated from within the authoritarian regime, headed by the dictator-president Ernesto Geisel, with the help of the DSN mentor, General Golbery do Couto e Silva. Long lasting and highly controlled, the Brazilian transition did not begin without reason. Anticipating a significant loss of legitimacy of the civil-military coalition in power, which could only get worse with the economic retraction resulting from the exhaustion of the “economic miracle” at the end of 1974, President Geisel began the regime’s liberalization, by accepting the result of the elections held in November (when the opposition won).³ In doing so, on the one hand, he guaranteed the continuity of the conservative political modernization project started after 1964, and, on the other hand, implemented a politically bold strategy that would ensure the regime’s interference in the transition’s path.⁴

Between advances and setbacks, the transition continued at a slow and very controlled pace, being carried out until the end by Geisel’s successor, the dictator-President João Baptista Figueiredo (1979–1985), the last president of the civil-military dictatorship.

The law that guaranteed the 1979 amnesty, as mentioned, came along with a broad mobilization of Brazilian society. Gaining strength from 1978 onwards, the fight for a “broad, general and unlimited Amnesty” can be considered as a demonstration of the resurrection of parts of civil society, which were exceptionally disjointed, considering the edition of AI-5, due to the hardening of repression from 1968.

Made possible by the beginning and progress of the liberalization process, the movement that resulted in the fight for amnesty, however, dates back to May 1975, when the Women’s Movement for Amnesty (MFPA) was founded in São Paulo, directed by lawyer Therezinha Zerbine.⁵

In June 1979, the government sent to the National Congress the Amnesty Law Project (PL No. 14/1979) that it had elaborated. Classified as “limited”, “miserly”, “discriminatory”, “bureaucrat-ic”, “casuistic”, “partial”, “arbitrary”, “silent” and even “hateful” by members of the opposition,⁶ the proposed amnesty clearly contradicted the Brazilian Committees for Amnesty (CBAs) demand for a provision that was “broad, general and unlimited”.

1. [1] I consider as agents of repression any person who collaborated with the repressive apparatus of the Brazilian dictatorship. The term, therefore, ranges from people linked to the Armed Forces who participated in arrests, tortured, killed or disappeared political opponents of the authoritarian regime, to other collaborators, such as public servants of the judiciary and businessmen.

2. [2] Luciano Martins, “A ‘liberalização’ do regime autoritário no Brasil”, in Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transições do regime autoritário: América Latina, São Paulo: Vértice / Revista dos Tribunais, 1988, 129.

3. [3] In the 1974 elections, the consenting opposition, represented by the MDB, elected 16 of 22 Senators, and 160 of 364 Federal Deputies, obtaining a significant increase in their representation in the National Congress. See, about: Velasco e Cruz, Sebastião C., Martins, Carlos Estevam, “De Castello a Figueiredo: uma incursão na pré-História da ‘Abertura’”, in Bernardo Sorj, Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida, eds., Sociedade e política no Brasil pós-64., São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1984, 51.

4. [4] Carlos S. Arturi, “O debate teórico sobre mudança de regime político: o caso brasileiro”, in Revista de Sociologia e Política, 2001, (17), 17.

5. [5] Carla Rodeghero, Gabriel Dienstmann, Tatiana Trindade, Anistia ampla, geral e irrestrita: história de uma luta inconclusa, Santa Cruz: Edunisc, 2011.

6. [6] Glenda Mezarobba, Um acerto de contas com o futuro: a anistia e suas con-sequências: um estudo do caso brasileiro, Dissertação (Mestrado em Ciência Política) – Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciência Política da Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo, 2003, 35.

After all, in addition to not allowing those individuals convicted of “terrorism” to benefit from the law (in the cases of expropriations, kidnappings and personal attacks committed by left-wing militants), according to its art. 1, § 2, the benefit provision for “related crimes” committed, inserted in art. 1, § 1, showed that the Government intended to establish a reciprocal amnesty (extended to agents of repression).

The amnesty approved by the National Congress on August 22, 1979, and sanctioned by General Figueiredo on the 28th, did not satisfy the demand formulated throughout the 1970s by social movements. It was not broad, general, nor unlimited. It was “po-litically intelligent”.⁷ Using terminology of legally controversial content (the “related crimes” of Article 1 of the Law) and relying on a comprehensive interpretation that would be followed, above all, by their supporters, the military in power guaranteed the impunity of those who had violated the human rights of political prisoners and the persecuted.

Thus, the “reciprocal amnesty” thesis gained legitimacy, specially at the time of Law No. 6.683 approval, which would be evoked during the following decades whenever someone tried to talk about the possibility of punishment or, at least, clarification on the crimes the crimes committed by the repressive apparatus.

Furthermore, under the “national reconciliation logic”,⁸ the last Government of the dictatorship guaranteed, through de facto impunity, its control over the process of the transition to democracy, establishing three types of silences around the issue: a silence about torture and torturers; a silence on society’s support for the dictatorship; and a silence on the left revolutionary proposals defeated by the repression.⁹

Despite the critics, the reciprocal amnesty interpretation partly calmed the spirits of the hardliners, who feared the possibility of “revanchism” by the victims of the repression. On the one hand, the Law allowed thousands of political exiles to return to the country, and many others to come out of hiding. On the other hand, it allowed the Figueiredo Government to carry out the transition initiated in the previous administration without major disturbances.¹⁰ Along with the widespread commotion originated by the return of exiles and the release of a significant portion of political prisoners, the mobilization of the CBAs was, little by little, losing its strength, causing the limits of the amnesty to be given a low priority on the transi-tion’s political agenda.

INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMES COMMITTED BY THE BRAZILIAN DICTATORSHIP

Legal requests from relatives of the dead and politically disappeared in Brazil to the Judiciary Power had already occurred during the dictatorship period. Until the mid-1990s, however, the efforts made in the legal sphere (both civil and criminal) were not very successful. In addition to difficulties in accessing the repression archives (which limited and still limits the production of evidence) and the delay in the judgment of cases involving crimes committed by repression agents, the interpretative barrier of the Amnesty Law prevailed.¹¹

The Amnesty Law, as mentioned in the first section of this chapter, consolidated itself as the main barrier in the fight for memory, truth and justice in the Brazilian case, being considered a key element in the transitional process initiated in 1974.

In April 2010, more than three decades after the law’s approval, a discussion about its reach took place in the highest level of the national judiciary. On this occasion, during the judgment of the Claim of Non-Compliance with Fundamental Precept (ADPF) No. 153 (presented by the Federal Council of the Brazilian Bar Association – OAB in 2008), the Supreme Federal Court (STF) decided, by a majority of votes of its members, that the interpretation of the law guaranteeing reciprocal amnesty, although controversial and questioned, should be maintained. In general terms, the argument used to reject the request presented by the Federal Council of OAB was based on the idea that the context of the democratic transition justified the need for reciprocal concessions by both the authoritarian regime and its opponents, something that suggests that repression agents impunity can be understood as the “price of the transition”, as well as an interpretation according to which the reciprocity of the amnesty would be presumably guaranteed, despite the imprecision of the text of the law.¹²

In addition to contradicting international norms for human rights protection and being in the opposite direction of the IA-CHR’s understanding (according to which self-amnesties are invalid), a direct consequence of the STF judgment (and its maintenance until today) can be seen in the following case: at the international level, there are decisions condemning Brazil and mentioning that self-amnesties are not valid, as mentioned by the IACHR when judging the case of the disappeared ones from the Araguaia Guerrilla War and the Herzog case;¹³ at the same time, internally, the highest level of the Judiciary adopts a divergent position.

The interpretation of the amnesty, reinforced by the STF in 2010, reflects the way the Judiciary deals with cases involving the crimes of the dictatorship since the transition. Both on the civil and the criminal sphere.

1. [7] Carlos S. Arturi, Op. cit., 18.

2. [8] Glenda Mezarobba, “Anistia de 1979: o que restou da lei forjada pelo arbí-trio?”, in Cecília MacDowell Santos, Edson Teles, Janaína de Almeida Teles, eds., Desarquivando a ditadura: memória e justiça no Brasil, v. 2, São Paulo: Hucitec, 2009, 372–385.

3. [9] Daniel Aarão Reis Filho, “O governo Lula e a construção da memória do regime civil-militar”, in António Costa Pinto, Francisco Carlos Palomanes Martinho, eds., O passado que não passa: a sombra das ditaduras na Europa do Sul e na América Latina, Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2013, 217–218.

4. [10] Although some members of the military hardline have adhered to the liberalization of the regime, there continued to be voices against the military leaving power. In this sense, between 1980 and 1981, there were explosions attributed to members of the radical right and the military hardline who tried to block the political opening. The most emblematic case, which still lacks clarification, was the bomb explosion in RIOCENTRO occurred on April 30, 1981, in Rio de Janeiro. During a fund-raising spectacle in benefit of left-wing sectors, a captain and a sergeant linked to DOI-CODI died in the parking lot at the site due to a bomb explosion. At the time, it was said that the explosion intended to cause widespread panic, in addition to blame on the left for the attack. See: Thomas Skidmore, Brasil: de Castelo a Tancredo, Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1988, 442–447.

5. [11] Janaína de Almeida Teles, “Os familiares de mortos e desaparecidos políticos e a luta por ‘verdade e justiça’ no Brasil”, in Edson Teles, Vladimir Safatle, eds., O que resta da ditadura: a exceção brasileira, São Paulo: Boitempo, 2010, 272–281.

6. [12] See: Supremo Tribunal Federal, Acórdão da ADPF no 153, 2010, https://www.stf.gov.br Accessed on: 30 June 2021.

7. [13] See: Bruno Boti Bernardi, “O Brasil condenado: a lei de anistia no sistema interamericano de direitos humanos”, in Carlos Artur Gallo, ed., Anistia: 40 anos, uma luta, múltiplos significados, Rio de Janeiro: Gramma, 2019, 215–250.

THE DETERMINATION OF LIABILITIES IN THE CIVIL SPHERE

Regarding the legal actions processed in the civil sphere, an analysis carried out by Criméia Schmidt de Almeida¹⁴ and Janaína de Almeida Teles¹⁵ shows that many proposals by repression victims’ relatives, aiming to hold the Brazilian State responsible for the death and disappearance of civil-military regime opponents were successful. These processes resulted, basically, either in the acknowledgment of State’s liability for the repression agents’ crimes or, in some cases, in the establishment of a pecuniary indemnity to the victims’ relatives. These are partially positive results concerning the victim’s memory, but they were not able to generate advances for the right to truth and justice. This incapacity exists because: 1) the real circumstances of the violations committed by the repressive apparatus were not clarified; 2) despite some exceptions, such as the case filed in Federal Court by the widow of sergeant Manoel Raymundo Soares (who died in 1966), the agents who committed the criminal acts were not identified; 3) based on the interpretation of the reciprocal amnesty, it was not possible to assign individual liability to any agent involved in the violations. Still in the civil sphere, an action that generated paradigmatic results was proposed in February 1982 by relatives of 22 guerrillas who disappeared in the Araguaia region, which requested the Brazilian State to locate and move the militants’ bodies, among other things. This action is being processed, and is currently in its sentence execution phase. So far, it has brought important gains to the case in 2003, when Judge Solange Salgado, from the 1st section of the Federal Court from Federal District, recognized the demands’ legitimacy and ordered the Brazilian State to locate the bodies of 70 militants from PCdoB who disappeared in the first half of the 1970s and to present the required documents.¹⁶

However, other examples highlight the ambiguity present in Brazil’s judicial institutions’ approach toward cases involving political repression. While an action filed by the Teles family in 2005 obtained a declaratory sentence acknowledging the involvement of Carlos Alberto Brilhante Ustra, an agent of repression, in acts carried out against this family of political activists linked to the Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB), in the decade of 1970, a judge from the Federal Court of Rio de Janeiro accepted the requests made by the Military Club in 2015 to declare null the amnesty granted by the Amnesty Commission to Carlos Lamarca (a victim of the dictatorship).

Although both actions referred to above involve the realization of the right to memory and the truth through alternative means, the impact that maintaining the interpretation of the reciprocal amnesty generates is clear in both cases, significantly limiting the content of the processes and the results obtained.

THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES OF THE REPRESSIVE APPARATUS

As mentioned, there were also no advances between the 1970s and the 2000s in the criminal legal sphere. Generally, the courts considered the crimes committed by repression agents as amnes-tied and/or prescribed, blocking their investigation. Therefore, no single Brazilian repression agent was investigated, convicted and punished. In the last decade, a group of prosecutors from the Federal Prosecution Service (MPF) filed a series of actions aiming to hold repression agents criminally responsible for violations

TABLE 1 – CRIMINAL ACTIONS ABOUT BRAZILIAN DICTATORSHIP CRIMES: LEGAL DECISIONS ACCORDING TO INSTANCES OF THE JUDICIARY POWER

Source: table produced by the author according to: Ministério Público Federal, Op. cit., 28.

that occurred during the dictatorship. This initiative can be understood as capable of generating new outcomes for the victims, their families, and human rights organizations.

According to data from the MPF,¹⁷ between the years of 2012 and 2016, 27 criminal actions were filed, accusing 47 agents of repression involved in 43 types of crimes. Up till 2016, 11 types of crime were listed in the actions. More than 75 % of these criminal practices involve acts directly and indirectly related to fatal victims of political repression: qualified homicide (11 cases), ideological falsehood (9 cases), qualified kidnapping (7 cases) and concealment of human corpse (6 cases). Regarding the occupation of the defendants, 21 were part of the Brazilian Army, which represented almost 50 % of those accused for the dictatorship crimes. In addition to the Armed Forces, members of other security forces such as the Military Police (7 people) and the Civil Police (9 people) were also identified as responsible for human rights violations during the dictatorship. Although people directly linked to the military and other security forces head the list of defendants, as approximately 75 % of those accused, there is also the presence of civilians on the list, such as the case of a person identified as “dog” (an infiltrated in groups of political opponents of the dictatorship) and 8 cases of people linked to the IML (Institute of Legal Medicine), most of them accused of committing ideological falsehood in the reports that attested the death of repression victims.¹⁸

1. [14] Criméia Schmidt de Almeida et al., eds., Dossiê ditadura: mortos e desaparecidos políticos no Brasil (1964–1985), São Paulo: Imprensa Oficial do Estado de São Paulo, 2009, 45–46.

2. [15] Janaína de Almeida Teles, Op. cit., 272–281.

3. [16] It is not possible to deepen the analysis and debate about this specific topic in this section. Since this action was filed, a series of domestic and international events are overlapping, resulting in the absence of a solution for it. Between advances and setbacks, Brazil was convicted in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) in 2010 and, despite appeals for delaying the sentence’s execution, partial advances were obtained concerning the location of dictatorship victims’ bodies in the region where Araguaia Guerrilla took place. For more information about this: Criméia Schmidt de Almeida et al., Op. cit.; Janaína de Almeida Teles, Op. cit.; Bruno Boti Bernardi, Op. cit.; Brasil, Secretaria de Direitos Humanos, Habeas Corpus: que se apresente o corpo: a busca dos desaparecidos políticos no Brasil, Brasília: SDH, 2010.

4. [17] Ministério Público Federal – MPF, Crimes da ditadura militar, Brasília: MPF, 2017, 25.

5. [18] Ministério Público Federal – MPF, Op. cit., 27.

Regarding the progress of these criminal actions filed since 2012, Table 1 identifies the judicial decisions that have already been taken in these processes, including at the appeal instance: A preliminary view of Table 1 shows that the legal interpretation contrary to the processing of criminal actions related to the punishment of dictatorship crimes prevail, considering the decisions from the Brazilian Judiciary. By the time of the publication organized by the MPF, 27 out of 33 decisions (about 82 %) were against the continuation of the criminal proceedings. None of the decisions judged the merit of any of the cases. All of them are based on the argument that the Amnesty Law interpretation justifies the closure of the actions and the impossibility of prosecuting those responsible for the violations.

In June 2021, for the first time an agent of repression was convicted of crimes committed during the dictatorship.¹⁹ Despite being an advance, it is a non-definitive decision (which can be reversed by the higher courts), and the defendant may appeal in freedom.

In practice, Brazil remains without anyone responsible for human rights violations during the dictatorship either tried, convicted or serving time. Advances, when they exist, are limited and depend on what the judge who will decide about the case thinks, evidencing the current legal volatility in the country.

IDENTIFICATION OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE VIOLATIONS

Although there has been practically no progress in terms of civil and criminal liability of political repression agents, there are advances in terms of identifying those responsible for part of the violations committed during the dictatorship period. This occurs in three circumstances: 1) the identification of repressors by the victims, who publicly recognize their perpetrators since the final stage of the transitional process; 2) the identification of agents of repression by victims, family members and human rights organizations, through the archives that have been opened up to the present; 3) the assignment of responsibilities, considering the elaboration by CNV of a list of people involved in the crimes committed by the dictatorship.

The first two circumstances mentioned are evidence of the great and continuous effort undertaken for decades by victims and human rights organizations in the country. In the absence of greater state support, the denunciation and identification of perpetrators became another duty of the victims themselves in the fight against forgetfulness. In other words, it is one more way to particularize something that should be treated as something collective, public and as a State duty.

It is precisely in the sense of treating the issue as something public, and that should be undertaken by the State itself, which violated the rights of its citizens in the past, that the work carried out by the CNV between 2012 and 2014 is remarkable. After a great documentary research and the hearing of witnesses, the CNV presented the society with a list containing the names of 377 people responsible for the dictatorship crimes. Although incomplete and mostly composed with the names of deceased people (due to their advanced age), it is a relevant publication. Contradictorily, and considering the legal issues exposed in the previous sections, the identification of those involved did not result in the filing of criminal proceedings.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In view of the panorama presented in this chapter, and considering the obstacles imposed to the demands for justice in the country, it is recommended:

1/ The opening of all archives on the repression, because their inaccessibility constitutes a barrier that turns the fight for truth and justice more difficult or even unfeasible;

2/ The Amnesty Law interpretation revision, in order to allow repression agents to be tried for crimes committed during the dictatorship.

1. [19] “Pela primeira vez, Justiça condena penalmente repressor da ditadura brasileira e abre precedente histórico”, in El País, 22/06/2021, https:// brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2021-06-21/pela-primeira-vez-justica-federal-condena-penalmente-repressor-da-ditadura-brasileira-e-abre-precedente-historico.html, Accessed on: 30 June 2021.

SOURCES USED AND FURTHER READING

Almeida, Criméia Schmidt de et al., eds., Dossiê ditadura: mortos e desaparecidos políticos no Brasil (1964–1985), São Paulo: Imprensa Oficial do Estado de São Paulo, 2009

Arturi, Carlos S., “O debate teórico sobre mudança de regime político: o caso brasileiro”, in Revista de Sociologia e Política, 2001, (17), 11–31 Bernardi, Bruno Boti, “O Brasil condenado: a lei de anistia no sistema interamericano de direitos humanos”, in Carlos Artur Gallo, ed., Anistia: 40 anos, uma luta, múltiplos significados, Rio de Janeiro: Gramma, 2019, 215–250

Brasil, Secretaria de Direitos Humanos, Habeas Corpus: que se apresente o corpo: a busca dos desaparecidos políticos no Brasil, Brasília: SDH, 2010

Martins, Luciano, “A ‘liberalização’ do regime autoritário no Brasil”, in Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transições do regime autoritário: América Latina, São Paulo: Vértice / Revista dos Tribunais, 1988, 108–139

Mezarobba, Glenda, “Anistia de 1979: o que restou da lei forjada pelo arbítrio?”, in Cecília MacDowell Santos, Edson Teles, Janaína de Almeida Teles, eds., Desarquivando a ditadura: memória e justiça no Brasil, v. 2, São Paulo: Hucitec, 2009, 372–385

Mezarobba, Glenda, Um acerto de contas com o futuro: a anistia e suas consequências: um estudo do caso brasileiro, Dissertação (Mestrado em Ciência Política) – Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciência Política da Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo, 2003

Ministério Público Federal – MPF, Crimes da ditadura militar, Brasília: MPF, 2017

“Pela primeira vez, Justiça condena penalmente repressor da ditadura brasileira e abre precedente histórico”, in El País, 22/06/2021, https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2021-06-21/pela-primeira-vez-justica-federal-condena-penalmente-repressor-da-ditadura-brasileira-e-abre-precedente-historico.html Accessed on: 30 June 2021

Reis Filho, Daniel Aarão, “O governo Lula e a construção da memória do regime civil-militar”, in António Costa Pinto, Francisco Carlos Palomanes Martinho, eds., O passado que não passa: a sombra das ditaduras na Europa do Sul e na América Latina, Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2013, 215–233

Rodeghero, Carla, Dienstmann, Gabriel, Trindade, Tatiana, Anistia ampla, geral e irrestrita: história de uma luta inconclusa, Santa Cruz: Edunisc, 2011

Skidmore, Thomas, Brasil: de Castelo a Tancredo, Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1988

Supremo Tribunal Federal, Acórdão da ADPF nº 153, 2010, https://www.stf.gov.br Accessed on: 30 June 2021

Teles, Janaína de Almeida, “Os familiares de mortos e desaparecidos políticos e a luta por ‘verdade e justiça’ no Brasil”, in Edson Teles, Vladimir Safatle, eds., O que resta da ditadura: a exceção brasileira, São Paulo: Boitempo, 2010, 253–298

Velasco e Cruz, Sebastião C., Martins, Carlos Estevam, “De Castello a Figueiredo: uma incursão na pré-História da ‘Abertura’”, in Bernardo Sorj, Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida, eds., Sociedade e política no Brasil pós-64., São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1984, 13–61.

REHABILITATION OF VICTIMS

Carlos Artur Gallo

INTRODUCTION

Politics of memory aiming at the rehabilitation or, in other words, the reparation of victims, vary greatly according to each context, and, above all, according to the public for which they are intended. They can be accomplished through measures that provide symbolic reparation, pecuniary indemnities, pensions, provision of services, guarantee of educational or healthcare rights such as scholarships or medical assistance, reintegration into public service, among others.¹

Specifically, the reparation of victims of the Brazilian civil-military dictatorship (1964–1985), unlike what happened in other countries that went through dictatorships, was carried out gradually, slowly, and, above all, late. Effectively initiated in 1995, after the edition of Law No. 9.140, the reparation for political repression victims has started to progress more than a decade after the last dictator-President left office, putting an end to the process of transition to democracy.

The main objective of this chapter is to draw an overview of the measures that were created and implemented in Brazil to address the demands of dictatorship victims for reparation. In order to do so, the text is divided into five parts. The first one identifies how, when and which policies were made to repair the victims of the Brazilian authoritarian regime. In the second and third parts, respectively, the results and the current status of the measures are discussed. The fourth part identifies the main victims’ organizations existing in the Brazilian context.² In the fifth and last part, a balance is made on the advances and limits related to the measures analyzed, and then recommendations for overcoming them are presented.

REPARATION OF DICTATORSHIP

VICTIMS IN BRAZIL: LEGAL BASES AND IMPLEMENTED MEASURES

Law No. 6.683/1979 (Amnesty Law) provided in its text the possibility of reintegration into work for people who were dismissed from their professional positions for political reasons.³ Although this was applied insome cases in the 1980s, during the final phase of the transition process, the fact is that effective reparative measures for the dictatorship victims were only elaborated and implemented since 1995, ten years after the exit of the military from the Executive Power.

Next, details related to the elaboration and implementation of those considered as the main politics of memory for dictatorship victims’ reparation in Brazil will be addressed: a) Law No. 9.140/1995, b) Law No. 10.559/2002, c) Law No. 12.528/2011.

LAW NO. 9.140 OF 1995: THE “LAW OF THE DEAD AND DISAPPEARED”

The Commission of the Families of the Dead and Disappeared Political Activists (CFMDP) launched the basis of Law No. 9.140 in 1993, as it organized a meeting along the Torture Never Again groups, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, among others, in which a Law Project (PL) was elaborated. This PL was given to the Minister of Justice and then to President Itamar Franco, who would submit it to vote in the National Congress. In 1994, given the frustration generated by the president, who, even after the vigils held in Rio de Janeiro, Brasília, Porto Alegre and Recife, left the issue unsolved, family members managed to collect signatures for a Public Commitment Document (containing the issues presented to the Justice Minister) by representatives of the main candidates for the Presidency of the Republic.⁴ In June 1995, after being constantly pressured by relatives of the dead and disappeared and by members of international human rights organizations, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, ordered Nelson Jobim, Minister of Justice at that time, to move the matter forward, resulting in the PL. No. 869/95. Supported by the participation of the CFMDP and members of other organizations for human rights protection, the PL was submitted for consideration at the National Congress, where, after little debate, it was processed immediately, and, without any amendments, the text was sanctioned in 4 of December 1995, originating the Law No. 9.140.⁵

For the text approval, however, it was necessary for President Fernando Henrique Cardoso to assure representatives of the Armed Forces that the effects of the law that would be created would be limited by the interpretation of the reciprocal amnesty. In other words, even though the law recognized the responsibility of the Brazilian State for crimes committed by the repressive apparatus, this would not allow prosecutions to be instituted against the agents involved in such practices.

The approval of the Law of the Dead and Disappeared resulted in: a) recognizing the Brazilian State responsibility for the deaths and disappearances of 136 people listed as political disappeared in Addendum I of the Law; b) the guarantee that the families of the persons listed in the Addendum could register their deaths; c) the creation of the Special Commission on Political Deaths and Disappearances (CEMDP), to grant pecuniary compensation to family members of people listed in the Law; d) the possibility of new cases which occurred between 1961 and 1979 being

1. [1] Juan Mario Solís Delgadillo, Los tiempos de la memoria en las agendas políticas de Argentina y Chile, Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 2015.

2. [2] For more information on the context of political repression practiced during the dictatorship in Brazil, see the chapter “Transformations in the Brazilian political system”.

3. [3] Eneá de Stutz e Almeida “Memória, verdade, reparação e justiça: uma tese de resistência constitucional”, in Justiça de Transição, 04/10/2020, https://justicadetransicao.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/memoria-verdade-reparacao-e-justica-1.pdf.

4. [4] See: Criméia Schmidt de Almeida et al., eds., Dossiê ditadura: mortos e desaparecidos políticos no Brasil (1964–1985), São Paulo: Imprensa Oficial do Estado de São Paulo, 2009, 32–33; and: Brasil, Secretaria Especial de Direitos Humanos, Comissão Especial sobre Mortos e Desaparecidos Políticos, Direito à memória e direito à verdade, Brasília: SEDH, 2007, 30–33.

5. [5] See: Criméia Schmidt de Almeida et al., Op. cit., 33; and: Brasil, Op. cit., 2007, 33–37.

tried (according to the period that the Amnesty Law provided), granting them the respective indemnities; e) the establishment of a minimum amount (R$ 100,000.00⁶ ) for indemnities; f) CEMDP’s prerogative to request from official entities the presentation of appropriate documents for the requests’ analysis.

Although the Law has made possible undeniable advances, the CFMDP points out the following problems from its approval: 1) it prevented the State from identifying and holding responsible the agents involved in the crimes that occurred during the dictatorship; 2) left the burden of proof to family members; 3) did not compel the Brazilian State to locate the bodies of the disappeared; 4) excluded the possibility of other interested parties to file a the request for recognition of deaths and/or disappearances, thereby reinforcing the idea that those interested are solely and exclusively relatives of the victims, something that denies the public nature of the matter.⁷

In the years that followed the beginning of the Special Commission work, the family members fought against the limitations of Law No. 9.140, asking for its revision. Requests for revision of the law would be partially accepted in 2002 and 2004. In 2002, Law No. 10.536 allowed the time lapse provided by Law No. 9.140 (from September 2 of 1961 to August 15 of 1979) to be extended until October 5, 1988 (promulgation of the current Federal Constitution). Subsequently, aiming to overcome difficulties in the interpretation of Law No. 9.140 and its uses, which arose in the CEMDP judgments, family members managed to get Law No. 10.875 of 2004 approved. According to this law, the CEMDP would recognize cases of people: a) who were killed in the streets, participating in marches or actions against the regime; b) who committed suicide when they received a prison sentence, when they were arrested and tortured, or even due to psychological disorders resulting from the repression.⁸

LAW 10.559/2002: THE AMNESTY COMMISSION

Linked to the Ministry of Justice until 2018, the Amnesty Commission was created in 2001 by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who regulated (though the Provisional Measure converted into Law No. 10.559 of 2002) Art. 8 of the Constitutional Transitional Provisions Act (ADCT) of the Federal Constitution of 1988. According to art. 8 of the ADCT, it provided the creation of a governmental entity that would be in charge of: a) promoting the recognition of the condition of political amnesty for those who, persecuted for political reasons between 1946 and 1988, a period that covers the authoritarian period, were fired as a result of Government acts’ editions; b) granting them, according to each case, their respective financial compensation.⁹

For years, the Commission helped to disseminate and promote the memory of the repression in the country through: 1) the Caravanas da Anistia, public judgment sessions that were held in all regions of the country between 2007 and 2015; 2) the inauguration of 27 monuments in memory of the dead and disappeared (in partnership with the Secretariat for Human Rights of the Presidency of the Republic); 3) the organization of national and international events to debate the issue.

It should be noted that the judgment sessions held during the Caravanas constitute an activity of mainly symbolic nature. At the end of the analysis of the requests presented by people who consider themselves victims of political persecution, being accepted, the members of the Commission apologized to the victim publicly on behalf of the Brazilian State. After, they declared its amnesty, and, if applicable, granted a pecuniary indemnity.

LAW NO. 12.528/2011: THE NATIONAL TRUTH COMMISSION

Regarding specifically, the Brazilian case, the development of human rights policies has advanced significantly since the 1993 Vienna Conference. In addition to having reinserted the theme on the agenda, the Conference suggested that the countries concerned with the protection of human rights could reorganize them internally¹⁰ through the elaboration of a “National Human Rights Program” (PNDH): a document intended for countries participating in the meeting to establish an agenda in order to develop human rights policies and, in addition, align them with the international parameters established by the Conference.

In Brazil, the first two editions of the document, PNDH-1 and PNDH-2, were launched respectively in 1996 and 2002, during the governments of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002). However, only considering the publication of PNDH-3, in December 2009, that there is a significant expansion of the treatment of the memory of repression in the country reserved a specific Guideline Axis to the issue: Axis VI, called Right to Memory and Truth.¹¹ In addition to establishing the need to preserve and promote the memory of the period (Guideline No. 24), and the revision of the legislation that, produced by the military and based on the DSN, continued to be applied in the country (Guideline No. 25), it also provided for the creation of a National Truth Commission (Guideline No. 23).

Before the launch of the Program’s new edition, in December 2009, there was an attempt to make necessary its endorsement by all ministries, in order to give greater legitimacy to the guidelines established by the conferences that prepared the document.¹² The launch of the Program was delayed by almost a year due to the opposition presented by the Ministry of Defense to the investigation of violations that occurred during the authoritarian period.¹³

Between the end of 2009, when PNDH-3 was published, and the beginning of 2010, there were a series of public demonstrations and controversial discussions on the publication of the Programs’ new edition, and, above all, on the content of the VI Guideline Axis. Involving human rights defenders, on the one hand, and the Armed Forces, represented by Defense Minister Nelson Jobim, on the other hand, the controversies highlighted the strength with which some ideas have echoed in public opinion since the transition to democracy. The reciprocal amnesty thesis was raised by the Armed Forces and the public

1. [6] At the time, something around US$ 100,000.00.

2. [7] Criméia Schmidt de Almeida et al., Op. cit., 33–34.

3. [8] Brasil, Op. cit., 2007, 44–46.

4. [9] Brasil, Ministério da Justiça, Comissão de Anistia, Cartilha Informativa da Comissão de Anistia, Brasília: CA/MJ, 2011.

5. [10] Andrei Koerner, “O papel dos direitos humanos na política democrática: uma análise preliminar”, in Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, 2003, (18), 53, 143–157.

6. [11] Brasil, Secretaria de Direitos Humanos, 3º Programa Nacional de Direitos Humanos (PNDH-3), Brasília: SDH, 2010b.

7. [12] Brasil, Op. cit., 2010b, 11.

8. [13] IPEA, Políticas sociais: acompanhamento e análise, Brasília: IPEA, 2010, 285.

opinion, who defended the idea that everything that happened should be forgotten since many crimes were also committed by leftist militants. The discussions generated an important tension, leading to the retreat of the Federal Government, which in May 2010 edited Decree No. 7.177, changing the provisions of the Program.

According to the Decree, the time lapse to be investigated by the National Truth Commission, which in the original version of the PNDH-3 was referred to as the dictatorship period, would include all crimes committed by the Brazilian State between 1946 and 1988, having also been reinforced, as an objective limit to their work, the Amnesty Law (Law No. 6.683 of 1979). Thus, the entity would be responsible for clarifying the crimes committed by the repression but could not punish those responsible.

In another sense, the controversies and upheavals resulted from the release of the new PNDH text delayed the proceedings of the Law Project that created the Truth Commission (PL No. 7.736 of 2010). The project was only approved by the two Houses of the National Congress in October 2011, while its originating Law (Law No. 12.528/2011) was sanctioned by President Dilma Rousseff in November of the same year. After that, the National Truth Commission (CNV) began its activities on May 16 of 2012 (almost two and a half years after the launch of the PNDH-3).

In addition to the period to be investigated by the Commission covering crimes committed in a democratic political setting (from 1946 to the Coup of 1964), human rights groups had their expectations diminished by two other limitations. The first one concerns the reduced number of members: only 7 people to analyze crimes committed in almost 50 years of history, in a country as huge as Brazil. The other limitation was related to the validity term of the Commission’s work: initially, it would be only 2 years, however, in December 2013, the Presidency of the Republic extended its term, so the deadline for the activities closure was extended to December 2014.

SOCIAL SATISFACTION

Measures aiming for the rehabilitation and/or repair of an authoritarian regime’s victims can be analyzed, regarding its effectiveness, by observing the capacity they present to contemplate both their specific audience, but also what concerns the reach they have for the general population. After all, reparation cannot be understood as something exclusive to those who suffered political violence, as crimes committed by a dictatorship must be understood and recognized as something that affects society altogether.¹⁴

Considering this, social satisfaction resulting from the implementation of reparation policies in the Brazilian context could be observed based on two aspects: on the one hand, the identification of the amount of people benefited from the measures, and, on the other hand, through data on their reach considering society in general. The first analysis category mentioned can be verified more easily. The second one becomes difficult to be precise because of the absence of opinion polls on the subject, as well as other means used to verify the measures reached, considering broad sectors of the population. In part, one can residually think about the social satisfaction resulting from the reparation measures by observing whether data on their performance are available for the general population.

ABOUT LAW NO. 9.140/1995:

Up to 2006, considering ten years of appreciation of the 475 requests filed to CEMDP, another 221 people were recognized as dead and/or missing, in addition to the victims referred to in the Addendum Law, granting compensation to their families.¹⁵ In 2007, in order to systematize and disseminate the results of its activities, the Special Commission launched the book-report Direito à Memória e à Verdade (Right to Memory and Truth). Since then, CEMDP has continued to operate, dedicating itself to: 1) the assessment of new cases; 2) the organization of a genetic database to help identify the remains that have already been rescued and/or that may be rescued in clandestine graves; 3) the participation and advice of working groups created to locate and identify the remains of repression victims.¹⁶

ABOUT LAW NO. 10.559/2002:

Up to 2015, the Amnesty Commission carried out more than 90 editions of the Caravanas. In another sense, aiming to disseminate studies and intending to promote debate on the issue among researchers, political activists and others interested, the Commission published, from 2009 to 2016, editions of the journal Anistia Política e Justiça de Transição (Political Amnesty and Transitional Justice). The journal, published both in physical and electronic formats, was distributed for free and could be accessed on the official website of the Commission. Mainly presenting academic works and specialist analysis on policies that deal with the memory of repression and enable the granting of pecuniary and symbolic compensation to victims of violence in Brazil or other countries that have gone through authoritarian regimes, the journal also published interviews with key-actors from the fight for memory, truth and justice, as well as documents about the Brazilian dictatorship.

Between 2002 and 2021, more than 79.000 amnesty requests were filed to the Commission. From these amount, 71.703 were assessed and finalized, many of them granting compensation to the victims and/or their families. Around 6.400 cases wait for analysis and judgment.

ABOUT LAW NO. 12.528/2011:

Between May 2012 and 2014, the CNV held or supported 80 public hearings (in various regions of the country) with victims of the dictatorship, witnesses, and even with repression agents who were subpoenaed to give statements. More than 1.000 testimonies were collected in public activities or privately. During the same period, the work teams created within the Commission carried out investigations and documentary research in different entities and public archives. On

1. [14] According to: Carlos Artur Gallo, “Pensar o passado, construir o futuro, fortalecer a democracia: políticas de memória e memória da ditadura no Brasil”, in Cristiano Engelke, Nilton Sainz, eds., Sombras no Extremo Sul: luzes sobre o passado ditatorial no Sul gaúcho, Rio Grande: Editora da FURG, 2019, 169–192; and: Solís Delgadillo, Juan Mario, Op. cit.

2. [15] Brasil, Op. cit., 2007, 46–47.

3. [16] Brasil, Secretaria de Direitos Humanos, Habeas Corpus: que se apresente o corpo: a busca dos desaparecidos políticos no Brasil, Brasília: SDH, 2010a, 136–138.

December 10 of 2014, CNV delivered the final report of its activities to President Dilma Rousseff.

Containing two thousand pages, the final report was divided into 3 volumes. The first, sets out the objectives of the Commission, presents an overview of political history in Brazil from 1946 onwards, details how the repressive structure worked in the country and the techniques used by state agents during the dictatorship. It even highlights the connections between the repressive structure in Brazil and neighboring countries, which acted in a coordinated way in the international repressive “Operation Condor”. Also, beyond exposing the command chain in the period, it estimates the balance of repression and, names 377 persons directly or indirectly responsible for the crimes committed in the period (many of them already deceased), and establishes a set of 29 recommendations.

The second volume analyzes the role played by part of civil society and businessmen in the coup and during the dictatorship, as well as the various forms of opposition and resistance to the military takeover and occupation in the country. In addition, data is presented regarding the repressions practiced against specific segments of Brazilian society: from members of the Armed Forces who were against the takeover in 1964, to the urban workers, peasants, indigenous, religious, LGBTs, professors and university students.

In the third and final volume of the report, there is a list and profile of 434 people who were recognized as dead or missing as a result of political violence committed between 1946 and 1988. Referenced in the “Introduction to Volume 3”, as a list subject to revision, it is still recognized as limited by members of the CNV, those being attributed to the lack of collaboration of members of the Armed Forces.

In order to prevent the reproduction of anti-democratic behaviors from the Armed Forces, to relativize their maintenance as veto players of the new democracy and to enable an end to impunity for crimes committed in the name of the authoritarian regime, the CNV, in the set of 29 recommendations presented in its final report, suggested, among other measures: a) that the Brazilian Armed Forces should publicly acknowledge the repressions practiced by their agents during the period investigated by the Truth Commission; b) that the civil, criminal and administrative liability of those involved in human rights violations during the dictatorship should be investigated and attributed to them, in contrariety to the Amnesty Law; c) that the curriculum of military academies should be reformulated based on democratic values and respect for human rights; d) that official activities celebrating the 1964 coup should be prohibited; e) that a national system for the prevention and combat of torture should be improved and strengthened; f) that the National Security Law should be revoked; f) that the state Military Justice should be extinguished; g) that the right of access to the files of the repression should be made effective.

Although limited, the document represented an advance in the treatment of the subject at the national level. In addition to pointing out those responsible for a number of human rights political repression was not restricted to armed movements, it also affected urban and rural workers, university professors and students, dissident military, indigenous people and LGBTs; 3) the participation of civil segments in the coup and in the dictatorship, emphasizing the role of entrepreneurs who benefited from the economic modernization carried out by the dictatorship as being essential to the maintenance of the regime.

All measures mentioned here can be consulted in official websites, maintained by the Federal Government, on which it was possible to obtain partial data on the implemented policies:

• CEMDP: https://www.gov.br/participamaisbrasil/cemdp

• Amnesty Commission: https://www.gov.br/mdh/pt-br/navegue-por-temas/comissao-de-anistia-1

• CNV: https://cnv.memoriasreveladas.gov.br/

However, the websites of the first two entities suffered changes in recent years, and because of that, a considerable amount of data, materials and reports that were previously available online have been removed. In recent years, there have also been problems with accessing the CNV website, where it is possible to download the final report and other partial reports produced by the Commission. On more than one occasion, the site was unavailable, leaving groups of dictatorship victims, human rights organizations and researchers apprehensive.

CURRENT STATUS

The recent political context, marked by the approval of President Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment, in 2016, and the presidential election of 2018, in which a far-right politician was elected, directly impacted the continuity of activities related to the main reparation policies in the country since the 1990s.

Regarding the Amnesty Commission specifically, when the parliamentary coup that removed Dilma Rousseff from the Presidency and its vice-president, Michel Temer, took office, in August 2016, it suffered a profound restructuring that had repercussions on its actions range.¹⁷ In addition to the new government significantly and arbitrarily having altered the composition of the commission, it became evident a change in the peace and format of its work. Judgment Caravans no longer occur, nor public apologies, and also, an attempt to turn weak their functions is denounced. This denunciation is corroborated by the absence of publicity for the commission’s work, and the fact that its autonomy had been reduced. Their decisions started being subject to the assessment of the Attorney General (AGU), who denied the granting of some indemnities.¹⁸

Since January 2019, in view of Jair Bolsonaro inauguration as President of the Republic, the Commission suffered new modifications, deepening the measures that had been taken since the Temer Government (2016–2018). The first one refers to the relocation of the entity, which was linked to the Ministry of Justice since its origins, to the Ministry of Women, Family and Human Rights (MMFDH). Although the relocation to a Ministry dedicated to human rights seems appropriate, as it has a self-evident violations, and recommending a series of measures against the impunity that remains, it brings to the debate on the civil-military dictatorship the recognition of at least three important aspects, concerning: 1) the existence of an organized repressive apparatus, which, operating in all regions of the country, systematically committed violations during the dictatorship period; 2) the repression’s reach: according to the data presented in the report,

1. [17] About this subject, see: “Alberto Goldman e o retrocesso da Comissão da Anistia”, in Carta Capital, 06/02/2017, https://www.cartacapital.com.br/sociedade/alberto-goldman-e-o-retrocesso-da-comissao-da-anistia.

2. [18] About this subject, see: “A lei da Anistia 39 anos depois: ainda restrita e par-cial”, in Câmara dos Deputados, 28/08/2018, https://www2.camara.leg.br/ atividade-legislativa/comissoes/comissoes-permanentes/cdhm/noticias/a-lei-da-anistia-39-anos-depois-ainda-restrita-e-parcial.

thematic affinity, the change is more complex than it appears. The MMFDH was created by the government after a ministerial reform marked by controversy, and is headed by Damares Alves, a figure associated with the so-called “ideological wing” of the government, who represents evangelical and conservative sectors linked to the new president.

This is a change that represents a significant symbolic and political break, on the part of the Federal Government, regarding the way issues related to the dictatorship victims’ reparations had been treated for over fifteen years in the country. Intimately associated with justice, the issue is now being addressed by a Ministry that, even though it carries term “human rights” in its name, was clearly created to subordinate the guarantee of such rights to a stereotyped, conservative and religious vision.

The relocation to a new Ministry impacted other problems, precisely, regarding the work of the Amnesty Commission. Changes in the composition of the entity, loss of transparency in the release of information, website alterations, suppression of materials (books, magazines, reports) produced by the Commission over the years, all of which have contributed, during the first year of the Bolsonaro Government, to the deceleration and dismantling of a public policy that, for years, had been successfully implemented. As for the way the analysis of requests started to be carried out, the format implemented since 2016 became consolidated under the new Ministry. This means that the judgements, that used to be frequently public and apologetic to the victims, began to happen behind closed doors, in an impersonal way.

A significant change was the alteration of the Commission’s statute, to reduce the possibilities of administrative appeals presented in light of the decisions taken by the entity. Only one appeal may be filed by those who had their request rejected or partially denied.

Another controversial change, resulted from the new administration was the untying of the recognition of political amnesty condition from the granting of eventual pecuniary compensation to victims. Before, the amnesty person had defined, in the same decision, the granting or not of a pecuniary indemnity for the damages caused by the political persecution. Since 2019, in order to receive such compensation, it is necessary for the interested party to file a court order. According to Victor Neiva, representative of political amnesties on the Commission, who would be dismissed by Minister Damares Alves in October 2019, the measure represents a major setback for dictatorship victims, who, in addition to waiting years for the granting of amnesty, will have to wait, indefinitely, and by court proceedings, to receive pecuniary indemnity.¹⁹

As if the mentioned problems were not enough, other facts related to the Commission during the year of 2019 helps to summarize the direction of the organization under the new government. In March, Minister Damares Alves said publicly that she would open the “little boxes” of compensation granted by the Amnesty Commission, in a speech that suggests that decisions favorable to the dictatorship victims would have been fraudu-lent.²⁰ In September, a denouncement that the orientation given to the Commission was to “deny massively the requests” became public, which actually occurred in practice. 80 requests were decided until September 2019, 74 were denied.²¹ In 2021, this tendency remains, so that around 90 % of the requests for reparation have been denied, and according to an article published by El País,²² members of the Federal Government want to extinguish the Commission in 2022.

The modifications and setbacks deepened since the beginning of the new Federal Government are not restricted to the Amnesty Commission. CEMDP has also been the target of measures implemented both by the Temer Government and by the current one. Responsible for investigating the cases of deaths and disappearances that occurred during the dictatorship and for granting economic reparation to the victims’ families, CEMDP has also been working, in recent years, to identify the remains of political militants persecuted by the repressive apparatus. Considering the arbitrary change of its composition (first in 2016, then in 2019), along with the continuous reduction in the budget allocated to those entities, the Bolsonaro Government, although it cannot be accused of extinguishing the politics of memory in the country, can be identified as responsible for their lessening, as well as for their infeasibility.²³

In addition to this, there is the fact that most of the CNV’s recommendations, contained in the final report delivered in 2014, have not been implemented. Out of a total of 29 recommendations made by the Commission, 22 were never realized, according to the Transitional Justice Studies Center.²⁴ Even those cases in which there has been progress, it is still quite limited in some cases. Criminal actions were initiated, but no single agent was punished. The Amnesty Law and the National Security Law issued by the authoritarian regime is still in force. Repression archives kept by the Armed Forces remain inaccessible.

VICTIMS’ ORGANIZATIONS

The main dictatorship victim’s organizations in Brazil started to organize themselves during the authoritarian regime period, gaining strength in the context of the fight for Amnesty, during the second half of the 1970 decade. Nowadays, the following organizations can be indicated as representatives of the demands:

• The Commission of the Families of the Dead and Disappeared Political Activists – CFMDP

• Torture Never Again groups – GTNM

1. [19] About the change in the way how amnesty and indemnities started to be granted, see: “Integrante da Comissão de Anistia avalia como ‘desastre’ decisão sobre valores das indenizações”, in Blog do Matheus Leitão, 25/06/2019, https://g1.globo.com/politica/blog/matheus-leitao/post/2019/06/25/integrante-da-comissao-de-anistia-avalia-como-desastre-decisao-sobre-valores-das-indenizacoes.ghtml.

2. [20] On the Ministry speech, see: “Caixinhas da Anistia serão abertas, diz Damares Alves”, in Folha de São Paulo, 27/03/2019, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2019/03/caixinhas-da-anistia-serao-abertas-diz-damares-alves.shtml.

3. [21] According to: “Orientação na Comissão de Anistia é negar pedidos em massa, diz conselheiro do órgão”, in Folha de São Paulo, 12/09/2019, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2019/09/orientacao-na-comissao-de-anistia-e-negar-pedidos-em-massa-diz-conselheiro-do-orgao.shtml.

4. [22] See: “Governo quer fim da Comissão de Anistia em 2022 e nega 90 % dos pedidos de reconhecimento de anistiados”, in El País, 10/04/2021, https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2021-04-10/governo-quer-fim-da-comissao-de-anistia-em-2022-e-nega-90-dos-pedidos-de-reconhecimento-de-anistiados.html.

5. [23] About the impacts of Bolsonaro Government on the Amnesty Commission and the CEMDP works, see: “Mudanças no governo Bolsonaro em comissões desmontam anos de políticas de reparação da ditadura”, in Huffpost Brasil, 01/02/2020, https://www.huffpostbrasil.com/entry/comissos-ditadura-bolsonaro_br_5e2eed99c5b6779e9c37adc1.

6. [24] See: “Maioria das recomendações da Comissão Nacional da Verdade segue no papel”, in Veja, 12/02/2021, https://veja.abril.com.br/politica/maioria-das-recomendacoes-da-comissao-nacional-da-verdade-segue-no-papel/.

• Children and Grandchildren for Memory, Truth and Justice

• Brazilian Association of People Who Received Political Amnesty – ABAP

• Justice and Human Rights Movement – MJDH

• Helena Greco Institute of Human Rights and Citizenship – IHG

• Vladimir Herzog Institute – IVH

• Brazil Network – Memory, Truth and Justice – RBMVJ

It is important to mention that the list presented above is not exhaustive, having been identified here the main organizations that support and/or represent different sectors directly or indirectly affected by the repression: relatives of victims (spouses, children, grandchildren, etc.), former political prisoners, persecuted, exiled, amnesty.

LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The reparation measures created and implemented for the dictatorship victims in Brazil, as seen, had their path marked by gradualism and delay. Even so, it is possible to observe that the main existing measures, altogether, enabled:

1/ The recognition of the crimes committed by the Brazilian State and its agents during the authoritarian regime;

2/ The rescue of part of the memory and the truth about the period;

3/ The concession of pecuniary and/or symbolic compensations to part of the dictatorship victims and their relatives, through the work of the CEMDP and the Amnesty Commission;

4/ The location and identification of the remains of some repression victims;

5/ A public space to listen to the victims, through the audiences promoted by the CNV between 2012 and 2014.

Despite the advances mentioned, two significative problems involving the creating and implementation of the measures kept present as time goes by: 1) the focus on financial indemnities in prejudice and/or as a condition to the other possibilities of compensation, 2) the task of producing evidences of the persecution and/or violence’s suffered being left to the victims and their relatives.

Also, other limits related to those measures can be identified:

a/ There are no advances concerning to the punishment of those involved in the violations;

b/ The largest part of political disappeared people remains have not yet been located or identified;

c/ The CNV recommendations, in large part, were not implemented;

d/ The compensations granted by the Amnesty Commission started to be massively denied in the current Government;

e/ The CEMDP and the Amnesty Commission suffered constant interventions since 2016, disarticulating the progress that have been accomplished during previous administrations;

In view of this, it is recommended:

1/ The implementation of the CNV recommendations;

2/ The opening of the archives of repression;

3/ The increase of the efforts to locate or identify the remains of political disappeared people;

4/ The guarantee that CEMDP and the Amnesty Commission can carry out their activities autonomously, without the intervention of the current Federal Government.

SOURCES USED AND FURTHER READING

“A lei da Anistia 39 anos depois: ainda restrita e parcial”, in Câmara dos Deputados, 28/08/2018, https://www2.camara.leg.br/atividade-legislativa/comissoes/comissoes-permanentes/cdhm/noticias/a-lei-da-anistia-39-anos-depois-ainda-restrita-e-parcial

“Alberto Goldman e o retrocesso da Comissão da Anistia”, in Carta Capital, 06/02/2017, https://www.cartacapital.com.br/sociedade/alberto-goldman-e-o-retrocesso-da-comissao-da-anistia

Almeida, Criméia Schmidt de et al., eds., Dossiê ditadura: mortos e desaparecidos políticos no Brasil (1964–1985), São Paulo: Imprensa Oficial do Estado de São Paulo, 2009

Almeida, Eneá de Stutz e, “Memória, verdade, reparação e justiça: uma tese de resistência constitucional”, in Justiça de Transição, 04/10/2020, https://justicadetransicao.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/memoria-verdade-reparacao-e-justica-1.pdf

Brasil, Ministério da Justiça, Comissão de Anistia, Cartilha Informativa da Comissão de Anistia, Brasília: CA/MJ, 2011

Brasil, Secretaria de Direitos Humanos, Habeas Corpus: que se apresente o corpo: a busca dos desaparecidos políticos no Brasil, Brasília: SDH, 2010a

Brasil, Secretaria de Direitos Humanos, 3º Programa Nacional de Direitos Humanos (PNDH-3), Brasília: SDH, 2010b

Brasil, Secretaria Especial de Direitos Humanos, Comissão Especial sobre Mortos e Desaparecidos Políticos, Direito à memória e direito à verdade, Brasília: SEDH, 2007

“Caixinhas da Anistia serão abertas, diz Damares Alves”, in Folha de São Paulo, 27/03/2019, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2019/03/caixinhas-da-anistia-serao-abertas-diz-damares-alves.shtml

Gallo, Carlos Artur, “Pensar o passado, construir o futuro, fortalecer a democracia: políticas de memória e memória da ditadura no Brasil”, in Cristiano Engelke, Nilton Sainz, eds., Sombras no Extremo Sul: luzes sobre o passado ditatorial no Sul gaúcho,

Rio Grande: Editora da FURG, 2019, 169–192

“Governo quer fim da Comissão de Anistia em 2022 e nega 90 % dos pedidos de reconhecimento de anistiados”, in El País, 10/04/2021, https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2021-04-10/governo-quer-fim-da-comissao-de-anistia-em-2022-e-nega-90-dos-pedidos-de-reconhecimento-de-anistiados.html

“Integrante da Comissão de Anistia avalia como ‘desastre’ decisão sobre valores das indenizações”, in Blog do Matheus Leitão, 25/06/2019, https://g1.globo.com/politica/blog/matheus-leitao/post/2019/06/25/integrante-da-comissao-de-anistia-avalia-como-desastre-decisao-sobre-valores-das-indenizacoes.ghtml

IPEA, Políticas sociais: acompanhamento e análise, Brasília: IPEA, 2010, 283–305

Koerner, Andrei, “O papel dos direitos humanos na política democrática: uma análise preliminar”, in Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, 2003, (18), 53, 143–157

“Maioria das recomendações da Comissão Nacional da Verdade segue no papel”, in Veja, 12/02/2021, https://veja.abril.com.br/politica/maioria-das-recomendacoes-da-comissao-nacional-da-verdade-segue-no-papel/

“Mudanças no governo Bolsonaro em comissões desmontam anos de políticas de reparação da ditadura”, in Huffpost Brasil, 01/02/2020, https://www.huffpostbrasil.com/entry/comissos-ditadura-bolsonaro_br_5e2eed99c5b6779e9c37adc1

“Orientação na Comissão de Anistia é negar pedidos em massa, diz conselheiro do órgão”, in Folha de São Paulo, 12/09/2019, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2019/09/orientacao-na-comissao-de-anistia-e-negar-pedidos-em-massa-diz-conselheiro-do-orgao.shtml

Solís Delgadillo, Juan Mario, Los tiempos de la memoria en las agendas políticas de Argentina y Chile, Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 2015.

EDUCATION AND THE PRESERVATION OF SITES OF CONSCIENCE

Paulo Cesar Endo, Márcio Seligmann-Silva

1/ THE NEED FOR THE PRESERVATION OF WITNESS MEMORY

It is fair to say that the interpretation of the 1979 Amnesty Law in Brazil in terms of blocking the work of the justice system has been one of the major impediments to confronting the nation’s dictatorship period, equally in terms of historical research and memory work. In truth, there is still ample evidence in Brazil today of veritable “forgetting work” and glamorisations of the dictatorial era – one of the darkest and most violent periods in the nation’s history – on the part of countless fans of the dictatorship who support the current government. Given this reality, there is an urgent need to fight for the implementation of spaces dedicated to the memory of the dictatorship era, aimed at recording the facts about what took place at that time, and focused on acts of State violence and acts of resistance by the population. In this context the collection and presentation of testimonies of survivors of this dictatorial violence are also urgently required. Collections of such testimonies have been created in Brazil in the form of publications that recount events that occurred during the dictatorship (testimonial literature), countless films, and visual art works, but also in the form of testimonies presented to national and state-level Truth Commissions, the Ministry of Justice’s Amnesty Commission, and collections created by human rights NGOs, in addition to those compiled by relatives and friends of the dead and the disappeared, research centres and universities. The National Truth Commission was finally established in 2011, as a response to the condemnation that Brazil had suffered in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 2010, shortly after the Federal Supreme Court’s decision to recognise the interpretation of the 1979 Amnesty law as an impediment to trials relating to crimes perpetrated by the State during the dictatorship period. The so-called “Gomes Lund and others v Brazil” case led to the condemnation of the Brazilian State. This case had been referred to the Inter-American System of Human Rights in 1995 on the initiative of relatives of the dead and disappeared, human rights organisations and the Public Prosecutor. Their aim was to bring about an investigation and trial of those responsible as well as reparations for relatives of the victims of the massacre of members of the Araguaia Guerrilla that occurred in the south of the state of Pará between 1973 and 1975. In this operation over five thousand soldiers from the three armed forces were mobilised to hunt down and eliminate 76 guerrillas. To this day the bodies of most of the dead have not been located and/or identified.

On 18 November 2011, law no. 12,528 created the National Truth Commission (CNV). The first article in this law states that it aims to: “examine and elucidate the serious human rights violations that occurred during the period established in article 8 of the Transitory Constitutional Provisions Act, with the aim of effectuating the right to memory and historical truth and promoting national reconciliation.”

The CNV, however, had limited scope, given that the armed forces did not grant the Commission’s investigators access to their archives. Its work should be recognised in terms of the symbolism of a commission created by the State with the sole objective of investigating the serious human rights violations committed by the State itself during the dictatorship era. Among the report’s recommendations, the need for a memory policy focusing on symbolic reparations and for civic education was highlighted, as the following excerpts illustrate:

• 48. Measures must be taken to preserve the memory of the serious human rights violations that occurred during the period investigated by the CNV and, especially, the memory of all the people who were victims of these violations. These measures should aim, among others, to:

  • preserve, restore and promote the registration or creation of memory marks on urban or rural properties where serious human rights violations occurred;

  • set up and establish, in Brasília, a Museum of Memory.

• 49. With the same purpose of preserving memory, the CNV proposes to repeal measures that, during the period of the military dictatorship, were intended to pay homage to the perpetrators of serious human rights violations. Among others, measures must be taken to:

  • cancel the honours that have been granted to public or private agents associated with such serious violations, such as many of those awarded the Peacemaker Medal;

  • promote the name change of public places, transport routes, buildings and public institutions of any nature, whether federal, state or municipal, which refer to public agents or individuals who have notoriously been involved in the practice of serious violations.¹

These proposals are broad and very important in the context of a Brazilian national culture marked by inertia regarding the suspension of tributes to members of dictatorial governments and their agents. Conversely, there has also been an enormous reluctance to establish spaces dedicated to the inscription of the memory of the violence perpetrated and of acts of combat against the dictatorship. However, unfortunately, even today, despite these recommendations made in the CNV report, this culture of forgetting prevails. As this chapter will discuss, there are many important initiatives to reverse this situation, but the sphere of politics and its official representatives, as well as most of the mainstream media in Brazil, still prefer to repeat slogans such as “let’s turn this page of history”, “let’s not touch the wounds” etc. (referring to the dictatorial period and the demands of survivors and victims). It is important to emphasise that the transition to democracy in Brazil was a slow process and controlled at all times by the military

1. [1] Relatório da Comissão Nacional da Verdade do Brasil, I, p. 974.

and their political partners. These same agents remained important pillars in the State, as can be seen in the massive return of the military to power after the 2018 elections, thirty-three years after the official end of the civil-military regime that ruled Brazil between 1964 and1985. This chapter will return to this issue below.

2/ TYPES OF MEMORY INSTITUTIONS AND THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS OF MEMORY

Today, in the midst of the struggle for the preservation of its democracy, Brazil faces serious problems regarding the institutionalisation, recognition and preservation of its places of conscience and, therefore, the material promotion of the memory marks already identified, in line with the reports of the country’s different Truth Commissions. It cannot even be said that Brazil has a consistent memory policy, in the sense of a State policy at municipal, state or federal level.

Likewise, the process of physically establishing memory marks and memory sites, as well as sites of conscience, has ground to a halt at a national level, despite the initiatives and demands of groups of victims’ relatives and activists, sometimes supported by specific governors and mayors in certain states and cities. It is true to say that currently not only is there no broad policy for the preservation of memory but, on the contrary, existing policies are constantly being attacked or halted by the current federal government, running the serious risk of turning back the clock on the little progress that has been made in recent decades.

NATIONAL TRUTH COMMISSION (CNV) AND STATE-LEVEL TRUTH COMMISSIONS (CEVS)

During its investigations, the National Truth Commission (CNV) identified twenty-one Clandestine Detention Centres (CCD) in Brazil spread across nine different states, namely Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Pará, Minas Gerais, Pernambuco, Goiás, Bahia, Ceará and Sergipe. Seventeen of these locations were identified by testifiers themselves when the CNV report was created, another 7 feature in official documents produced by the repressive government itself, and are confirmed in testimonies collected by the CNV.

In addition, the commission pinpointed 233 locations where serious human rights violations occurred during the period 1964–1985, distributed as follows by region:

• Northeast: 49

• North: 28

• Southeast: 90

• Centre-West: 08

• South: 58

It is very important to stress that during the CNV’s investigations, an official request was made to the Ministry of Defence for the institution to collaborate in the inquiries into violations that occurred in the period between 1960 and 1980 in facilities belonging to the Armed Forces, and into the use of these locations for other purposes. The Defence Ministry’s response at the time was that the Armed Forces did not explicitly recognise that atrocities took place inside official facilities or in related Clandestine Detention Centres (CCD).²

Another important episode that exemplifies the obstacles created by the armed forces to impede the truth commissions occurred during the investigations carried out by the CNV, together with the State Truth Commission of Rio de Janeiro (CEV-RJ). The day before the visit of the commissions to the site, records of political prisoners who were hospitalised during the period of repression were removed.³ These records were later located in an annex building and incorporated into the commissions’ files of supporting documents.⁴

Such episodes already clearly indicated the non-collaborative position adopted by the Brazilian armed forces with regard to the investigations carried out by the CNV and the CEVs.

This chapter will summarise below some of the results of the CEVs' work, regarding sites of conscience and memory sites described in the respective reports, which have already been fully or partially completed. Due to space limitations, and to give an overview, only the reports concerning the five most populous states in Brazil, which together represent over half the nation’s population, will be referred to. It must also be remembered that the methodology and definition of memory locations used in the reports produced by each of the CEVs, including the CNV Report, vary greatly. Efforts will be made to indicate the definitions proposed by each CEV, where they exist, together with the data presented. We will see that in all cases the presentation of places, sites and marks of memory – both potential and those already in existence –, listed in each of the reports, are not, and are not intended to be, exhaustive because the process of cataloguing these places and sites, as well as the defining criteria, only gained real momentum after the beginning of the Truth Commissions in Brazil in 2011.

The work of the CEVs and the CNV represents the beginning of a nascent process of recognition, research, investigation and scrutiny of Brazil’s dictatorial past with the ability to institutionalise and materialise places of memory and sites of conscience nationwide. This vital national process is currently stalled and looks set to be reversed at a federal level. Therefore, given the directives imposed by the current government of Jair Bolsonaro and its actions, it is not possible to envisage either the conclusion of the process of cataloguing, institutionalising and materialising these places, or their progress in the short term.

In this sense, Brazil finds itself in blatant contravention of the nation’s 1988 constitution, as well as of the directives of the Third National Human Rights Plan, and has failed to comply with the aforementioned judgement of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights handed down in 2010 on the Gomes Lund v Brazil case, better known as the “Araguaia Guerrilla” case. In addition the government has turned its back on the recommendations of the UN reports on torture in Brazil of 2001 and 2016 and on the recommendations of the State and National Truth Commissions.

A/ THE STATE OF SÃO PAULO

The São Paulo Resistance Memorial database catalogued, in the state of São Paulo alone, 189 places and reference points could potentially constitute and be materialised as places of memory and/or sites of conscience. Of all these spaces, approximately 119 are located in the city of São Paulo and the rest in towns and cities throughout São Paulo state or on its coastline. Almost all these places still have no physical reference to events relating to detentions, arrests, torture, murders and resistance that took place there.

1. [2] Relatório da Comissão Estadual da Verdade do Estado de São Paulo, T. 1.

2. [3] Relatório da Comissão Estadual da Verdade do Rio de Janeiro, p. 328–329.

3. [4] Relatório da Comissão Estadual da Verdade do Rio de Janeiro. pp. 327–329.

One example is the São Paulo Resistance Memorial, renamed and relaunched in 2009 and maintained by the government of the state of São Paulo. It was established thanks to the struggles of survivors, activists and researchers in a process marked by internal conflicts and disagreements. Today, it constitutes an important focus for the dissemination of a culture of memory, justice and truth that has culminated in the recognition, registration, materialisation and institutionalisation of one of the most important and active memory sites in the country. The Resistance Memorial has enabled continuous efforts to produce and preserve archives and testimonies, and plan, develop and conduct research and human rights education projects for over a decade.

Groups such as the Commission of Relatives of the Dead and the Disappeared, Torture Never Again /SP, and the Vladimir Herzog Institute, amongst others, have over the years been key protagonists in the archiving and memorialisation process in São Paulo and Brazil as a whole. However, these groups and organisations have struggled for decades to remain active and often without any assistance from successive municipal, state or federal governments.

B/ THE STATE OF RIO DE JANEIRO

The Rio de Janeiro State Truth Commission’s report identifies and maps nineteen places in which serious human rights violations systematically occurred during the period 1964–1985. Fourteen of them are located in the metropolitan region of Rio de Janeiro and the others in other regions of the state. These places were considered the main detention and torture sites in the state of Rio de Janeiro during the regime of exception, according to the definition contained in the CEV-RJ report:

The main criterion for the selection of the locations presented herein was the establishment of the occurrence, on the premises in question, of serious violations of human rights in a generalised, continuous and systematic manner.⁵

The CNV report, however, raises this number to thirty-eight (38), to include prison ships.

For at least 10 years, the so-called “House of Death” in the city of Petrópolis in Rio de Janeiro state, one of the main and most widely acknowledged places where serious human rights violations occurred during the civil-military dictatorship in that state and the country as a whole, has been struggling to gain recognition and institutionalisation as a memory site and memorial. Today, it still lacks significant support from the state and federal governments that would allow it to become a fully-fledged site of conscience.

C/ THE STATE OF MINAS GERAIS

The Minas Gerais State Truth Commission identified about 97 places where systematic or occasional serious human rights violations were committed by the State. These locations are defined as follows by the Minas Gerais State Truth Commission:

Places where fundamental rights of opponents of the military regime were violated by public agents, belonging to the three branches of the repressive apparatus of the Brazilian State: Civil Police, Military Police and Armed Forces.⁶

Thirty (30) of these sites were located in Belo Horizonte, the state capital, and 67 in towns and cities in the interior of Minas Gerais. The CNV’s figures amount to 24 locations of this kind in the state of Minas Gerais.

One example is the Belo Horizonte Human Rights Memorial, created by a state law in 2000, yet to date not constructed despite the planning and conceptualisation processes being almost completed. Successive changes in the composition of state governments have prevented the project coming to fruition, as does the absence of a national memory and truth plan.

D/ THE STATE OF PARANÁ

The report by the Paraná State Truth Commission, although not very precise about the specifics of memory sites, features important information about the role of the dictatorial government in the persecution, death and torture of indigenous peoples, inhabitants of former maroon slave communities, and peasants in the state. It presents a general overview that highlights the practices of extermination, persecution and continued and historical violence against the Xetá indigenous tribe, which began before the dictatorship and continued during that period. Members of the tribe were virtually exterminated and their culture and land erased and expropriated. Today, there are six (6) to eight (8) remaining individuals of the Xetá ethnic group. The report therefore presents clear indicators of which regions and places could be investigated in order to identify sites of memory and of conscience in the rural areas of the state. The report suggests ways of investigating the crimes and serious violations that occurred in the interior of the country, far from urban centres.

The following is an example. Despite the information contained in the report of the Paraná State Truth Commission (CEV-PR) it contains no reference to localised sites of conscience and/ or institutionalised memorials relating to the violence committed against indigenous peoples, former maroon slave communities and peasants in the state of Paraná.

E/ THE STATE OF BAHIA

The Bahia State Truth Commission (CEV-BA) report mentions places that are already in the process of becoming institutionalised memory sites, such as the “Resistance Memorial” (originally the “Carlos Marighela Resistance Memorial”) in the Pelourinho district of the city of Salvador da Bahia; the consolidation of the Carlos Marighela Memory Centre in the Baixa dos Sapateiros area of the city; the affixing of informative plaques to the Barbalho Fort, the main torture centre, on the initiative of the CBV – Bahian Truth Committee – and SECULT – the Department of Culture of the State of Bahia. The report also mentions that other memorials and spaces can be linked to this same network, such as the one in the municipality of Brotas de Macaúbas (that commemorates Carlos Lamarca and peasants persecuted in the region) and existing memory spaces connected to trade unions and civil society organisations.

However, to date none of these initiatives have been completed or are in operation. For example, the process of formally recognising the Carlos Marighella Memory Centre, named after one of the main national leaders of the opposition against the

1. [5] Relatório da Comissão Estadual da Verdade do Rio de Janeiro, p. 287.

2. [6] Relatório Comissão Estadual da Verdade de Minas Gerais, p. 294.

civil-military dictatorship in Brazil, has been dragging on for years. Without public or government support, the likelihood of its inauguration is still uncertain.

BRAZIL

The following is a further example. An important role could be played by the creation of the Memory Nucleus, the Resistance Memorial and the Brazilian Network of Memory Sites (REBRALUME) and all the organisations involved in this project. Currently, the REBRALUME network is composed of eleven groups from different states that work towards the recognition, preservation and construction of memory sites in Brazil.

4/ TYPES AND ACTORS IN CIVIC, POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL EDUCATION IN NON-TRANSITIONAL POLITICS

Since the return to democracy, supported by free and direct elections that began in 1985 (although the first direct presidential election occurred only in 1989), the struggles for institutionalised memory began, but it was the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in 2016 that triggered a dramatic rupture to the slow process of creating places, sites, memorials and archives about the dictatorship in Brazil and the virtual stagnation of the processes of transition to democracy. This was because a far-right federal government then came to the fore, taking over the country from 2019. This government openly declares itself to be a sworn enemy of democracy, institutional memorialisation practices and the related processes of searching for the truth about the period between 1964 and 1985.

Since then, there have been countless public manifestations and governmental actions by the elected president that have made it difficult or impossible to advance an agenda for the implementation of memory policies nationally.

The direct consequence of this is that certain government initiatives at the federal level that were previously in force and aimed to establish collections, archives, memorials and memory sites representative of the regime of exception (1964–1985), were immediately halted and/or attacked and/or dismantled by the current government.

There are countless examples that demonstrate attempts at federal level to attack and destroy efforts to consolidate a continuous educational process regarding memorialisation, musealisation, archiving and reparations in Brazil. Among many processes of dis-avowal, destruction and erasure, this chapter will now consider two that originated from initiatives by previous federal governments and which have now been paralysed, abandoned or cancelled.

A / THE UNDERMINING OF THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE’S AMNESTY COMMISSION⁷

The Amnesty Commission was created in 2002 by the government of the then Brazilian president Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and is underpinned by the Brazilian Constitution enacted in 1988. The Commission recognises and establishes the profile of individuals granted political amnesty, giving them reparation rights arising from damages and deprivations suffered during the regime of exception. In 2008, during the presidency of Luís

Inácio Lula da Silva, the Commission expanded its functions by creating strategies for preserving memory and introducing psychological reparations.

This was followed by the creation of the Amnesty Caravans (2008), the Marks of Memory project (2008), the Testimony Clinics (2012) and the ambitious project to conceptualise and build an Amnesty Memorial (a site of conscience) in the city of Belo Horizonte. These initiatives and strategies were part of the same set of government actions aimed at establishing and developing archival collections, setting up procedures for financial, political and psychological redress, and continuing work on human rights education.

Although not part of the justice system and relying on reparation strategies that did not extend to the punishment of crimes committed during the dictatorship, the Amnesty Commission began to fulfil some of the commitments made to the democratic State, since the introduction of the new constitution in 1988. A process still in its infancy that would entail more daring and far-reaching policies around memory, reparations and human rights in the future.

However, as of 2016, the year in which the elected president Dilma Rousseff was removed from office, in a controversial impeachment process considered by many as a coup brought about by parliament, the media and the judicial system, the Amnesty Commission came under attack and was subject to interventions from the government of Michel Temer, Dilma Rousseff’s former vice-president, who took over the presidency after her impeachment.

Seventeen of the twenty-two members of the Commission were dismissed in the early days of Michel Temer’s term of office, and in addition, some of the new members appointed are recognised supporters of the dictatorial regime in power between 1964 and 1985. It is precisely the consequences of this regime for the lives of victims and survivors that the Commission is supposed to be committed to ascertaining and making amends for. Immediately afterwards, the processes of pecuniary reparation to those granted amnesty under the Amnesty Commission were suspended. This signalled the start, during Michel Temer government in 2016, of the dismantling of the Amnesty Com-mission’s work, which encompassed ongoing projects centred on the creation of memory, archival collections, testimonies and sites of conscience.

In 2019, with the election of Jair Messias Bolsonaro to the presidency, the Commission suffered a definitive setback. Under a government characterised by a powerful rhetoric against human rights, and a president who is a supporter and admirer of the 1964 military coup and the regime of exception, the Commission was, in practice, rendered unfeasible as a policy of memory, truth and reparations, and its work ground to a halt.

1. [7] See: https://www.justica.gov.br/acervo_legado/anistia/projetos#%3A%7E%3Atext%3Dem%20contato%20conosco.-%2CCaravanas%20da%20Anistia%2Cde%20atividades%20educativas%20e%20culturais.%26text%3DAs%20Caravanas%20levam%20a%20tem%C3%A1tica%2Cum%20esfor%C3%A7o%20de%20restaura%C3%A7%C3%A3o%20coletiva , https://www.justica.gov.br/acervo_legado/anistia/sobre-a-comissao/sobre-a-comissao , https://www.brasildefato.com.br/2020/06/21/desde-o-governo-temer-quem-foi-anistiado-nao-recebeu-diz-analista-sobre-ditadura , https://veja.abril.com.br/politica/memorial-da-anistia-que-ja-custou-r-28-mi-sera-cancelado-diz-damares/ , https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2021-04-10/governo-quer-fim-da-comissao-de-anistia-em-2022-e-nega-90-dos-pedidos-de-reconhecimento-de-anistiados.html .

In August 2019, the new Minister for Women and Human Rights, Damares Regina Alves, announced the suspension of work on the Amnesty Memorial and her intention to radically alter the purpose of the building, if it were completed. The long-awaited Memorial, which would probably have been one of the main sites of conscience in Brazil and which was already under construction, will not open its door in the coming years, if the current federal government has its way. The aim is clearly and explicitly to dismantle the Amnesty Commission and all that it stands for before the end of Jair Bolsonaro’s term of office (2022). This is because the Commission represented, legitimised and gave institutional status to the struggles against the civil-military dictatorship that is so explicitly admired by the current leader of the Brazilian government. In the eyes of the current president and former federal deputy, the victims and survivors of the period of exception are his greatest enemies.

In 1999, in a television programme entitled Câmara Aberta (Open Chamber), the then Federal Deputy Jair Bolsonaro stated:

Unfortunately, things will only change when we have a civil war, carrying out the work that the military regime didn't do. Killing about 30,000 people.⁸

Twenty-two years later, when he finally took over the Presidency of the Republic, none of his initiatives or those of his ministers indicate that there has been a change in his former convictions.

B/ SPECIAL COMMISSION ON POLITICAL DEATHS AND DISAPPEARANCES⁹

The Commission on Political Deaths and Disappearances was created in 1995 during the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso. It had three main, distinct responsibilities: to ratify the death certificates of those killed by the dictatorship; to search for the bodies of those who are still missing; and to carry out activities that serve as a reminder of the military government’s impact on human rights in Brazil. It is to be underlined that such missions are fundamental for the continued implementation of memory and truth policies in Brazil, but they are also decisive for the implementation of human rights education strategies. These include the dissemination of the failures of successive governments to identify and recognise the victims and survivors of the regime and the respective personal and political trajectories of the protagonists and of those who resisted and fought against the implantation of a dictatorship in the country.

However, since the beginning of the present government, in 2019, the current Ministry of Women and Human Rights, headed by Minister Damares Alves, has been working to radically alter the nature of the work of the CEMDP. In 2020, the functions of the Commission were changed to make it impossible for the three aforementioned activities to be carried out as planned and in accordance with international agreements to which Brazil is a signatory.

On July 31, 2019, Jair Bolsonaro’s government changed the composition of the Commission’s membership. Among those replaced were recognised activists and experts in the field of human rights. Two military personnel took up positions in the Commission, including a well-known defender of the civil-military coup that took place in 1964. Since then, the process of undoing the Commission’s work has begun.

In this regard, the current president stated:

The reason [is] that the president changed, now it’s Jair Bolsonaro, from the right. It’s done. When they put terrorists there [in the Commission], nobody said anything. Now the president has changed. The environmental issue changed too¹⁰

C/ OTHER ACTORS

It is important to include here, in addition to the aforementioned initiatives and groups, the names of some of the Brazilian artists who have resisted, both in the past and the present, arbitrary and dictatorial practices by creating numerous important works: Claudio Tozzi, Cildo Meireles, Antonio Manuel, Artur Barrio, Evandro Teixeira, Nelson Leirner, Claudia Andujar, and Gontan Guanaes Netto among others. In the post-dictatorship period, artists, with rare exceptions, turned more to formalist poetics or other thematic agendas. However, since 2013–2014 this landscape has changed. A new lineage of production (after the so-called “June Journeys” / Jornadas de Junho of 2013 and after the National Truth Commission, whose final report was delivered on 12/10/2014) has embraced the challenge of inscribing the dictatorial past today. The urgent need for this inscription of the past became evident throughout the 2018 presidential campaign and the first year of Bolsonaro’s government, which was marked by a succession of denials (including denials of global warming and of the violence of the dictatorial period, as well as “pardoning” the Jewish Holocaust of World War II).

These new artists of memory who recognise the importance of building an active image depository from the narratives of dictatorial violence, as a source capable of fuelling the struggles for human rights and justice today, include the following: Rosângela Rennó, Clara Ianni, Fernando Piola, Laís Myrrha, Jaime Lauri-ano, Fulvia Molina, Leila Danziger, Paulo Nazareth, Xadalu and Rafael Pagatini.

In a country without consistent memory policies and especially since the beginning of President Jair Bolsonaro’s government, increasing numbers of artists have dedicated themselves to the theme of critical artistic re-inscription of the dictatorial period. There is a symbolic demand for opposing the official revisionism that seeks to exalt the dictatorship era, including the torturers and dictators of the 1960s–1970s, such as the Paraguayan Alfredo Stroessner and the Chilean Augusto Pinochet, praised by Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro as great statesmen.

This is exemplified by three major recent exhibitions dedicated to critically shedding light on the dictatorship period: “Hiatus: memory of dictatorial violence in Latin America” (held at the São Paulo Resistance Memorial between 10/2017 and 03/2018); “AI-5. 50 years” (held at the Tomie Ohtake Institute, between 04/09 and

1. [8] See: https://noticias.uol.com.br/colunas/andre-santana/2021/03/28/bolsonaro-desejou-30-mil-mortos-a-pandemia-multiplicou-o-numero-por-10.htm.

2. [9] See: https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2019/08/bolsonaro-muda-comissao-de-mortos-e-desaparecidos-em-meio-a-ataques-sobre-o-tema.shtml . Date accessed: 01/06/2021; https://congressoemfoco.uol.com.br/direitos-humanos/governo-reduz-atribuicoes-da-comissao-de-mortos-e-desaparecidos-politicos/ . Date accessed: 01/06/2021; https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2019/08/01/comissao-sobre-mortos-e-desaparecidos-politicos-veja-quem-entra-e-quem-sai.ghtml. Date accessed: 01/06/2021.

3. [10] https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2019/08/01/bolsonaro-e-damares-trocam-integrantes-da-comissao-sobre-mortos-e-desaparecidos-politicos.ghtml. Date accessed: 30/05/2021.

04/11 2018); and “Meta-archive 1964–1985” (held at the SESC Belenzinho between 23/08 and 24/11 2019). None of these benefitted from consistent support from the public authorities at municipal, state or federal level.

5/ LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As discussed above, the projects implemented by the CNV, followed by those of the CEVs, have given rise and impetus to memory preservation initiatives in other Brazilian states. Some of the future strategies regarding human rights education will depend on them, linked to a policy of memory and truth that does not yet exist in Brazil.

All locations defined and listed in the CNV and CEV reports are therefore potentially capable of being bearers of memory marks and are candidates for materialisation, either as a site of conscience, or as a place and/or site of memory. The reports have fulfilled an important goal in identifying hundreds of these locations. Identified and detailed in the reports, such memory locations are no longer subject to absolute erasure, since they have now been recorded in the official, institutional reports of the respective states and Brazil as a nation. However, these sites still await their definitive material inscription that would mark the atrocities that occurred there, and urge and cause governments to assume their civic obligation to protect them from erasure, denial and indifference.

Only with a governmentally and institutionally strengthened and supported network will Brazil be able to take important steps towards consolidating a memory project, as well as implementing full investigations, punishments and reparations for the heinous crimes committed by the dictatorial government installed by a coup in 1964, thus serving those affected in that period.

The interpretation of twenty-one years of terror that swept across the country, destroying ethical, moral, social, political and psychological foundations, requires conviction and civic courage from government officials, parliamentarians and civil society in a country that, since the 2018 elections, is once again flirting with the dictatorship and its methods, and impelling the defenders of democracy to, once again, defeat the implantation of another dictatorship in Brazil. The election of a president who took office in 2019 and who is a sworn enemy of democracy and a supporter of persecution, murder and torture as governmental practices, leaves the country in a dilemma today that could lead to the destruction of the political, governmental, institutional and psychological bases of its democracy or severely impede its democratic transition in the coming years or decades.

It must be stated that the foundations of Brazilian democracy are far from being consolidated and that the current far-right government of Jair Bolsonaro not only threatens the powers established by the 1988 constitution, but has also been an insurmountable obstacle for the promotion and creation of policies of justice, memory and truth in the country.

Today, once again, the responsibility for resisting the destruction of documents, museums, memorials, research and archives in Brazil and for fighting against the radical overturning of the achievements of the last 34 years of democracy years falls on the shoulders of the relatives of the dead and the disappeared, activists, NGOs, research centres, universities and the free press. This wave of destruction has been carried out since the beginning of the current government of Jair Bolsonaro and by about 30 % of the population that elected him and still support him and his methods.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1/ That parliamentary committees be created at the municipal and state levels to propose and implement policies of memory and truth in towns, cities and states in order to counteract the destruction of these policies at federal level.

2/ That funding schemes be set up in state-level research funding agencies (FAPESP, FAPERJ, FAPEMIG, etc.) to facilitate and encourage links between universities, activist groups and NGOs in order to organise and bring together dispersed archival collections; consolidate ongoing memorial and memory sites projects; and promote continued human rights education policies that extend to the respective education departments in all Brazilian states.

3/ Promote at state and municipal levels funding calls and initiatives specifically on the theme of memory, truth and justice, bringing together activists, artists and researchers and aimed at achieving concrete, ongoing results with regard to memory sites catalogued by the CEVs and the CEV.

4/ Establish a broad national front including parliamentarians, members of the executive, NGOs, political parties and collectives, and activist groups to demand that federal and state governments immediately comply with the recommendations of the CNV, the CEVs, the IACHR report on Brazil of 2021 and the judgement of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the case of the Araguaia Guerrilha of 2010 and, in the same way, immediately halt the destruction of the memory, truth, justice and human rights policies successfully created in Brazil over recent decades.

5/ Demand from the federal chamber and senate that deputies and senators create a dedicated parliamentary inquiry commission (CPI) to investigate the systematic attacks by the federal government on human rights activists and policies in Brazil since 2019.

SOURCES

REPORTS

Relatório da Comissão Nacional da Verdade no Brasil. link: https://cnv.memoriasreveladas.gov.br/

Relatório da Comissão Estadual da Verdade de São Paulo. link: https://comissaodaverdade.al.sp.gov.br/

Relatório da Comissão Estadual da Verdade de Minas Gerais. link: https://www.comissaodaverdade.mg.gov.br/index.php/legislacao/relatorio-final/page/129?view=page

Relatório da Comissão Estadual da Verdade do Rio de Janeiro. link: www.memoriasreveladas.gov.br/administrator/components/com_simplefilemanager/uploads/Rio/CEV-Rio-Relatorio-Final.pdf

Relatório da Comissão Estadual da Verdade da Bahia. link: https://www.comissaodaverdade.ba.gov.br/arquivos/File/1.pdf

Relatório da Comissão Estadual da Verdade do Paraná. link: https://www.memoriaedireitoshumanos.ufsc.br/files/original/3ac3d48df8fdef7c921b626681126f52.pdf

Relatório da Comissão Estadual da Verdade de Santa Catarina. link: https://www.memoriaedireitoshumanos.ufsc.br/files/original/389fa27327d13645e1c7627cdf1c232a.pdf

Relatório da Comissão Estadual da Verdade do Rio Grande do Sul. link: https://www.al.rs.gov.br/FileRepository/repdcp_m505/ccdh/Relat%C3%B3rio%20Subcomissao%20Verdade,%20Mem%C3%B3ria%20e%20Justi%C3%A7a.pdf

Relatório da Comissão Estadual da Verdade da Paraíba. link: https://cev.pb.gov.br/relatorio-final

VIDEOS

Ciclo de lives: Conhecendo Lugares de Memória produzido por Rede Brasileira de Lugares de Memória (REBRALUME) e Núcleo Memória (NM)

Memorial da Resistência/SP. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tDbeoq-vjYY
Prédio do antigo DOI-CODI/SP. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Iu9txVHPFpc
Memorial da Luta pela Justiça/SP. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=78s7z0BWjNA

Memorial das Ligas Camponesas/PB. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M0KAFqMgjAc
Centro de Memória Frei Tito de Alencar. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G_O-AASRQVg
Memorial dos Direitos Humanos/MG. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8zbVo3Ui77U
Casa da Morte/RJ. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B-EBceEob2U

SOURCES CONSULTED AND FURTHER READING

Almeida, P.C., Oliveira, R.C., Lugares de Memória da Resistência em Salvador: Arte, Ruínas e Descaso. Revista Interdisciplinar de Gestão Social. May/August 2019, 8, 2, 31–56

Alves, J.M.M., Memorial das Ligas Camponesas: Preservação da Memória e Promoção dos Direitos Humanos. Masters dissertation. Programa de Pós-Graduação em Direitos Humanos, Cidadania e Políticas Públicas da Universidade Federal da Paraíba, 2014

Brandão, S., As máquinas de memória: o corpo-vítima da ditadura militar brasileira como peça dos processos de subjetivação

do contemporâneo. Tese de doutorado defendida no Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia da Universidade Federal de São Paulo- Campus Guarulhos, September 2019

Brito, Ana Paula (ed.), Memorial da Luta pela Justiça: histórico da retomada do prédio e resultados preliminares do projeto de implantação. Núcleo Memória. São Paulo: Expressão Popular, 2017

Brito, Ana Paula, Escrachos aos torturadores da ditadura: resignificando os usos da memória. São Paulo: Expressão Popular, 2017 Endo, P., “Sobre a prática da tortura no Brasil”, in Revista USP, 2018, 119, 43–58. https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2316-9036.v0i119p43-58

Memórias Resistentes, Memórias Residentes: Lugares de Memória da Ditadura Civil-Militar no Município de São Paulo. Coordenação de Direito à Memória e à Verdade (ed). São Paulo: Secretaria Municipal dos Direitos Humanos e Cidadania, 2017

Santos-Filho, Plínio, Queiroz, Malthus Oliveira de, Rocha, Sidney, Recife. Lugar de memória. Recife: Secretaria de Direitos Humanos e Segurança Cidadã/Prefeitura de Recife; Ministério da Justiça; AERPA Editora, 2012

Seligmann-Silva, Márcio, “Anistia e (in)justiça no Brasil: o dever de justiça e a impunidade”, in Literatura e Autoritarismo. Memórias da Repressão, 9, 2006, Santa Maria. https://w3.ufsm.br/literaturaeautoritarismo/revista/num09/art_02.php

Teles, Janaina de Almeida, “A vala clandestina de Perus: entre o passado e o presente”, in InSURgência: Revista De Direitos E Movimentos Sociais, 2019, 4, 1, 300–341. https://doi.org/10.26512/insurgencia.v4i1.28837

Thiesen, I., Almeida, P.C., Lugares de memória da ditadura e a patrimonialização da experiência política. Museologia e Interdisciplinaridade. V.IV, n. 8, December 2015, 15–30

Tosi, G. (et al.), Justiça de transição: direito à justiça, à memória e à verdade. João Pessoa: Editora da UFPB, 2014

Vala clandestina de Perus: desaparecidos políticos, um capítulo não encerrado da história brasileira. São Paulo: Instituto Macuco, 2012.

TIMELINE OF MAJOR EVENTS

Bruno Mello Souza, Carlos Artur Gallo

August, 1961 After the resignation of President Jânio Quadros, sectors of the Armed Forces tried to prevent Vice President João Goulart from assuming the Presidency. Goulart’s inauguration happens only after an intense popular mobilization. He takes over, however, through changes in the form of government (as the adoption of parliamentarism, until 1963)

April, 1964 Occurrence of the coup that starts the civil-military dictatorship in Brazil

October, 1965 The Institutional Act No. 2 (AI-2) is decreed, turning the presidential election indirect, modifying the composition of the Federal Supreme Court (STF), and, among other measures, extinguishing the existing political parties from 1945. The last one resulted in a bipartisan political system around the regime party (National Renewal Alliance – ARENA) and the authorized opposition party (Democratic Brazilian Movement – MDB)

December, 1968 Institutional Act No. 5 (AI-5) is decreed, prohibiting habeas corpus for political crimes, closing the National Congress and authorizing the President to decree a type of State of Siege for an indefinite period, cancel mandates, dismiss civil servants, intervene in all states and municipalities of the federation and also confiscate private property

1974 President-Dictator Ernesto Geisel (1974–1979) elaborates and initiates, from within the regime itself, a “slow, safe and gradual” transition project, extended until 1985 and characterized for being “agreed from above”.

November, 1974 The MDB has a significant performance in the elections, winning 16 of the 22 seats in the Senate and increasing its representation in the Chamber of Deputies from 28 to 44 %

December 1978 AI-5 is revoked by Constitutional Amendment No. 11, whose in force period would begin on January 1, 1979

August, 1979 The Amnesty Law (Law No. 6.683/1979) is edited by the regime

December, 1979 Law No. 6.767/1979 is edited, ending the bipartisan political system in the country

April, 1981 Military opposed to the process of transition to democracy promoted a failed bomb attack in Rio de Janeiro (“Riocentro attack”)

1983 The “Diretas Já” movement begins, demanding direct elections for the Presidency and lasting until 1984. This demand ended up frustrated by the rejection of the Constitutional Amendment proposal, which would make such elections possible

January, 1985 In an indirect election for the Presidency, Tancredo Neves, the opposition candidate, wins the regime’s candidate, Paulo Maluf

March, 1985 José Sarney, elected Vice President, take charge as President of the Republic in place of Tancredo Neves, who would die in April

October, 1988 The new Federal Constitution is promulgated

November, 1989 The first direct presidential election occur, won by Fernando Collor de Mello, from the National Reconstruction Party (PRN).

December, 1992 President Collor resigns after an impeachment process and corruption accusations

October, 1994 Fernando Henrique Cardoso, from the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB), wins presidential elections

December, 1995 President Cardoso sanctioned Law No. 9.140/1995, which created the Special Commission on Political Deaths and Disappearances (CEMDP) and provided a compensation to the relatives of the fatal victims of the dictatorship

November, 2001 President Cardoso edited a Provisional Measure, converted into Law No. 10.559/2002, that created the Amnesty Commission, an entity responsible for repairing other sectors of the population that were persecuted by the dictatorship

October, 2002 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, from the Workers’ Party (PT), is elected President of the Republic

October, 2010 Dilma Rousseff (PT) is elected President of the Republic, becoming the first woman to win a presidential election in the country

November, 2011 President Dilma Rousseff sanctions Law No. 12,528/2011, which created the National Truth Commission (CNV), whose work would begin in May 2012

December, 2014 CNV delivers its Final Report

August, 2016 Dilma Rousseff is removed from the Presidency (through a parliamentary coup) and is replaced by Vice President Michel Temer, from the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB)

October, 2018 Jair Bolsonaro, at the time a candidate for the Social Liberal Party (PSL), is elected President of the Republic

SOURCES USED AND FURTHER READING

História da Ditadura, Linha do Tempo, https://www.historiadaditadura.com.br/1961

SOURCES USED AND FURTHER READINGS

“A lei da Anistia 39 anos depois: ainda restrita e parcial”, in Câmara dos Deputados, 28/08/2018, https://www2.camara.leg.br/atividade-legislativa/comissoes/comissoes-permanentes/cdhm/noticias/a-lei-da-anistia-39-anos-depois-ainda-restrita-e-parcial

Abrão, Paulo, “A Lei de Anistia no Brasil. As alternativas para a verdade e a justiça”, in Acervo, Rio de Janeiro, 2011, v. 24, n. 1, jan./jun, p. 119–138

Almeida, P.C., Oliveira, R.C., “Lugares de Memória da Resistência em Salvador:

Arte, Ruínas e Descaso”, in Revista Interdisciplinar de Gestão Social. May/August 2019, 8, 2, [pages] 31–56

“Alberto Goldman e o retrocesso da Comissão da Anistia”, in Carta Capital, 06/02/2017, https://www.cartacapital.com.br/sociedade/alberto-goldman-e-o-retrocesso-da-comissao-da-anistia

Almeida, Alberto Carlos, A cabeça do brasileiro, Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2012

Almeida, Criméia A. S.; Lisbôa, Suzana K.; Teles, Janaína de A; Teles, Maria Amélia de A., eds., Dossiê Ditadura: Mortos e Desaparecidos políticos no Brasil (1964–1985). São Paulo, Imprensa Oficial/IEVE, 2009

Almeida, Criméia Schmidt de et al., eds., Dossiê ditadura: mortos e desaparecidos políticos no Brasil (1964–1985), São Paulo: Imprensa Oficial do Estado de São Paulo, 2009

Almeida, Eneá de Stutz e, “Memória, verdade, reparação e justiça: uma tese de resistência constitucional”, in Justiça de Transição, 04/10/2020, https://justicadetransicao.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/memoria-verdade-reparacao-e-justica-1.pdf

Alves, J.M.M., Memorial das Ligas Camponesas: Preservação da Memória e Promoção dos Direitos Humanos. Masters dissertation. Programa de Pós-Graduação em Direitos Humanos, Cidadania e Políticas Públicas da Universidade Federal da Paraíba, 2014

Anistia Internacional, Informe 2020/2021. O Estado de Direitos Humanos no mundo. https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/POL1032022021BRAZILIAN%20PORTUGUESE.PDF

Arquidiocese de São Paulo, Brasil: Nunca Mais. Petrópolis/RJ, Vozes, 1985 Arquidiocese de São Paulo, O perfil dos atingidos. Petrópolis/RJ, Vozes, 1987

Arruda, Roldão, “Parentes de desaparecidos dizem que PF usou o arquivo”, in O Estado de S. Paulo, 19. 3. 1992

Arturi, Carlos S., “O debate teórico sobre mudança de regime político: o caso brasileiro”, in Revista de Sociologia e Política, 2001, (17), 11–31

Aquino, Maria Aparecida, “As Vísceras expostas do autoritarismo. Uma exposição do resultado de exaustivas pesquisas realizadas sobre a série Dossiês do Arquivo Deops/SP”, in Revista do Arquivo Público Mineiro. Belo Horizonte/MG, ano XLII, n. 1, jan.–jun., 2006

Azevedo, Desirée de Lemos, “Documento Reservado. Verdades, segredos e disputas pela memória nos acervos da Ditadura Civil Militar brasileira”, in Teoria e cultura, Juiz de Fora, Jan./Dec. 2011, No. 1–2, V. 6, 11–24

Barbon, Júlia; Queirolo, Gustavo; Nogueira, Italo. ”Saiba quem são e como morreram as 28 vítimas do jacarezinho, in Folha de S. Paulo, 12. 5. 2021. https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2021/05/saiba-quem-sao-e-como-morreram-as-28-vitimas-do-jacarezinho.shtml

Baquero, Marcelo; González, Rodrigo, “Cultura política, mudanças econômicas e democracia inercial: uma análise pós-eleições de 2014”, in Opinião Pública, 2016, (22), 3, 492–523

Bernardi, Bruno Boti, “O Brasil condenado: a lei de anistia no sistema interamericano de direitos humanos”, in Gallo, Carlos Artur, ed., Anistia: 40 anos, uma luta, múltiplos significados, Rio de Janeiro: Gramma, 2019, 215–250

Bernardi, Bruno Boti; Teles, Janaína de Almeida; Schallemüller, Christian Jecov, “Memória, verdade e justiça: desdobramentos do sistema interamericano de direitos humanos no Brasil”, in Carlos Artur Gallo, ed., Nas trincheiras da memória: lutas pelo passado, políticas de memória e justiça de transição no Sul da Europa e na América do Sul. Rio de Janeiro, Editora Oficina Raquel, 2021

Bonelli, Maria da Gloria, Os Delegados de Polícia entre o Profissionalismo e a Política no Brasil. São Paulo: Universidade Federal de São Carlos, 2003

Brandão, S., As máquinas de memória: o corpo-vítima da ditadura militar brasileira como peça dos processos de subjetivação do contemporâneo. Tese de doutorado defendida no Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia da Universidade Federal de São Paulo – Campus Guarulhos, September 2019

Brasil, Relatório/Comissão Nacional da Verdade, Brasília: CNV, 2014. Vol. I. https://cnv.memoriasreveladas.gov.br/

Brasil, Secretaria Especial de Direitos Humanos, Comissão Especial sobre Mortos e Desaparecidos Políticos, Direito à memória e direito à verdade, Brasília: SEDH, 2007

Brasil, Secretaria de Direitos Humanos, Habeas Corpus: que se apresente o corpo: a busca dos desaparecidos políticos no Brasil, Brasília: SDH, 2010

Brasil, Secretaria de Direitos Humanos, 3º Programa Nacional de Direitos Humanos (PNDH-3), Brasília: SDH, 2010b Brito, Ana Paula (ed.), Memorial da Luta pela Justiça: histórico da retomada do prédio e resultados preliminares do projeto

de implantação. Núcleo Memória. São Paulo: Expressão Popular, 2017

Brito, Ana Paula, Escrachos aos torturadores da ditadura: resignificando os usos da memória. São Paulo: Expressão Popular, 2017 Brasil, Ministério da Justiça, Comissão de Anistia, Cartilha Informativa da Comissão de Anistia, Brasília: CA/MJ, 2011 “Caixinhas da Anistia serão abertas, diz Damares Alves”, in Folha de São Paulo, 27/03/2019, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2019/03/caixinhas-da-anistia-serao-abertas-diz-damares-alves.shtml

Camargo, Ana Maria de Almeida, “Informação, documento e arquivo: o acesso em questão”, in Boletim da Associação dos Arquivistas Brasileiros, Seção Regional de São Paulo, no. 11, mai.–ago./1993

Camargo, Ana Maria de Almeida, “Os arquivos da polícia política como fonte”, in Registro, Indaiatuba, n. 1, jul. 2002

Camargo, Ana Maria de Almeida., “Os arquivos e o acesso à verdade”, in Cecília M. Santos, Janaína de Almeida Teles, Edson Luís de Almeida Teles, eds., Desarquivando a Ditadura. Memória e justiça no Brasil. Vol. II, São Paulo, Hucitec, 2009

Capelato, Maria Helena, “O Estado Novo: o que trouxe de novo?”, in Jorge Ferreira, Lucilia de Almeida Neves Delgado, eds., O Brasil Republicano: o tempo do nacional-estatismo: do início da década de 1930 ao apogeu do Estado Novo, V. 2, Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2003, 107–143

Carvalho, José Murilo de, Forças Armadas e política no Brasil. São Paulo, Companhia das Letras, 2015 Carvalho, José Murilo de., Forças Armadas e política no Brasil. São Paulo: Todavia, 2019

Catela, Ludmila da Silva, “Do segredo à verdade… processos sociais e políticos na abertura dos arquivos da repressão no Brasil e na Argentina”, in Cecília M. Santos; Janaina de Almeida Teles, Edson Luís de Almeida Teles, eds., Desarquivando a Ditadura. Memória e justiça no Brasil. Vol. II, São Paulo, Hucitec, 2009

Comissão de Familiares de Mortos e Desaparecidos Políticos, Instituto de Estudos sobre a Violência do Estado (IEVE), Grupo Tortura Nunca Mais (GTMN/RJ e PE). Dossiê dos Mortos e

Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos. (2018), Caso Herzog e outros vs. Brasil. Sentenca de 15 de marco de 2018. Disponivel em: https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_353_por.pdf

Comissão Nacional da Verdade, Relatório Final, Brasília: CNV, 2014, https://cnv.memoriasreveladas.gov.br/

Comissão Nacional da Verdade, Relatório, Vol. I, II, III, Brasília/DF, 2014. “Estado abre arquivo do Deops”, in Diário Popular, 25. 8. 1994

Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos. (2018), Caso Herzog e outros vs. Brasil. Sentença de 15 de março de 2018. Disponível em: https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_353_por.pdf

Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos. Caso Gomes Lund e outros – Guerrilha de Araguaia – c. Brasil – sentença de 24 de novembro de 2010, 2010

Cruz Júnior, Ademar Seabra, “Constituinte e democratização no Brasil: o impacto das mudanças do sistema internacional”, in Lua Nova, 2013, (88), 217–256

D’araújo, Maria Celina, “Limites políticos para a transição democrática no Brasil”, in Carlos Fico, Monica Grin e Maria Paula Araújo,

Violência na História. Memória, trauma e reparação. Rio de Janeiro: Ponteio, 2012, 39–56

Debert, Guita, Polícia e delegacias. Antropologia e Direito: temas antropológicos para estudos jurídicos. Rio de Janeiro/Brasília: ABA/ LACED/Contracapa Livraria, 2012

Del Río, Andrés; Meyer, Emilio Peluso Neder, “Justica transicional no brasil: os labirintos da impunidade”, in Marona, Marjorie; Del Rio, Andrés. Justiça no Brasil: às margens da democracia. Belo Horizonte: Arraes Editores, 2018

Del Río, Andrés; Cesário Alvim Gomes, Juliana, Direitos Humanos e Relações Cívico-Militares: o caso da expansão da competência da Justiça Militar no Brasil. Mural Internacional, Rio de Janeiro, Vol. 11, 2020, e48807

Desaparecidos Políticos a partir de 1964, Recife/PE, CEPE/IEVE, 1995

Endo, P., “Sobre a prática da tortura no Brasil”, in Revista USP, 2018, (119), 43–58. https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2316-9036.v0i119p43-58

Fernandes, Pádua, ”Ditadura Militar na América Latina e o Sistema Interamericano de Direitos Humanos: (in)justiça de transição no Brasil e Argentina”, in XIV Encuentro de Latinoamericanistas Españoles: congreso internacional, Santiago de Compostela, 2010, 1674–1692. https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/file/index/docid/531273/filename/AT12_Fernandes.pdf

Fico, Carlos. “Brasil: a transição inconclusa”, in Carlos Fico, Monica Grin e Maria Paula Araújo. Violência na História. Memória, trauma e reparação. Rio de Janeiro: Ponteio, 2012, 39–56

Fico, Carlos, Como eles agiam: os subterrâneos da ditadura militar. Rio de Janeiro, Record, 2001

Figueiredo, Lucas, Ministério do Silêncio. A história do serviço secreto brasileiro de Washington Luís a Lula (1927–2005). Rio de Janeiro, Record, 2005

Figueiredo, Lucas, Lugar Nenhum: militares na ocultação dos documentos da ditadura. São Paulo, Companhia das Letras, 2015 Freire, Vinícius Torres et. al., “Amigos divergem sobre veracidade de fotos”, in Folha de S. Paulo, 20. 10. 2004

Gallo, Carlos Artur; Gugliano, Alfredo Alejandro, “Political memory, authoritarian legacies, and the quality of democracy: considerations for a comparison between Brazil and Argentina”, in Revista del CESLA, 2020 (25), 251–276

Gallo, Carlos Artur, “O Cone Sul entre a memória e o esquecimento: elementos para uma comparação”, in Revista Debates, 2017, (11), 3, 57–78

Gallo, Carlos Artur, “Pensar o passado, construir o futuro, fortalecer a democracia: políticas de memória e memória da ditadura no Brasil”, in Cristiano Engelke, Nilton Sainz, eds., Sombras no Extremo Sul: luzes sobre o passado ditatorial no Sul gaúcho, Rio Grande: Editora da FURG, 2019, 169–192

Gallo, Carlos Arthur, “Quarenta anos da Lei da Anistia: uma luta do passado, uma interdição no presente, uma dívida com o future”, in Maia, Tatyana de Amaral, Fernandes, Ananda Simões (eds.). Anistia, um passado presente? Porto Alegre: Edipucrs, 2020, 77–108

Garrido da Silva; Alexandre, Ribas Vieira, José, “Justiça transicional, direitos humanos e a seletividade do ativismo judicial no Brasil”, in Revista Anistia Política e Justiça de Transição, n. 2 (jul./dez. 2009). Brasília: Ministerio da Justiça

Gomes, Angela de Castro, “Oitenta anos de Estado Novo ou quando o Brasil era grande e ia dar certo”, in Luciana Murari, Tatyana de Amaral Maia, Antonio de Ruggiero, eds., Do Estado à Nação: política e cultura nos regimes ditatoriais dos anos 1930, Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS, 2018, 19–47

Goulart, Jefferson, “Processo constituinte e arranjo federativo”, in Lua Nova, 2013, (88), 185–215

“Governo quer fim da Comissão de Anistia em 2022 e nega 90 % dos pedidos de reconhecimento de anistiados”, in El País, 10/04/2021, https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2021-04-10/governo-quer-fim-da-comissao-de-anistia-em-2022-e-nega-90-dos-pedidos-de-reconhecimento-de-anistiados.html

Green, James Nolan, “A Proteção da Privacidade com a Abertura Plena dos Arquivos”, in Acervo, Rio de Janeiro, v. 24, n. 1, jan/jun 2011

Grellet, Fábio; o Estado de São Paulo, “Grávida de 24 anos é baleada e morre em meio a operação policial no Rio”, in Estado de São Paulo, 8. 6. 2021. https://brasil.estadao.com.br/noticias/rio-de-janeiro,gravida-de-24-anos-e-baleada-e-morre-em-meio-a-operacao-policial-no-rio,70003740859

Guerra, Maria Pia; Machado Filho, Roberto Dalledone, “O regime constitucional segurança pública: dos silêncios da Constituinte às deliberações do Supremo Tribunal Federal”, in Revista de Informações Legislativas, Brasília, v. 219, 2018, p. 155–181

Gugliano, Alfredo Alejandro; Gallo, Carlos Artur, “On the ruins of the democratic transition: Human Righst as an agenda item in abeyance for the Brazilian democracy”, in Bulletin of Latin American Research, 2013, (32), 3, 325–338

Guitiérrez, Juan Carlos; Cantú, Silvano, “A restrição à jurisdição militar nos sistemas internacionais de proteção dos direitos humanos”, in SUR – Revista Internacional e Direitos Humanos, 2010, v. 7, n. 13, p. 75–97

“Historiador se demite do projeto Memórias Reveladas em protesto contra sigilo de acervos da ditadura”, in Associação Brasileira de Jornalismo Investigativo (Abraji), 4. 11. 2010, https://abraji.org.br/noticias/historiador-se-demite-do-projeto-memorias-reveladas-em-protesto-contra-sigilo-de-acervos-da-ditadura

Hollanda, Cristina B., “Direitos Humanos e Democracia: A experiência das comissões da verdade no Brasil”, in Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, V. 33, n. 96, 2018

Huggins, Martha K., Polícia e política: relações Estados Unidos/América Latina. São Paulo, Cortez, 1998 IPEA, Políticas sociais: acompanhamento e análise, Brasília: IPEA, 2010, 283–305

“Integrante da Comissão de Anistia avalia como ‘desastre’ decisão sobre valores das indenizações”, in Blog do Matheus Leitão, 25/06/2019, https://g1.globo.com/politica/blog/matheus-leitao/post/2019/06/25/integrante-da-comissao-de-anistia-avalia-como-desastre-decisao-sobre-valores-das-indenizacoes.ghtml

Ishaq, Vivien Fialho da Silva, “Entrevista concedida a Shana Santos”, in Carla Osmo, Shana Marques Prado dos Santos, eds.,

Justiça e arquivos no Brasil: perspectivas de atores da justiça de transição, Florianópolis, Tribo da Ilha; Belo Horizonte: Rede Latino-Americana de Justiça de Transição (RLAJT); Centro de Estudos sobre Justiça de Transição, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (CJT/UFMG), 2016, 114–125

Jelin, Elizabeth, Los trabajos de la memoria. Madrid: Siglo XXI, 2002

Koerner, Andrei, Assumpção, San Romanoli, “A lei de Anistia e o Estado democrático de direito no Brasil”, in Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, 2009, Vol. 24, n. 69. São Paulo, fev

Koerner, Andrei, “O papel dos direitos humanos na política democrática: uma análise preliminar”, in Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, 2003, (18), 53, 143–157

Kushnir, Beatriz, “Decifrando as astúcias do mal”, in Revista do Arquivo Público Mineiro. Belo Horizonte/MG, ano XLII, n. 1, jan.–jun., 2006

“Maioria das recomendações da Comissão Nacional da Verdade segue no papel”, in Veja, 12/02/2021, https://veja.abril.com.br/politica/maioria-das-recomendacoes-da-comissao-nacional-da-verdade-segue-no-papel/

Manso, Bruno Paes, A República das milícias: dos esquadrões da morte à era Bolsonaro. São Paulo: Todavia, 2020

Martins, Luciano, “A ‘liberalização’ do regime autoritário no Brasil”, in Guillermo O’Donnell, Philip Schmitter, Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transições do regime autoritário: América Latina, São Paulo: Vértice / Revista dos Tribunais, 1988, 108–139

“Memórias Resistentes, Memórias Residentes: Lugares de Memória da Ditadura Civil-Militar no Município de São Paulo”,

in Coordenação de Direito à Memória e à Verdade (ed). São Paulo: Secretaria Municipal dos Direitos Humanos e Cidadania, 2017 Mezarobba, Glenda, “Anistia de 1979: o que restou da lei forjada pelo arbítrio?”, in Santos, Cecília MacDowell; Teles, Edson; Teles,

Janaína de Almeida, eds., Desarquivando a ditadura: memória e justiça no Brasil, v. 2, São Paulo: Hucitec, 2009, 372–385 Mezarobba, Glenda, “Do que se fala quando se diz ‘Justiça de Transição?’”, in Revista Brasileira de Informação Bibliográfica

em Ciências Sociais, n. 41. São Paulo, Anpocs, 1996, 111–122

Mezarobba, Glenda, Um acerto de contas com o futuro: a anistia e suas consequências: um estudo do caso brasileiro, Dissertação (Mestrado em Ciência Política) – Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciência Política da Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo, 2003

Meyer, Emílio Peluso Neder, “Criminal Responsibility in Brazilian Transitional Justice: A Constitutional Interpretative Process under the Paradigm of International Human Rights Law”, in Indonesian Journal of International and Comparative Law, 2017, v. IV, p. 41–72

Mingardi, Guaracy, Tiras, gansos e trutas: cotidiano e reforma na polícia civil. São Paulo: Scritta, 1992

Ministerio da Defesa, Histórico de GLO. 26/11/2019. 2019. https://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/exercicios_e_operacoes/glo/2_tabelas_glo_atualizada_em_261119.pdf

Ministério Público Federal – MPF, Crimes da ditadura militar, Brasília: MPF, 2017 Moisés, José Álvaro, Os brasileiros e a democracia, São Paulo: Editora Ática, 1995

Motta, Rodrigo Patto Sá, Em guarda contra o perigo vermelho: o anticomunismo no Brasil (1917–1964), São Paulo: Perspectiva / Fapesp, 2002

“Mudanças no governo Bolsonaro em comissões desmontam anos de políticas de reparação da ditadura”, in Huffpost Brasil, 01/02/2020, https://www.huffpostbrasil.com/entry/comissos-ditadura-bolsonaro_br_5e2eed99c5b6779e9c37adc1

Muniz, Jacqueline de Oliveira, “A Crise de Identidade das Polícia Militares Brasileiras”, in Security and Defense Studies Review, 2001, p. 177–198

Muniz, Jacqueline de Oliveira.; Proença Júnior, Domício, “Forças armadas e policiamento”, in Revista Brasileira de Segurança Pública, 2007, a. 1, ed. 1, pp. 48–63

Napolitano, Marcos, 1964: história do regime militar brasileiro, São Paulo: Contexto, 2014 Nicolau, Jairo, “Partidos na República de 1946: velhas teses, novos dados”, in Dados, 2004, (47), 1

O’Donnell, Guillermo; Schmitter, Philippe C., Transições do regime autoritário: primeiras conclusões, São Paulo: Vértice / Revista dos Tribunais, 1988

“Orientação na Comissão de Anistia é negar pedidos em massa, diz conselheiro do órgão”, in Folha de São Paulo, 12/09/2019, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2019/09/orientacao-na-comissao-de-anistia-e-negar-pedidos-em-massa-diz-conselheiro-do-orgao.shtml

Padrós, Enrique Serra, “Repressão e violência: segurança nacional e terror de Estado nas ditaduras latino-americanas”, in Carlos Fico et al., eds., Ditadura e democracia na América Latina: balanço histórico e perspectivas, Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2008, 143–178

Prado, Luiz Carlos Delorme; Earp, Fábio Sá, “O ‘milagre’ brasileiro: crescimento acelerado, integração internacional e concentração de renda”, in Jorge Ferreira, Lucilia de Almeida Neves Delgado, eds., O Brasil Republicano: o tempo da ditadura: regime militar

e movimentos sociais em fins do século XX, V. 4, Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2003, 207–241

“Pela primeira vez, Justiça condena penalmente repressor da ditadura brasileira e abre precedente histórico”, in El País, 22/06/2021, https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2021-06-21/pela-primeira-vez-justica-federal-condena-penalmente-repressor-da-ditadura-brasileira-e-abre-precedente-historico.html

Pereira, Anthony W., Ditadura e repressão: o autoritarismo e o estado de direito no Brasil, no Chile e na Argentina. Sao Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2010

Quintana, Antonio González, Los archivos de seguridad del Estado de los desaparecidos: regímenes represivos, Santiago de Chile, 1999 Rede Latino-americana de Justiça de Transição, Nota de repúdio à declaração do Deputado Federal Jair Bolsonaro, 2016

Reis Filho, Daniel Aarão, “O governo Lula e a construção da memória do regime civil-militar”, in António Costa Pinto, Francisco Carlos Palomanes Martinho, eds., O passado que não passa: a sombra das ditaduras na Europa do Sul e na América Latina, Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2013, 215–233

Resende, João Francisco, Da opacidade à publicidade: atores e ideias na construção de políticas de acesso à informação governamental no Brasil. São Paulo, Dissertação de Mestrado, Gestão de Políticas Públicas-EACH/USP, 2018

Rocha, Alexandre Pereira da, A gramática das polícias militarizadas: estudo comparado entre a Polícia Militar do Estado de São Paulo – Brasil e Carabineros – Chile, em regimes políticos autoritários e democráticos. 2013. 303 f. Tese (Doutorado em Ciências Sociais). Universidade de Brasília, Brasília

Rocha, Antônio Sérgio, “Genealogia da Constituinte: do autoritarismo à democratização”, in Lua Nova, 2013, (88), 29–87 Rodeghero, Carla, Dienstmann, Gabriel, Trindade, Tatiana, Anistia ampla, geral e irrestrita: história de uma luta inconclusa, Santa Cruz: Edunisc, 2011

Rodeghero, Carla Simone, “A Anistia de 1979: um levantamento bibliográfico à luz de algumas efemérides”, in Maia, Tatyana de Amaral; Fernandes, Ananda Simões (ed.), Anistia, um passado presente? Porto Alegre: Edipucrs, 2020, 17–42

Rodeghero, Carla Simone, “A Anistia de 1979 e seus significados, ontem e hoje”, in Reis, Daniel Aarão; Ridenti, Marcelo; Sá Motta, Rodrigo Patto, A ditadura que mudou o Brasil: 50 anos do golpe de 1964, Rio de Janeiro, Zahar, 2014 172–186

Rötzsch, Rodrigo, “Historiador protesta contra censura no Arquivo Nacional”, in Folha de S.Paulo, 4. 11. 2010, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/poder/po0411201025.htm

Santos, Boaventura de Sousa, “Que democracia é esta?”, in Público.pt, 19/07/2021. https://www.boaventuradesousasantos.pt/media/Que%20democracia%20%C3%A9%20esta_P%C3%BAblico19Julho2011.pdf

Santos, Cecília M., Teles, Janaína de Almeida, Teles, Edson Luís de Almeida, eds., Desarquivando a Ditadura. Memória e justiça no Brasil. Vol. II, São Paulo, Hucitec, 2009

Santos, Fabiano, “A República de 46: separação dos poderes e política alocativa”, in Carlos Ranulfo Melo, Manuel Alcántara Sáez, eds., A democracia brasileira: balanço e perspectivas para o século 21, Belo Horizonte: Editora UFMG, 2007, 39–72

Santos-Filho, Plínio; Queiroz, Malthus Oliveira de; Rocha, Sidney. Recife, Lugar de memória. Recife: Secretaria de Direitos Humanos e Segurança Cidadã/Prefeitura de Recife; Ministério da Justiça; AERPA Editora, 2012

Schinke, Vanessa Dorneles, “A história que nos contam: a memória do judiciário sobre o regime autoritário”, in Revista Direito e Práxis, v. 8, p. 1224–1249, 2017

Schinke, Vanessa Dorneles, Judiciário e autoritarismo: regime autoritário (1964–1985), democracia e permanências. Rio de Janeiro: Lumen Juris, 2016

Schinke, Vanessa Dorneles, “O papel da Escola Superior de Guerra na sustentação do regime autoritário brasileiro ”, in Revista Direito e Práxis, v. 10, n. 3, p. 1955–1980, 2019. https://www.e-publicacoes.uerj.br/index.php/revistaceaju/article/view/34661/26355

Schinke, Vanessa Dorneles, “A assembleia nacional constituinte e as forças armadas: os trabalhos da subcomissão ”, in Revista Direito e Práxis, 2021. https://www.e-publicacoes.uerj.br/index.php/revistaceaju/article/view/52473/37200

Seligmann-Silva, Márcio, “Anistia e (in)justiça no Brasil: o dever de justiça e a impunidade”, in Literatura e Autoritarismo. Memórias da Repressão, 9, 2006, Santa Maria. https://w3.ufsm.br/literaturaeautoritarismo/revista/num09/art_02.php

Sikkink, Kathryn, “A Era da Responsabilização: a ascensão da responsabilização penal individual ”, in A anistia na era

da responsabilização: o Brasil em perspectiva internacional e comparada. Brasília: Ministério da Justiça, Comissão de Anistia; Oxford: Oxford University, Latin American Centre, 2011

Silva, A. M. D. Da, Ditadura e Justiça Militar no Brasil: A Atuação do Superior Tribunal Militar (1964–1980). Tese de Doutorado em História, Política e Bens Culturais. Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil – CPDOC, Rio de Janeiro, 2011

Silva, Francisco Carlos Teixeira da, “Crises da ditadura militar e o processo de abertura política no Brasil, 1974–1985”, in Ferreira, Jorge; Neves, Lucília Delgado de Almeida, O Brasil Republicano, O tempo da ditadura, Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2003, 243–28

Skidmore, Thomas, Brasil: de Castelo a Tancredo, Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1988

Supremo Tribunal Federal, Acórdão da ADPF nº 153, 2010, https://www.stf.gov.br Accessed on: 30 June 2021 Soares, Luiz Eduardo, Desmilitarizar: segurança pública e direitos humanos. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2019

Solís Delgadillo, Juan Mario, Los tiempos de la memoria en las agendas políticas de Argentina y Chile, Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 2015 Souza, A. B.; Silva, Angela M. D. Da, “A organização da Justiça Militar no Brasil: Império e República ”, in Estudos Históricos, 2016, maio–agosto, 29 (58), pp. 361–380

Stampa, Inez; Assunção, San R.; Hollanda, Cristina Buarque de, eds., Arquivos, democracia e ditadura: reflexões a partir dos 10 anos do Centro de Referência Memórias Reveladas do Arquivo Nacional. Curitiba, Appris, 2020

Tavares de Almeida, Maria Hermínia, “O Estado no Brasil contemporâneo: um passeio pela história”, in Carlos Ranulfo Melo, Manuel Alcántara Sáez, eds., A democracia brasileira: balanço e perspectivas para o século 21, Belo Horizonte: Editora UFMG, 2007, 17–37

Teles, Janaína de Almeida, “A abertura dos arquivos da ditadura militar e a luta dos familiares de mortos e desaparecidos políticos no Brasil”, in Diversitas FFLCH/USP, 2006. https://diversitas.fflch.usp.br/files/a%20abertura%20dos%20arquivos%20da%20ditadura.pdf

Teles, Janaina de Almeida, “A vala clandestina de Perus: entre o passado e o presente”, in InSURgência: Revista De Direitos E Movimentos Sociais, 2019, 4,1, 300–341. https://doi.org/10.26512/insurgencia.v4i1.28837

Teles, Janaína de Almeida, “‘Eliminar, sem deixar vestígios’: a distensão política e o desaparecimento forçado no Brasil”, in Revista

M. Estudos sobre a morte, os mortos e o morrer, Rio de Janeiro, v. 5, n. 10, jul./dez.2020

Teles, Janaína de Almeida, Memórias dos cárceres da ditadura militar: as lutas e os testemunhos dos presos políticos no Brasil, São Paulo, Tese de Doutorado, História/FFLCH-USP, 2011

Teles, Janaína de Almeida, “Mortos e desaparecidos políticos: um resgate da memória brasileira”, in Janaína Teles, ed., 2a. ed., Mortos e desaparecidos políticos: reparação ou impunidade¿, São Paulo, Humanitas/FFLCH/USP, 2001

Teles, Janaína de Almeida, “Os familiares de mortos e desaparecidos políticos e a luta por ‘verdade e justiça’ no Brasil”, in Edson Teles, Vladimir Safatle, eds., O que resta da ditadura: a exceção brasileira, São Paulo: Boitempo, 2010, 253–298

Teles, Janaína de Almeida, Os herdeiros da memória: as lutas dos familiares de mortos e desaparecidos políticos por “verdade e justiça” no Brasil, São Paulo, Dissertação de Mestrado, História/FFLCH-USP, 2005

Teles, Janaína de Almeida, “Vala clandestina de Perus: entre o passado e o presente”, in Revista InSURgência, Brasília, ano 4, v. 4, no. 1, 2018

Telles, Edson, Quinalha, Renan, “O alcance e os limites do discurso da Justiça de Transição no Brasil”, in Edson Teles, Renan Quinalha (eds.), Espectros da ditadura: da Comissão Nacional da Verdade ao Bolsonarismo, São Paulo: Autonomia Literária, 2020, 15–58

Thiesen, I.; Almeida, P.C., Lugares de memória da ditadura e a patrimonialização da experiência política. Museologia e Interdisciplinaridade. V.IV, n. 8, December 2015, 15–30

Toledo, Luiz Fernando, Desclassificação tarjada: o sigilo de documentos das Forças Armadas brasileiras no contexto da Lei de Acesso à Informação, Fundação Getúlio Vargas, São Paulo, 2021, p. 74. https://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace/handle/10438/30717

Toledo, Luiz Fernando, “Ministério da Saúde alega ‘interesse privativo’ de Bolsonaro para negar informações sobre crédito extraordinário”, in Fiquem Sabendo, 9. 11. 2021. https://fiquemsabendo.com.br/transparencia/ministerio-da-saude-alega-interesse-privativo-de-bolsonaro-para-negar-informacoes-sobre-credito-extraordinario/

Tosi, G. (et al.), Justiça de transição: direito à justiça, à memória e à verdade. João Pessoa: Editora da UFPB, 2014

Vala clandestina de Perus: desaparecidos políticos, um capítulo não encerrado da história brasileira. São Paulo: Instituto Macuco, 2012

Velasco e Cruz, Sebastião C., Martins, Carlos Estevam, “De Castello a Figueiredo: uma incursão na pré-História da ‘Abertura’”, in Bernardo Sorj, Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida, eds., Sociedade e política no Brasil pós-64., São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1984, 13–61

Zaverucha, Jorge, Melo Filho, H. C., “Superior Tribunal Militar: entre o autoritarismo e a democracia”, in Dados. 2004, 47 (4), pp. 763–797

Zaverucha, Jorge, “Relações civis-militares: o legado autoritário da Constituição brasileira de 1988”, in Safatle, Edson Teles e Wladimir, O que resta da ditadura: a exceção brasileira, São Paulo: Boitempo, 2010, 41–76, 41

www.cevro.cz/guide